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| Subject: | [Full-Disclosure] Re: Xfree86 video buffering? |
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| Date: | Fri, 25 Feb 2005 11:40:18 -0600 |
Stan Bubrouski <stan.bubrouski@gmail.com> wrote:
With this solution someone could intentionally crash your machine to avoid those routines from running. I'm not trying to put you down or anything, in fact I probably know less about video related stuff than most on the list, this just doesn't seem like the best way to do it. I have no better suggestions, I'll leave this one to the experts.
You've found a valid case where clear-on-shutdown breaks, but your solution doesn't solve the problem, it exacerbates it! Let's consider the threat here. - I'm looking at something sensitive on my screen. - I shut down my computer. ...some time passes... - Mallory boots my computer and reads out the buffers from my video card, thereby obtaining the sensitive information. By your proposal, we _intentionally_ leave the data on the video card until Mallory already has access to the machine, trusting that he'll be stupid enough to load our clear-on-startup video card drivers before dumping out the framebuffer. The alternative, to clear-on-shutdown, is obviously better under normal circumstances, since sensitive data are never left in the framebuffer. In an exceptional case such as the computer crashing and failing to clear the framebuffer, it's true that the data remain on the card. Note, however, that we're in the same situation post-crash that we'd _always_ be in under your proposed system. It's obvious that clear-on-startup is strictly worse than clear-on- shutdown; implementing the latter will prevent a casual observer from seeing anything sensitive on the screen at startup, but it doesn't actually grant you any more security, since the data are still physically on the card. Implementing both gives you a slight edge against a passive attacker in a small range of exceptional cases, so it might be the right way to do things. Has anyone ever noticed this behavior with Windows, say, after a crash? I'm not saying I have (haven't actually run a Windows machine regularly in years, so I probably wouldn't remember anyway), I'm just curious. -- Riad S. Wahby rsw@jfet.org _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
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