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| Subject: | Re: IDS: Snort detecting distributed syn floods |
|---|---|
| Date: | Fri, 21 Jan 2005 04:09:47 +0000 |
On Tue, 2005-01-18 at 18:37 +0000, nick black wrote:
- Should the three-way handshake complete, the IPS SNAT's a
connection to the original dest, claiming to be the source.
The server will respond; should it not, the IPS can attempt
to determine why, perhaps lowering RED/etc thresholds if the
server appears already overwhelmed. If the server does indeed
respond with a SYN-ACK, the IPS need merely apply a constant
delta to SN's in both directions.
If I'm understanding you correctly, for a 'good' TCP connection (ie. an actual connection rather than a (spoofed) SYN packet), your IPS essentially establishes the three-way-handshake with the originating host and sets up a connection *before* actually establishing this three-way handshake with the *real* destination host. Purely out of (academic) interest, have you considered the implications of this to the client host, as this is a non-standard use of TCP/IP? I'm guessing that if the real destination host doesn't respond, you're simply resetting the TCP connection, but depending upon the protocol and application, this could prove extremely confusing to pieces of software coded with the assumption that (as per the way that TCP is supposed to work) the successful negotiation of a three way handshake indicates that the destination host is there. I can't think of any specific examples (not that I'd have many to hand in any case - my coding of anything involving sockets has been extremely sparse) of this breaking anything in production, but it's quite possible that this could break applications which rely on this assumption - causing erroneous results, unnecessary allocation of resources, unpredictable error messages from client software, etc. As a purely hypothetical example (which I do have a fair amount experience with the underlying technology of), it's assumptions such as the above (that the successful negotiation of a three-way handshake indicates that the host I'm wanting to talk to is there) which dictate error codes; for a VPN client which thinks that it's established a connection with a VPN server (but where the VPN server is in fact unavailable), this could cause at least a little wasted time debugging the connection (again, given the assumption that the VPN server is responding and the connection isn't negotiating, rather than that the whole server is unavailable). Executives get frustrated when they can't access their e-mail from the airport lounge in their hour's layover when they thought they'd be able to! ;) A trivial example - and one which would almost certainly be considered by savvy IT staff at any site with an IPS of this type installed, but still. I'm more interested if you've considered the issue than anything else, as I'm sure it's quite possible that this could be a more serious issue than a few hours of wasted support time in some instances! Slightly off-topic for the original poster, but I let my curiosity get the better of me, and I'm always on the look out for people breaking TCP/IP to lambaste (just kidding!) ;) - James. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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