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| Subject: | Re: Intrushield vs ISS |
|---|---|
| Date: | Tue, 04 Jan 2005 10:02:51 -0500 |
Matthew LeGrow wrote:
Dave Aitel wrote:
Interesting, because this means Intrushield must parse MSRPC and SMB correctly. This is actually quite rare in an NIDS or NIPS. It'd be good to see what NFR and some of the other heavy hitters do.
For NFR Sentivist, we reassemble MSRPC fragments before analyzing the traffic, including MSRPC over SMB and web (via CIS). Any anomalies in MSRPC fragment reassembly will also kick off alerts.
A pseudo-whitepaper written to help teach N-Code function callbacks appeared in our last quarterly newsletter here and describes the MSRPC over SMB interaction in some detail:
http://www.nfr.com/newsletter/fall-04/AdvancedN-CodeFUCallbacksPackageIntegration.htm
# MSRPC analyzes DCE/RPC data from the passed-in SMB payload
1. Receives an entire SMB, and the offset to the start of RPC header
after having registered callbacks with the SMB/Named Pipes
backend. *ENABLE_MSRPC_OVER_SMB * must be set to 1 and the named
pipes to monitor must be filled in the list for the
*MSRPC_NAMED_PIPES * variable.
2. Operates on the MSRPC traffic as if it were arriving over port
135/TCP - gathers fragments, optionally parses
3. Calls callbacks based on UUIDDave Aitel Immunity, Inc.
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