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| Subject: | [NEWS] MPlayer Buffer Overflow Vulnerability |
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| Date: | 7 Feb 2008 14:40:28 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - MPlayer Buffer Overflow Vulnerability ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY The <http://www.mplayerhq.hu/> MPlayer package [1] is vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack, which can be exploited by malicious remote attackers. The vulnerability is due to MPlayer not properly sanitizing certain tags on a FLAC file before using them to index an array on the stack. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary commands by opening a specially crafted file. The <http://xinehq.de/> Xine package [2], and probably other packages based on <http://www.mplayerhq.hu/design7/projects.html> MPlayer [3], are vulnerable to this attack too. DETAILS Vulnerable Systems: * MPlayer version 1.0rc2 and SVN before r25917 (Tue Jan 29 22:00:58 2008 UTC) * Xine-lib version 1.1.10 Immune Systems: * MPlayer SVN HEAD after r25917 * MPlayer version 1.0rc2 + security patches Vendor response: A fix for this problem was committed to SVN on the <http://svn.mplayerhq.hu/mplayer/trunk/libmpdemux/demux_audio.c?r1=25911&r2=25917> MPlayer project [4]. Users of affected MPlayer versions should download a <http://www.mplayerhq.hu/MPlayer/patches/demux_audio_fix_20080129.diff> patch [5] for MPlayer 1.0rc2 or update to the latest version if they are using SVN. Technical details: The vulnerability was found in the following code, used to parse FLAC comments inside MPlayer: libmpdemux/demux_audio.c 206 case FLAC_VORBIS_COMMENT: 207 { 208 /* For a description of the format please have a look at */ 209 /* http://www.xiph.org/vorbis/doc/v-comment.html */ 210 211 uint32_t length, comment_list_len; 212 (1) char comments[blk_len]; 213 uint8_t *ptr = comments; 214 char *comment; 215 int cn; 216 char c; 217 218 if (stream_read (s, comments, blk_len) == blk_len) 219 { 220 (2) length = AV_RL32(ptr); 221 ptr += 4 + length; 222 223 comment_list_len = AV_RL32(ptr); 224 ptr += 4; 225 226 cn = 0; 227 for (; cn < comment_list_len; cn++) 228 { 229 length = AV_RL32(ptr); 230 ptr += 4; 231 232 comment = ptr; 233 (3) c = comment[length]; 234 comment[length] = 0; ... We can see in (2) that the length variable is being loaded from a position on the file stream, and then used without any validation to index the comment buffer, that was allocated from the stack in (1). This causes a stack corruption, and possibly allows code execution (e.g. modifying the value of the length variable, that is also on the stack). Example Attack Scenario: 1) The user receives an email with an attachment called e.g. goodmusic.flac. 2) The user opens the file with MPlayer or another vulnerable software. 3) This causes a stack corruption and malicious code execution on the user computer. Report Timeline * 2007-12-18: Core Security Technologies notifies the MPlayer team of the vulnerability (no reply received). * 2008-01-04: A new notification of the vulnerability was sent to the MPlayer team (no reply received). * 2008-01-18: A new notification of the vulnerability was sent to the MPlayer team. * 2008-01-18: The MPlayer team asked Core Security Technologies for technical description of the vulnerability. * 2008-01-22: Technical details was sent to MPlayer team by Core Security Technologies. * 2008-01-28: MPlayer notified Core Security Technologies that a fix had been produced. * 2008-02-04: CORE-2007-1218 advisory was published. CVE Information: <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0486> CVE-2008-0486 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:advisories@coresecurity.com> CORE Security Technologies Advisories. The original article can be found at: <http://www.coresecurity.com/?action=item&id=2103> http://www.coresecurity.com/?action=item&id=2103 ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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