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[UNIX] Multiple Vendor ImageMagick Sign Extension Vulnerability

Subject: [UNIX] Multiple Vendor ImageMagick Sign Extension Vulnerability
Date: 24 Sep 2007 16:18:57 +0200
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  Multiple Vendor ImageMagick Sign Extension Vulnerability
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

ImageMagick is "a suite of image manipulation tools (animate, composite, 
conjure, convert, display, identify, import, mogrify and montage) that are 
sometimes used by other applications for processing image files". Remote 
exploitation of a sign extension vulnerability in ImageMagick, as included 
in various vendors' operating system distributions, allows attackers to 
execute arbitrary code.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
 * ImageMagick version 6.3.4

Immune Systems:
 * ImageMagick version 6.3.5-9

This vulnerability specifically exists in the ReadDIBImage() as shown 
below.

  558    image->columns=(unsigned long) dib_info.width
  ...
  620    
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*dib_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
  621    length=bytes_per_line*image->rows;
  622    pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireMagickMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
  623      
bytes_per_line,image->columns+256)*image->rows*sizeof(*pixels));
  ...
  629       count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
  ...
  638       status=DecodeImage(image,dib_info.compression ? MagickTrue : 
MagickFalse,pixels);

At line 558, "dib_info.width" is a signed short, which is extended to an 
unsigned long and assigned to "image->columns". For example, a value of 
0x8000 will be extended to 0xffff8000. Later, it is used as a multiplier 
when calculating the allocation size. An integer overflow occurs, leading 
to a heap block of insufficient size being allocated. Consequently, a heap 
buffer overflow occurs.

Analysis:
Exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary 
code in the context of the user.

One way of exploiting this vulnerability is to persuade a targeted user to 
open a malicious image file with a program that utilizes the ImageMagick 
library.

As the tools that are part of ImageMagick are sometimes used as helper 
tools by other applications, this user may be the same as the web server 
user. This scenario is somewhat more severe than the previously described 
attack vector since the image processing can occur automatically.

Workaround:
Exposure to this vulnerability can be mitigated by moving or deleting the 
related module files. The file locations may vary between distributions. 
The globbing expression listed below corresponds to a Red Hat Linux 
system.

  /usr/lib/ImageMagick-*/modules*/coders/dib.*

Vendor response:
The ImageMagick maintainers have addressed this vulnerability with the 
release of version 6.3.5-9. More information is available from the 
following URL.
 
<http://studio.imagemagick.org/pipermail/magick-announce/2007-September/000037.html>
 
http://studio.imagemagick.org/pipermail/magick-announce/2007-September/000037.html

CVE Information:
 <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-4988> 
CVE-2007-4988

Disclosure Timeline:
09/04/2007 - Initial vendor notification
09/05/2007 - Initial vendor response
09/19/2007 - Public disclosure


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  
<mailto:idlabs-advisories@idefense.com> iDefense Labs Security Advisories.
The original article can be found at:  
<http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=597> 
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=597



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