I think the joke is on you in this case. There is a large patch series of
which you judge the first steps only. Those steps introduce the
infrastructure and concepts into the kernel, and later patches will tweak
the exact numbers to values with more entropy. ONCE THEY EXISTING
INFRASTRUCTURE IS ACCEPTED AND DEBUGGED.
Maybe you don't understand that, I assume a lot of the other readers of this
list do. You don't plop a huge patch in the linux kernel in one chunk. You
do it in nice small, incremental and debuggable steps.
If Exec-shield is any model for what you plan to turn this into, my
comments still apply. If you like, I'll simply send out the same email
months from now when you "finalize" this patch into the level of
security you claim it to be able to provide (which will never happen,
since you won't be providing any bruteforce deterrence, so it doesn't
matter if you increase the randomization by a couple more bits).
I should also add that the stack randomization present in this patch and
that in exec-shield can be bypassed by tossing enough data into the
stack, like "/bin/sh" over and over, since the amount of randomization
is smaller than the stack itself. I should also note that the latest
output of paxtest I could find against exec-shield shows that the amount
of randomization for shared libraries is the same as in the patch you
sent to LKML. So if your argument is that you agree these values are
stupidly low, you're not saying much about your own "enterprise-grade"
software ;)
I would also like to correct a mistake in my previous mail. The glibc
issues are indeed fixed in the latest FC3 glibc, which was released on
December 27th, 2004, nearly 3 1/2 months after the bug was initially
reported. The glibc update was not released as a security update
however, so many users are still affected (like the two Fedora
developers I contacted).
-Brad
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