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Network Security Focus-Microsoft
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Re: Should webservers, eg. IIS 6 have anti--virus installed on them?

Subject: Re: Should webservers, eg. IIS 6 have anti--virus installed on them?
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2005 15:41:33 -0700
Do I want A/V as another onion layer skin?  You betcha.

Will I have a heart attack if I see the tale tell sign of Trend's red 'you have a virus' on a server or workstation? Oh you bet. Why? Because the goal is that the bad stuff never makes it in that far. If I see anything other than an Eicar test virus up there it means my onion layers are broken and I need to trace back what happened and beef up my defenses.

The goal is that a/v never kicks in because the bad stuff is all out there.

What's the saying ..... "know thy systems"?


Wozny, Scott (US - New York) wrote:

You're absolutely right. It's part risk analysis, part cost/benefit
analysis. You either choose to accept the risk of pushing out defs
blind because it costs too much in manpower and lost time OR you vet the
sigs and accept the cost of doing so in manpower and that you'll be
exposed for longer but reduce the chance of a repeat of that fateful
Friday, as rare an occurrence as it is, OR you do something in between
that fits for you.


However, _all_ the blame is not on the vendor (though it was a massive
screw-up on their part).  There's nothing in that software suite that
_requires_ all defs be pushed immediately, and it used to be that no-one
did.  Most of us have just gotten too comfortable with def updates
because problems with sigs so rarely happens.  If "other vendors"
patches didn't have so many unforeseen side effects, more people would
push them without testing as well because we're all over worked and we
make those cost / benefit decisions every day.

The concern I had which I wanted to address was with a perceived
implication that it's best to leave AV off IIS boxes (the question this
thread is addressing) because it regularly contains new, possibly
untested code and IMHO that, by itself, does not present a sufficient
risk offset the numerous other benefits AV provides (no matter how
_sure_ you're IIS server is locked down).  The event in question had, at
best, a tenuous cause / effect relationship with mitigating factors
which could have prevented it that organizations _chose_ to ignore.  It
doesn't matter that everybody does it.  Everybody got busted.  So we
dust ourselves off and figure out the best way to deal with it.  In some
situations, that's to make a conscious choice that enough controls are
in place that AV adds more hassle than it's worth and in _some_
situations that's to take at the servers that are administered by
professionals and put an additional line of defense on them in case
these administrators turn out to be human and make a mistake that AV
might be able to catch.  If the term "defense in depth" is unappealing
and too fuzzily defined for you, think of it as "infosec redundancy".
:)

Scott

-----Original Message-----
From: Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz - SBS Rocks [MVP]
[mailto:sbradcpa@pacbell.net] Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 7:57 PM
To: Wozny, Scott (US - New York)
Cc: Harlan Carvey; focus-ms@securityfocus.com; jeff@shawgo.com
Subject: Re: Should webservers, eg. IIS 6 have anti--virus installed on
them?



Can you honestly say that you vet every dat file that comes your way in the same manner that your do security patch testing on all of your systems? Show of virtual hands on this list... how many honestly have the resources to put the same testbed energy into a/v sig updates as they do patch deployment? Test it on lab settings/virtual system/canaries in the office and then roll it out... for all your sized


operations? There are some firms that indeed do this. There are many, however, that do not. I personally don't have the resources [nor the a/v deployment set in such a way] that I can do this. Nor do I feel that the few issues that I have had with allowing a/v to immediately deploy versus the issues I might have if I don't automate the process mean that I'm changing my methods.

But...obviously neither did several railroads in Japan, a few Japanese newspapers and other folks that were also affected and obviously didn't vet the a/v sigs either.

As often as they are updating these days, the risk of not pushing them out as they come in has to be weighed with the potential for issues when

not testing them. I'm sorry but this was a A/V dat sig update that affected the XP sp2 the hardest of all. Trend admitted they screwed up.

As fast as that nailed and flatlined my entire network... there's no way

that should have left Trend's doorstep and been pushed to boxes.  It was

an immediate CPU freeze up that had me booting into safe mode to get my machines back in working mode.

Even Microsoft has expanded their patch testing process to include external more real life testers. Sorry, but I do not accept that this dat file freeze up was in any way an acceptable screw up ...and obviously and unfortunately neither does Wall Street and analysts
...etc....


All I'm saying is we've [I've?] grown complacent and many of us forget that potentially every hour on the hour new untested code is on our boxes. Add that to your risk factors and decide accordingly.

Show me an a/v software and this year few of them haven't had their own security issues as well.

It's called a bit of risk analysis... what's the benefit....what's the risk. And no matter what size of firm you are... we all play the game, we just come to different conclusions. Ergo this thread which asked... what's the risk of webservers having a/v on them?

