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[Full-Disclosure] [OpenPKG-SA-2004.026] OpenPKG Security Advisory (apach

Subject: [Full-Disclosure] [OpenPKG-SA-2004.026] OpenPKG Security Advisory (apache)
Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 15:55:09 +0200
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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@openpkg.org                         openpkg@openpkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2004.026                                          27-May-2004
________________________________________________________________________

Package:             apache (option "with_mod_ssl" only)
Vulnerability:       arbitrary code execution
OpenPKG Specific:    no

Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:        Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT      <= apache-1.3.31-20040524 >= apache-1.3.31-20040527
OpenPKG 2.0          <= apache-1.3.29-2.0.1    >= apache-1.3.29-2.0.2
OpenPKG 1.3          <= apache-1.3.28-1.3.3    >= apache-1.3.28-1.3.4

Dependent Packages:  none

Description:
  Georgi Guninski discovered [1] a stack-based buffer overflow in
  the "SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth" implementation of Apache's SSL/TLS
  extension module mod_ssl [0]. The overflow can occur if the Subject-DN
  in the client certificate exceeds 6KB in length and mod_ssl is
  configured to trust the issuing CA. The Common Vulnerabilities and
  Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2004-0488 [2] to the
  problem.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
  apache" and "<prefix>/bin/rpm -qi apache | grep with_mod_ssl". If you
  have the "apache" package with option "with_mod_ssl" installed and its
  version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately
  upgrade (see Solution) [3][4].

Solution:
  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  [5][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror
  location, verify its integrity [9], build a corresponding binary RPM
  from it [3] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
  binary RPM [4]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.0, perform the
  following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
  other releases adjust accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  ftp> bin
  ftp> cd release/2.0/UPD
  ftp> get apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm
  ftp> bye
  $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm
  $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild --with mod_ssl 
apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm
  $ su -
  # <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.*.rpm
________________________________________________________________________

References:
  [0] http://www.modssl.org/
  [1] http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2004-May/021610.html
  [2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0488
  [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
  [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/apache-1.3.28-1.3.4.src.rpm
  [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.0/UPD/apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm
  [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/
  [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.0/UPD/
  [9] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
________________________________________________________________________

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