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Network Security Focus-IDS
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RE: IDS event filtering

Subject: RE: IDS event filtering
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 19:03:22 -0600
 
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Billy,

Patrick is right; filtering can be good...and bad. What
I have seen happen too many times is that someone turns
off their alerts for say slammer, and add 10 new developers
who install MSDN and you have 10 unpatched new MSDE instances
clogging your pipes. Or the fully-patched IIS web server
gets reloaded in the middle of the night as part of
trouble-shooting a corrupt metabase; within 15 minutes
you now have a new remotely managed system on your network.

I think there are a few ways to filter; the effectiveness
and scalability of each depend on the size of your enterprise
and the time you have on your hands:

1. Correlation of security event with vuln scanner data. ISS's
Fusion does this. Several SEM vendors (e.g.-Arcsight) claim
to do this.

2. Tuning of ruleset known vs. unknown. The beauty of snort
are her variables flexibility; you can create known-patched-sql
vs. rest-of-network vars and ignore or alert priority accordingly.

This is risky to me b/c you never know that was is patched
stays patched (unless you're small and doing it yourself).

3. Correlation of known-platforms vs. signature variables.
Sourcefire does this in a backend database now. RNA can let
you know that the server being attacked by Code Red is Apache
so you can filter out that noise. RNA is fairly accurate in
detection. Nevo does something like this but I haven't looked
at in over a year so not sure if any backend IDS correlation.

4. Holy grail of NIDS: auto-tune your sensors based upon either
scanner data or passive fingerprinting. Sourcefire is going this
way with RNA on the passive fingerprinting front. I don't know
anyone auto-tuning off of scan data yet.

Scanners get more accurate and detailed data than passive finger-
printing in most ways, and usually require less $ investment
and less change to infrastructure to use than passive finger-
printing. Downside to scanning is that it's non-real-time,
usually much slower data collecton process, and can be invasive.

5. Spreadsheet: Operationalize prioritization with a list of
what "should be patched" vs. unknown. Deprioritize alerts on
systems that should be patched (as above) and have someone
kick off a patch auditor to verify, perhaps next am, etc.

Unknown systems showing attack/response should get immediate
response and investigation.

I can't believe I'm reading this list for the first time in
weeks, and on NYE. Bad bad bad. Good luck, Happy New Year all,

Arian 

-----Original Message-----
From: Harper, Patrick [mailto:Patrick.Harper@phns.com] 
Sent: Friday, December 31, 2004 3:32 PM
To: CraftedPacket@securitynerds.org; focus-ids@lists.securityfocus.com
Subject: RE: IDS event filtering

 
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Thresholding is a wonderful thing.  And no, I personally do not want
to see alerts on tings I do not have.  If I am an all apache shop
then I do not turn on any IIS rules.  I also make sure, via scanning
and vulnerability analysis, that I do not in fact have any IIS (or
whatever) installed.  You first need to have a good inventory of what
you have.  And you need to keep that up to date so you always know
what you have.  Then you trim all rules to that.  Weather it be
ingress - egress firewall rules, IDS configs, or whatever.  Figure
out what you have, learn how it flows (and make it work/flow the
secure way) then monitor it. 

 
-----Original Message-----
From: Billy Dodson [mailto:CraftedPacket@securitynerds.org] 
Sent: Friday, December 31, 2004 9:37 AM
To: focus-ids@lists.securityfocus.com
Subject: IDS event filtering

I am wanting to get an idea of what you guys out there filter from
your
IDS sensors.  Some of the sensors I monitor get TONS of events for
MSSQL
control overflows.  If the customer is patched for slammer and does
not
have any SQL services on the internet, is it safe to filter out those
events?  Do you still want to see that traffic even though you know
your
are not vulnerable?  Thanks!

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