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| Subject: | RE: Firewall vs. IPS - Differences now (ISS, Intrushield 2.1?) |
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| Date: | Wed, 18 Aug 2004 15:31:32 -0400 |
Last month, Richard Beijtlich (sorry if I mangled your last name, Rich) said the following: "If I could have one wish granted, it would be for the IPS to be recognized as a layer 7 firewall, and not compared to an IDS." That sentence really resonated with me. It seems to make a lot of sense to me that an IPS might eventually be what gets used as a firewall...one which takes the next evolutionary step. At first, there were packet filters, which only cared about what ports were used and which hosts were talking; they were ignorant with regard to connection state, fragmentation, or any other aspects of the communication. And they failed to account for services like FTP, where an outside host needs to open a second inbound channel on an unpredictable port to the server. But it definitely cut back on the exposure of a network to outside attackers. Then came stateful inspection, which addressed some of these problems. Now, you couldn't just slip things through a firewall as easily just by setting a source port of 53. And because the firewall could do packet inspection to a certain degree, FTP would work transparently as well. And it could reject fragmented packets, or other packets that were deliberately malformed But it still couldn't tell the intent of the traffic passing back and forth; a simple GET request for "www.foo.org/index.html" looked the same to it as a GET request that used the unicode attack to traverse directories and grab a copy of the SAM. But just the same, it cut back even more on the exposure level. But what if the next step was to be able to specify not just that, but also to weed out a good bit of the hostile activity that would otherwise pass through unnoticed by the firewall? Mind you, I'm not saying that I think IPS would catch everything, or that it could even watch for attacks on all protocols, but it can definitely stop a good chunk of them. The exposure of your network has gone down, yet again. Even better is that I would expect an IPS to stop the most mundane and common attacks, the ones used by the ankle-biters. And while these are easier to deal with in the first place, nonetheless machines do go accidentally unpatched (or misconfigured), and the kiddies are so numerous that I feel that their attacks are the largest threat, based on sheer force of numbers. So the next level IPS/firewall/whatever you call it has cut back on most of the background noise, allowing you to focus on the really unique and truly dangerous (and, as Mudge once said, "really cool") hacks.
-----Original Message----- From: Jacob Winston [mailto:jctx09@yahoo.com] Sent: Sunday, August 15, 2004 10:46 PM To: focus-ids@securityfocus.com Subject: Firewall vs. IPS - Differences now (ISS, Intrushield 2.1?) Things are getting a little confusing. ISS claims that its Proventia boxes are also firewallas. Intrushield 2.1 has firewall/layer 4 filtering capabilities now. If the Intrushield box layer 4 acls now then what makes it not be equal to a firewall? What does a firewall do that an IPS doesn't as long as the IPS can do layer-4 access lists? Any info is apprecaited. -------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ FREE Network Security Webinar - How to implement IPSec security into VPN appliances New threats and vulnerabilities require new high-performance IPSec VPN solutions for network protection. Join the security experts from SafeNet on August 26 at 1:00 PM (Eastern), and learn how to successfully integrate IPSec security into VPN processors and appliances to provide powerful yet cost-effective VPN solutions for your customers. Register now:
http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/SafeNet_focus-ids_040817 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- FREE Network Security Webinar - How to implement IPSec security into VPN appliances New threats and vulnerabilities require new high-performance IPSec VPN solutions for network protection. Join the security experts from SafeNet on August 26 at 1:00 PM (Eastern), and learn how to successfully integrate IPSec security into VPN processors and appliances to provide powerful yet cost-effective VPN solutions for your customers. Register now: http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/SafeNet_focus-ids_040817 --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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