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| Subject: | ForeScout ActiveScout |
|---|---|
| Date: | Thu, 6 Jan 2005 19:14:24 -0800 (PST) |
Hello, Just a quick question on ForeScout ActiveScout as to whether anyone out there has used/eval'd it. I'm working with a client that is using an old version (2.7.x, I believe), is considering an upgrade, and I'm not sure it's worth the time and effort. They claim 100% accuracy which we all know is silly. Their whole methodology is based on an attacker using recon in advance of an attack and that the recon activity is detectable enough to start interfering with it.
From what I can gather from ForeScout's literature and
the management console of the app itself, when it's
able to run at all (Java-based, slow as dirt), this
product sits on the outside of the perimeter and looks
for suspicious traffic via a span session. When it
detects scans or similar recon activity, it can both
send back spurious information to the source IP and
update a firewall to block it. It seems to track
attacking IP's based on the spurious info it already
fed them.
Also, this version doesn't seem to track SMTP and DNS,
two of the most oft-attacked protocols out there.
Having run one or two firewalls and NIDS setups
myself, I'm not clear on the benefit of this beast
compared to either inline IPS or IDS plus firewall
blocking (or a firewall and patched servers, while I'm
going that way).
Stupid question - if my perimeter devices, including
DMZ servers, are patched, why the heck would I want to
send back _any_ data to an attacker? I guess if your
servers weren't patchable for some reason, maybe you'd
want to fake that they really are. Um, okay.
Probably better ways to handle that. I would think
that if my perimeter is properly locked-down, I'm
quite happy for an attacker to scan it and figure that
out for themselves - assuming they get much of a scan
past IPS/IDS/firewall.
What am I missing? Thanks for the feedback.
Brent Stackhouse, GSEC/GCIH, etc.
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