Ethical Hacking Learn to find vulnerabilities before the bad guys do! Gain real world hands on hacking experience in our state of the art hacking lab. Course designed and taught by expert instructors with years of penetration testing experience. 12 student maximum in every class. Certification attempt included in every package. | Computer Forensics Training at InfoSec Institute Gain the in-demand skills of a certified computer examiner, learn to recover trace data left behind by fraud, theft, and cybercrime perpetrators. Discover the source of computer crime and abuse at your organization so that it never happens again. All of our class sizes are guaranteed to be 12 students or less to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors. |

| Subject: | [Full-Disclosure] [OpenPKG-SA-2004.026] OpenPKG Security Advisory (apache) |
|---|---|
| Date: | Thu, 27 May 2004 15:55:09 +0200 |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ________________________________________________________________________ OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org openpkg-security@openpkg.org openpkg@openpkg.org OpenPKG-SA-2004.026 27-May-2004 ________________________________________________________________________ Package: apache (option "with_mod_ssl" only) Vulnerability: arbitrary code execution OpenPKG Specific: no Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages: OpenPKG CURRENT <= apache-1.3.31-20040524 >= apache-1.3.31-20040527 OpenPKG 2.0 <= apache-1.3.29-2.0.1 >= apache-1.3.29-2.0.2 OpenPKG 1.3 <= apache-1.3.28-1.3.3 >= apache-1.3.28-1.3.4 Dependent Packages: none Description: Georgi Guninski discovered [1] a stack-based buffer overflow in the "SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth" implementation of Apache's SSL/TLS extension module mod_ssl [0]. The overflow can occur if the Subject-DN in the client certificate exceeds 6KB in length and mod_ssl is configured to trust the issuing CA. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2004-0488 [2] to the problem. Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q apache" and "<prefix>/bin/rpm -qi apache | grep with_mod_ssl". If you have the "apache" package with option "with_mod_ssl" installed and its version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade (see Solution) [3][4]. Solution: Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release [5][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror location, verify its integrity [9], build a corresponding binary RPM from it [3] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [4]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.0, perform the following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust accordingly). $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org ftp> bin ftp> cd release/2.0/UPD ftp> get apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm ftp> bye $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild --with mod_ssl apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm $ su - # <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.*.rpm ________________________________________________________________________ References: [0] http://www.modssl.org/ [1] http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2004-May/021610.html [2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0488 [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/apache-1.3.28-1.3.4.src.rpm [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.0/UPD/apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/ [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.0/UPD/ [9] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature ________________________________________________________________________ For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/ for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory. ________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org> iD8DBQFAtfL+gHWT4GPEy58RAiHXAJ9sFlOogbuUgnwzcLAam4kLK2jo/ACffjv6 giSMaA/9esxIATuQipW17rg= =agtL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
| <Prev in Thread] | Current Thread | [Next in Thread> |
|---|---|---|
| ||
| Previous by Date: | RE: [Full-Disclosure] Cisco's stolen code, Ng, Kenneth (US) |
|---|---|
| Next by Date: | Re: [Full-Disclosure] New security ezine released, Nick FitzGerald |
| Previous by Thread: | [Full-Disclosure] [ GLSA 200405-23 ] Heimdal: Kerberos 4 buffer overflow in kadmin, Kurt Lieber |
| Next by Thread: | [Full-Disclosure] Rogers Cable Canada, http-equiv@excite.com |
| Indexes: | [Date] [Thread] [Top] [All Lists] |