Ethical Hacking Learn to find vulnerabilities before the bad guys do! Gain real world hands on hacking experience in our state of the art hacking lab. Course designed and taught by expert instructors with years of penetration testing experience. 12 student maximum in every class. Certification attempt included in every package. | Computer Forensics Training at InfoSec Institute Gain the in-demand skills of a certified computer examiner, learn to recover trace data left behind by fraud, theft, and cybercrime perpetrators. Discover the source of computer crime and abuse at your organization so that it never happens again. All of our class sizes are guaranteed to be 12 students or less to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors. |

| Subject: | Re: Password complexity - improvement |
|---|---|
| Date: | Fri, 17 Aug 2007 01:49:26 +0200 |
On 2007-08-16 Thor (Hammer of God) wrote:
Ah.... NOW I see what you mean... As in, if you required all 4 complexity requirements, and you knew the first three characters were Aa1, then you'd know for a fact that the last character had to be a "special" character...
Not exactly. By requiring characters from all 4 groups to be present in the password you reduce the number of passwords attacker must brute- force (because he can skip certain passwords now). How much that will gain him effectively depends on the length of the passwords and the number of special characters. I agree that for passwords of reasonable length and with an adequate number of special characters the loss will indeed be negligible, but I still think you need to take this effect into consideration before implementing a policy like that.
Only problem with that is that a BF attack does not give us one character at a time. You have to "crack" the hash in singularity...
I am aware of that. Regards Ansgar Wiechers -- "The Mac OS X kernel should never panic because, when it does, it seriously inconveniences the user." --http://developer.apple.com/technotes/tn2004/tn2118.html
| Previous by Date: | RE: Password complexity - improvement, Jonathan Kazmierczyk |
|---|---|
| Next by Date: | RE: Password complexity - improvement, Adrian Marsden |
| Previous by Thread: | RE: Password complexity - improvement, Thor (Hammer of God) |
| Next by Thread: | RE: Password complexity - improvement, James D. Stallard |
| Indexes: | [Date] [Thread] [Top] [All Lists] |