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| Subject: | RE: IDS alerts / second - Correlation - Virtualization |
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| Date: | Mon, 25 Jul 2005 17:34:55 -0400 |
David writes: "You have to detect before you can block." While I agree that this is generally true in practice, it is not required to be true. I believe that SYN-cookies are a good example of attack protection (prevention?) prior to detection. If the IPS is an inline product with the capability to potentially modify (not just drop) any packet on the wire, a whole new world of possibilities opens up beyond "inspect and drop". Paul -----Original Message----- From: Swift, David [mailto:dswift@ipolicynetworks.com] Sent: Sunday, July 24, 2005 4:31 PM To: Frank Knobbe; Nathan Davidson Cc: focus-ids@securityfocus.com Subject: RE: IDS alerts / second - Correlation - Virtualization Actually, I disagree with the restated number of alerts (though a common scale was not used). By nature, any IPS has to do IDS first. You have to detect before you can block. Therefore the number of IDS events will dramatically exceed the number of IPS events. IPS will always be a subset of IDS. Also, please note than many vendors (iPolicy included), are using correlation tools to tune the system to the deployed network. We work with EEye's Retina product. Retina scans the internal hosts (by IP), and creates a database of OS, Application and Ports that are open on the given network. Then the data is fed back into the IPS engine and Firewall to intelligently turn on signatures to block events that the protected network is vulnerable to, firewall unwanted ports, and ideally to turn off alerting for events the protected network is not vulnerable to. With virtualized products like the iPolicy Intrusion Prevention Firewall, a security domain with policies for each type of network (Windows, Unix, Mac...), can be created with different applied IDS/IPS/FW rules on the same box based on the internal network to be protected in order to reduce the number of false positives in IDS and increase IPS effectiveness. David Swift Sr. Systems Engineer dswift@ipolicynet.com CISSP, MCSE, MCNE, CCNA, AIX-CSA, SUN-CSA -----Original Message----- From: Frank Knobbe [mailto:frank@knobbe.us] Sent: Friday, July 22, 2005 4:39 PM To: Nathan Davidson Cc: focus-ids@securityfocus.com Subject: RE: IDS evaluations procedures On Sat, 2005-07-16 at 12:42 -0400, Nathan Davidson wrote:
To make things easier to compare let us say that the IPS and IDS have the SAME signatures/policy and they both identify all of the malicious traffic: The IPS will create 10 alerts/sec The IDS will create 100 alerts/sec
Uhm... then the IDS is not configured properly. IPSes seem to filter proactively, that means based on assumptions. It assumes that your server is vulnerable against xyz and blocks it. But the server doesn't have to be vulnerable. You can deploy an IDS as an ADS, that is, Attack Detection System. As such it would alert on every xyz packet that look suspicious and which the IDS thinks may cause harm to your server. But you can also deploy an IDS as an ...well... Intrusion Detection System. Configured like that, it doesn't make assumptions and doesn't care if it sees xyz hitting the server. It cares what the server responds with to xyz. If it detects an abnormal response, or outright hostile traffic (i.e. signature of a botnet c&c channel join), then it issues an alert, and only then. Given that, the math is as follows: ADS: 100 alerts /sec IPS: 10 alerts /sec IDS: 1 alert /incident I think the IDS has a much higher security ROI (oops, I said the evil word) than an IPS. The IPS is a broad-sword. The IDS, properly deploy and managed, is a sensitive detector, not a noisy alarm bell. It doesn't alert on every thrust of a sword, it only alerts when you bleed. Regards, Frank PS: I sometimes wonder if the I-have-more-alerts-than-you-stick-waving in the IDS market contributed to the misuse of IDS systems.... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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