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| Subject: | [UNIX] Multiple Vendor ImageMagick Sign Extension Vulnerability |
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| Date: | 24 Sep 2007 16:18:57 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - Multiple Vendor ImageMagick Sign Extension Vulnerability ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY ImageMagick is "a suite of image manipulation tools (animate, composite, conjure, convert, display, identify, import, mogrify and montage) that are sometimes used by other applications for processing image files". Remote exploitation of a sign extension vulnerability in ImageMagick, as included in various vendors' operating system distributions, allows attackers to execute arbitrary code. DETAILS Vulnerable Systems: * ImageMagick version 6.3.4 Immune Systems: * ImageMagick version 6.3.5-9 This vulnerability specifically exists in the ReadDIBImage() as shown below. 558 image->columns=(unsigned long) dib_info.width ... 620 bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*dib_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32); 621 length=bytes_per_line*image->rows; 622 pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireMagickMemory((size_t) MagickMax( 623 bytes_per_line,image->columns+256)*image->rows*sizeof(*pixels)); ... 629 count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels); ... 638 status=DecodeImage(image,dib_info.compression ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,pixels); At line 558, "dib_info.width" is a signed short, which is extended to an unsigned long and assigned to "image->columns". For example, a value of 0x8000 will be extended to 0xffff8000. Later, it is used as a multiplier when calculating the allocation size. An integer overflow occurs, leading to a heap block of insufficient size being allocated. Consequently, a heap buffer overflow occurs. Analysis: Exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the user. One way of exploiting this vulnerability is to persuade a targeted user to open a malicious image file with a program that utilizes the ImageMagick library. As the tools that are part of ImageMagick are sometimes used as helper tools by other applications, this user may be the same as the web server user. This scenario is somewhat more severe than the previously described attack vector since the image processing can occur automatically. Workaround: Exposure to this vulnerability can be mitigated by moving or deleting the related module files. The file locations may vary between distributions. The globbing expression listed below corresponds to a Red Hat Linux system. /usr/lib/ImageMagick-*/modules*/coders/dib.* Vendor response: The ImageMagick maintainers have addressed this vulnerability with the release of version 6.3.5-9. More information is available from the following URL. <http://studio.imagemagick.org/pipermail/magick-announce/2007-September/000037.html> http://studio.imagemagick.org/pipermail/magick-announce/2007-September/000037.html CVE Information: <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-4988> CVE-2007-4988 Disclosure Timeline: 09/04/2007 - Initial vendor notification 09/05/2007 - Initial vendor response 09/19/2007 - Public disclosure ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:idlabs-advisories@idefense.com> iDefense Labs Security Advisories. The original article can be found at: <http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=597> http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=597 ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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