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| Subject: | Re: Administrivia: Which virus is this? |
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| Date: | Tue, 30 Nov 2004 11:12:18 +1300 |
Jose Nazario wrote:
as a followup to marc's excellent reminder of links, a couple of links
related to this that people may want to know about ...
vgrep: http://www.virusbtn.com/resources/vgrep/
CME (from MITRE, forthcoming):
http://www.cbronline.com/article_news.asp?guid=11D11704-DE5B-45BD-AF4B-45D8F44E055C
vgrep is a great way to track virus names across vendors. ...
Indeed, but is even less likely to be of use to folk asking "What does foobar.exe do?"-style questions, as they either do not have a (working, current) virus scanner, or have something their scanner does not detect, so don't have a _malware name_ to start searching from...
... the CME one would just standardize the names and provide a common handle much like the CVE does (at least it appears so at this point according to the article).
CME is not about names. Common Malware Enumeration See -- "enumeration". It's more about cataloging or indexing. The idea is that there will be a universal referrent for (major, important) malware that can be used by any and all, regardless of the "human friendly" name that any or all may also attach to the beast. A slightly better link on the CME angle because it is is not filtered through the clue-factor of a CBR journalist (everything in the title and first paragraph of the CBR article is simply wrong) is this recent, archived SANS Handler's Diary page: http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?date=2004-11-23 Scroll down to the item "Open Letter To Anti-Virus Software Companies - A Response" where you can see the entire letter reported in the CBR article Jose cited. _Before_ reading that though, follow the back- links in this Handler's Diary to the two earlier items -- a original letter from Chris Mosby bemoaning the lack of naming standardization and co-ordination between vendors (a letter that, IMNSHO, shows a singular lack of grip from a supposed/self-appointed expert who advises others about antivirus issues, but I digress -- maybe I'll address that more fully later/elsewhere) and SANS CTO Johannes Ullrich's response to Mosby's letter. Anyway, if you read the "CME letter", you will see that ... Limited operational capability is expected 1Q05; this phase will concentrate on the most important threats, including the recent Beagle/Bagle variants. The role of US-CERT will be to assign a CME identifier (e.g., CME-1234567) to each new, unique threat and to include additional incident response information when available. ... As the CME identifier is a number, it does not address the _name_, and vendors are quite free to (and you can be sure they will continue to) keep using whatever other identifying names they choose for each piece of malware. In short, CME is (to use a local NZ/Australian idiom) a Claytons naming standardization; "the naming standardization you have when you are not having naming standardization". McAfee will still call members of the Bagle family, Bagle and Symantec will still call them Beagle (of course, to be churlish to my churlish comment, Symantec may just go and finally change this family name, but as a generalization across other families, the point will still stand). This likely explains why McAfee and Symantec are so favourably disposed to CME. Being the naming standardization you have when you are not having naming standardization, these vendors can unashamedly claim that they are "working together to solve the challenges surrounding the 'Virus Name Game'", while continuing doing pretty much the same as they always have... That's the beauty of Claytons solutions...
ideally some effort (maybe the CME) would contain info on ports bound and services used, we'll see. i'm hopeful that someone will get a network signature in the entries, as most AV vendors often lack detail on that sort of thing (in favor of detail on effects on the host, ie registry keys changed and DLL injections performed).
My understanding of the CME is that some basic descriptive material will be included in its entries, though the precise content and level of detail likely to be recorded is not clear to me at the moment. -- Nick FitzGerald Computer Virus Consulting Ltd. Ph/FAX: +64 3 3529854
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