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| Subject: | RE: IDS evaluations procedures |
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| Date: | Tue, 12 Jul 2005 17:33:03 -0400 |
Hi Dave, That's always an interesting question - how do you evaluate detection systems when all they respond to is known exploits? Yes, it's easy to launch all known exploits against a detection system using one of the many vulnerability scanners out there, but how do you test whether or not the detection system will respond (and hopefully block) zero-day attacks? Especially where the attack (and associated vulnerability) is not known yet? Just look at the devastating impact of recent worms that effectively bypassed all detection systems as they were not programmed to look for the exploit that they didn't know about... Whilst you're moving in the right direction by detecting anomalies, you have to be very careful as to how accurate this is. What technologies are being used to detect the anomalies? How many false positives do such detection methods invoke? What IS an anomaly? What it such an anomaly is in fact a surge in an increase in valid traffic due to heightened end-of-day activity or spikes in web usage? To specifically answer your question, look at current attack weather reports - you'll see approximately 15-20% of perimeter traffic is in fact worms trying to propagate. Any evaluation should be designed with this in mind. ..but more importantly, make sure you're evaluating something that will do the job in hand and doesn't lead you up the garden path with inaccurate marketing collateral! :) Regards, Tim -----Original Message----- From: david.sames@sparta.com [mailto:david.sames@sparta.com] Sent: 12 July 2005 03:40 To: focus-ids@securityfocus.com Subject: IDS evaluations procedures I'm in the process of developing test procedures for evaluating an internal anomaly-based detection system. I'd like to construct a test set of nominal data peppered with attack data. What is a reasonable ratio of attack data to "normal" traffic that is representative of "real" systems. Thanks, Dave -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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