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Network Security Focus-IDS
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RE: RE: IDS vs. IPS deployment feedback

Subject: RE: RE: IDS vs. IPS deployment feedback
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2006 08:30:51 -0800

If by firewall, you mean a proxy which validates protocols 
and is in default deny mode, then you are just wrong.

If I don't have a proxy for it, I don't let the traffic through works
just fine.

An IPS looks at stuff on the wire, decides what is bad, and blocks it.
A real firewall looks at stuff on the wire, decides what is good, 
and allows it. A real firewall hooks into everything (servers, 
network equipment, desktops...).

Proxy firewalls make up a small (and shrinking) percentage of the market
of firewalls. And having worked with over 500 different companies, my
experience is that proxy-based firewalls are rarely deployed in the
manner you describe. The default deny from unknown or unallowed
protocols is almost ALWAYS turned off because it breaks some important
businesses system that was poorly coded. Furthermore, a proxy validating
protocols still cannot stop a lot of exploits. Plenty of exploits live
quite comfortably inside the RFC-specs for a protocol. And in this case,
your proxy-firewall would do nothing to stop them. 

Most firewalls have no insight into application-layer content. And most
exploits are application-layer exploits. This isn't just some insane
idea, it's a fact. You can ignore this and tell yourself 10000 times you
don't need no stinkin' IPS, but the cold hard stiff fact is: firewalls
are not sufficient protection for most organizations. 

Once you have a firewall in place, you need a system which 
analyses logs and traffic which gets through your firewall.

Which is why you sandwich your firewall with a good IPS, so you can see
what gets through and block it - if necessary.

_____________________________________
Andrew Plato, CISSP, CISM
President/Principal Consultant
ANITIAN ENTERPRISE SECURITY

Your Expert Partner for Security & Networking

3800 SW Cedar Hills Blvd, Suite 280
Beaverton, OR 97005
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503-214-8069 Fax
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www.anitian.com
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