I think the answer is.. it depends. There may not be a best practice and instead each one of us needs to perform our own risk analysis and decide accordingly [I really don't like 'best practices' as a concept anyway - what's best for me... won't be best for the guy down the
street]


Nah... Dos 5, Wordstar and Lotus 123. Now those were killer apps... I still have a Compaq Portable luggable in our museum that boots if you want to try it. In the meantime, excuse me while I go update my Firefox..again and ensure my Greasemonkey is on whatever version that isn't vulnerable.

Wozny, Scott (US - New York) wrote:



Are you actually condemning AV because administrators blindly trusted
the AV sig updates they received and pushed them to live systems


without


testing them at all?  Who, precisely, wasn't doing their due diligence?


Computing is complicated. If one isn't implementing and following
procedures to protect oneself from screw-ups in other organizations one
depends upon, then we all really ought to roll back to DOS 6.22 and


stay


there.

If I misunderstood your implication, please correct me.  Otherwise, I
intend to keep AV in my bag of tricks.

Scott

-----Original Message-----
From: focus-ms-return-8320-swozny=deloitte.com@securityfocus.com
[mailto:focus-ms-return-8320-swozny=deloitte.com@securityfocus.com] On
Behalf Of Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz - SBS Rocks [MVP]
Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 3:32 AM
To: Harlan Carvey
Cc: focus-ms@securityfocus.com; jeff@shawgo.com
Subject: Re: Should webservers, eg. IIS 6 have anti--virus installed on
them?


Not to mention ..if you were anywhere near a live system at 3:45 p.m Pacific time on a certain Friday when someone didn't do their due diligence and flatlined every single one of my workstations and even nailed my server....you might make you look at antivirus in a new
light....


A/V is just introduction of new... possibly untested code on a machine .... possibly every hour on the hour....

http://silverstr.ufies.org/blog/archives/000844.html

Harlan Carvey wrote:





So far, this is has been an interesting discussion,
but beneath it all, I'm seeing what I think is a
disturbing trend.







Antivirus needs to be part of the overall security
plan for all Windows machines - it's just part of
the cost of doing business - the cost of the
software, maintenance, and CPU overhead.






I'm seeing absolutist statements like the one above,
and it bothers me.


If a web server is just a web server, the content is
served to the client, going outbound...not coming into
the server.  If the purpose of the system is to take
known-good pages (from the owner) and make them
available to the public (over ports 80 and 443), then
what is the point of A/V software?

I'm seeing a lot of people say that A/V software is
necessary, and that it's part of a 'holistic' or
'defense in depth' approach, but this really sounds
more like Dilbert's "buzz word bingo" than anything
else.







Certainly, servers need to be patched, firewalled,
isolated, and locked down. Additionally, code
should be audited for vulnerability to XSS and SQL
injection.






Yes, without a doubt.  This is all part of good
administration.







None of these things are perfect. Not that AV is
perfect, but it is another layer of defense - making
it part of that "Defense in Depth" strategy.






But, defense against what?







AV has grown into more than just defense against
viruses. It is often effective against worm code,
and some AV has identified common hacking tools
(e.g. - NetCat) as something that doesn't belong on
most systems. You can argue the viability of this
move, but most companies - if they have a security
team - have less that 0.1% of their machines which
maybe should have it there.






"something that doesn't belong on most systems"?  How
does it get there?  If a web server is properly
configured and managed, then perhaps the most likely
means of infection is from the administrator
himself...and in such cases, A/V software is useless.







AV needs to be part of the cost of running Windows -
for better or for worse.






Again, I'm seeing this as an approach that's being
parrotted, rather than thought out.  I'm not saying
that MS products are perfect...not at all.  But what I
am saying is that using proper administration
principles, those that have been espoused for well
beyond the past decade, paying additional money to add
yet another software package to a web server simply
doesn't make good business sense.

Why pay more money for another application to
maintain, and another set of logs that you're not
reviewing anyway?

Several years ago, Dave LeBlanc set up an IIS 4.0
server in accordance with simple common sense, and it
was not vulnerable to Code Red...a full year before
Code Red was launched.

When Code Red was launched, A/V software would not
have helped.  However, if the .hta script mapping had
been disabled the day before Code Red came out, then
guess what?  No problems.

Should systems have A/V software in place? Maybe...depending upon the function and purpose of the
system. Does it make sense? Does it make good
business sense? What's the business
reason/justification for installing another software
package (for $$) over disabling current functionality
(which doesn't cost anything)?


Harlan



------------------------------------------
Harlan Carvey, CISSP
"Windows Forensics and Incident Recovery"
http://www.windows-ir.com
http://windowsir.blogspot.com
------------------------------------------

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