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Network Security Focus-IDS
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Re: on TASL correlation rules

Subject: Re: on TASL correlation rules
Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2005 08:46:30 -0300
"I think its a dirty little secret that much fewer customers customize
NIDS rules than the NIDS vendors think..."

Totally true.

I believe that's because they sell their products as something that
doesn't need to be customized. I like to say that IDSes are more like
ERP systems than Antivirus. A lot of customization is required to make
it work.

Regards,

Augusto.


On 12/23/05, Anton Chuvakin <anton@chuvakin.org> wrote:
Ron and all,

In general though, the issue we've found while writing these types of rules
is that whatever the algorithm, there is always a trade off between being
exact and being general.
That is *exactly* the discussion I wanted to start! Thanks for picking
it up. When one provides canned correlation rules (such as your TASL
scripts), this question comes up in full force. And, unlike NIDS
rules, where people expect them to work pretty much out of the box (I
think its a dirty little secret that much fewer customers customize
NIDS rules than the NIDS vendors think...), this one gets real
subjective real quick.  And this is where the site-specific rules or
scripts come in.

Site-specific rules can get much more interesting. For example, writing
a rule that can alert on any "SSH login failure" not coming from the
SOC is very simple, but you have to know about the DNS server, the SOC
and the trust relationship between them before hand.
This is one of my favorite examples: its an extremely simple and just
as useful custom rule ("if SSH not from SOC, alert") but an impossible
default vendor -provided rule.  The main question is: how many people
will go and create it? Will the "NIDS disease" (mentioned above) hit
it as well and thus devalue the correlation software?

Best,
--
Anton Chuvakin, Ph.D., GCIA, GCIH, GCFA
     http://www.chuvakin.org
 http://www.securitywarrior.com

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--
Augusto Paes de Barros, CISSP-ISSAP(r)
http://www.paesdebarros.com.br/indexpb.html

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