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| Subject: | RE: Whole disk encryption |
|---|---|
| Date: | Fri, 25 Aug 2006 10:03:10 -0600 |
-----Original Message----- From: Erik Anderson [mailto:eanders@pobox.com] Sent: Thursday, August 24, 2006 12:07 PM To: focus-ms@securityfocus.com Subject: RE: Whole disk encryption
-----Original Message----- From: Sarah [mailto:sfelske@bgsu.edu] Sent: Thursday, August 24, 2006 11:48 AM To: focus-ms@securityfocus.com Subject: Whole disk encryption What is the consensus of the group on the use of whole disk encryption
in
an enterprise environment?
Why? You only need to protect the data not the whole OS. It causes too many problems. I don't recommend creating a headache for yourself when
you >only need to protect some data.
I recommend creating an encrypted partition and mounting an encrypted
file
system on that partition.
In addition there are plenty of 3rd party software packages out there
that
have encrypted filter drivers or will allow you to create an encrypted virtual disk. You use that disk just as any secondary disk. The encryption becomes transparent to you.
The problem comes when data that would be encrypted in a folder or partition is opened and used in OS swap space or other temporary containers. You can't tell how long that data, now decrypted, will remain accessible. I'll let you all decide how simple or hard it would be to access this data. I know I've been surprised how much you can pull back with forensic tools. Each system (full-disk and file/folder-level) have their bonuses and drawbacks but if people are truly concerned about encrypting their data they should consider full-disk encryption. If simple static storage of "finished" data is all that is required then perhaps file/folder encryption is enough but if you have users that may not save things in the correct, encrypted folder or would be required to encrypt the document themselves perhaps full disk is better to eliminate that variable.
Make sure to backup the keys somewhere or you will permanently loose everything if something happens to the key.
Amen brother. Many of the full-disk systems I've been reviewing have a centralized management console that would allow an admin to either recreate the key or access the encrypted system with an "admin key" to help alleviate the "I forgot my password" issues. Samuel Mason, CISSP Data Security Specialist Montana State Fund --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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