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| Subject: | RE: Should webservers, eg. IIS 6 have anti--virus installed on them? |
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| Date: | Wed, 20 Jul 2005 12:28:28 -0400 |
I take a more community mind approach to security. Yes, I can set ACLs to read and not execute, but that doesn't stop proliferation of the virus to others. As much as I don't want my server infected, I don't want reports that people visiting my site have become infected because of files they downloaded. Setting to read only can't protect me from that. With the logic you give, I don't need AV on my file servers either. As for the rest, It's obvious we disagree because the logic that we don't know what the next threat may be holds with me, or that we could have missed something when securing the server (again that infallibility thing) holds with me. So I'll agree to disagree. I gave my reasoning, if you don't agree, that's ok, but it's not helping anyone for me to continue to repeat myself. And correct that an A/V product without a definition for a virus is useless, unless you use one like I do that has heuristic scanning adding some level of protection. Also, many AV vendors now have definition for well-known "hacker tools" (I hate term, but can't think of a better one). Many worms and script-kiddies use the vulnerability to drop in files that do the real damage. Drop in an FTP server (reason for firewall), backdoor (reason for firewall), keylogger, whatever, and execute as SYSTEM. If there was no patch for the vulnerability, wouldn't it be nice to an AV product to grab those? And lastly if you state that AV or whatever is not needed if you properly secure your systems, that is an attitude of infallibility, and therefore I caution. You can not guarantee security! You may not need AV, but not for that reason. -----Original Message----- From: Harlan Carvey [mailto:keydet89@yahoo.com] Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 11:31 AM To: focus-ms@securityfocus.com Cc: jeff@shawgo.com; Brady McClenon Subject: RE: Should webservers, eg. IIS 6 have anti--virus installed on them? Brady,
If what I said was taken to be a cheap shot I apologize to all. It was meant to be a warning to never take the attitude that one is infallible,
Part of the reason I took your comment the way I did was b/c no one in the thread, that I could see, was taking the attitude that they were infallible. In fact, it appears to me that it's quite the opposite...the prevailing attitude seems to be that A/V software should be installed "just in case", and because "you can't possibly cover everything". All in all, I felt that your warning was about as appropriate as saying something like, "don't look directly at the sun"...okay, good advice, but what did that have to do with the thread?
I'll digress a bit now and say this. No, an AV product is not a necessity on an IIS server, but then neither is a firewall. They are both just ways to minimize risk, and I can not see how anyone can oppose one and advocate the other.
Again, I'm not following you. If you've configured your server so that it's only a web server, and confirmed that the only open port is port 80 (and perhaps port 443), what's the point of the firewall? What ports would you then be blocking? If a stateful inspection firewall or application proxy is used, I wouldn't load either one on the same system as the web server. With regards to minimizing risk, I have to ask...what risk? Based on what I'm seeing in the thread so far, the risks imposed to the system largely occur when it ceases to be *just* a firewall. Some respondants have mentioned SMTP servers, file sharing, FTP servers, etc...at which point, the web server ceases to be *just* a web server and includes other services. The function/role of the box has changed, and should be considered.
Would I recommend running IIS without either? No. If the added cost of either is too costly then let management make that call, but as a sys admin never rule out any security measure based on cost.
I think you're making a very valid point here, though perhaps not the one you intended. You say that the sys admin should not rule out any security measure based on cost. In my experience, not a great many sysadmins are security professionals - though some may be. My point is that I'm not sure that the run-of-the-mill sysadmin is really qualified to make the call. Let's say Joe SysAdmin does install the A/V software on a web server...what's his reasoning for doing so? Most of the reasons I've seen so far have been pretty ethereal...I've read statements about "unknown threats", but that logic doesn't hold. Unknown by whom? If it's unknown to the A/V vendor, then what good is the software product going to do? I've also received emails/responses from folks talking about some of the threats we've seen. One respondant (I'll go out on a limb here and guess that he was/is a sysadmin) stated to me that he "saw" an A/V product block a SQL Spida worm infection. IMHO, there are larger issues at work here, b/c if that admin didn't understand how Spida does what it does (ie, look for blank 'sa' accounts), in the larger scheme of things, A/V software (on a database server in this case) is only a band-aid solution and doesn't address the real issue(s).
What are we trying to protect ourselves from with AV? Well, except for the obvious viruses, worms and trojan horse answer, which seems smartass, I do know. What's the next threat going to be? No one knows that either. My system is fully patched and properly secured. Why do I need AV? Why do I need a firewall? Answer: To minimize risk
against what you, or your product vendor didn't see coming, or the vulnerability that is discover and disclosed to the public before a patch, or other solution was released or found. Yes, they are both band-aid approaches, but sometimes band-aids is all you have.
Again, I ask you...if the exploit is previously unknown, how is an A/V product going to protect you? If it's "unknown", then presumably the A/V vendor doesn't know about it either...so what good will their product do you?
AV software, firewalls, IDS systems, (I'm sure more could be named but I'm drawing a blank). They're all really band-aid approaches. If we could guarantee the security of our systems, none of them are needed. Unfortunately, we can not.
That argument doesn't make any sense at all, really. You're saying that we can't guarantee security, which I agree with. Security is not a point solution, it's a process. But you're recommending point solutions. If an exploit is previously unknown, how is A/V software going to help you? If it's not known, and especially if it's not known by the vendor, what good is the product going to do you? Firewalls might work, but if you've already got the port closed on the system...ie, your web server isn't running an FTP server, too...then what's the point? And IDS...*if* you've had the foresight to purchase an IDS based on heuristics, why would you just put that on the web server?
I also think it's being lost that a lot of web servers are not single admin, or a group of admin/developers posting content.
Then that is a security issue in and of itself, and one in which installing A/V software is NOT the best approach. After all, when you've got multiple admins on the system, what is to prevent one of them from disabling the A/V software all together.
I work in academia and know a few other colleges that use IIS to give student space to create their own personal web page. Many ISPs give clients space too. Can it honestly be said that these admins don't need to install an AV client, or that it might be a good idea?
What would be the point? Why not simply set ACLs so that files can be read but not executed? Or why not reject all files in which the first two bytes read "MZ"? Also, what is the threat of a student uploading a malware to a web server? If the malware cannot execute on the web server itself due to ACLs, then to what risk is the web server exposed? Sure, if someone else comes along and downloads and executes the malware, they will be infected, but as long as the malware is sitting on the system, what harm is it doing? I have copies of SubSeven on my system at home...but none of them are running. Harlan ------------------------------------------ Harlan Carvey, CISSP "Windows Forensics and Incident Recovery" http://www.windows-ir.com http://windowsir.blogspot.com ------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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