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[NT] Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in Cisco VPN Client

Subject: [NT] Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in Cisco VPN Client
Date: 30 Aug 2007 11:49:32 +0200
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  Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in Cisco VPN Client
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

A vulnerability in Cisco's VPN client allows locally logged-on users of 
affected hosts can cause arbitrary binaries to be executed in the context 
of Local System. This effectively compromises the host.

DETAILS

Vulnerable Systems:
 * Cisco VPN Client versions prior to 5.0.01.0600

Immune Systems:
 * Cisco VPN Client version 5.0.01.0600

Technical Details
Cisco's VPN client for Windows installs a Windows service, the "Cisco 
Systems, Inc. VPN Service" or CVPND, whose associated binary is C:\Program 
Files\Cisco Systems\VPN Client\cvpnd.exe. By default, the CVPND service 
runs as Local System.

SERVICE_NAME: CVPND
        TYPE               : 110  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (interactive)
        START_TYPE         : 2   AUTO_START
        ERROR_CONTROL      : 0   IGNORE
        BINARY_PATH_NAME   : "C:\Program Files\Cisco Systems\VPN 
Client\cvpnd.exe"
        LOAD_ORDER_GROUP   :
        TAG                : 0
        DISPLAY_NAME       : Cisco Systems, Inc. VPN Service
        DEPENDENCIES       : TCPIP
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem

Interactive Users (i.e. those who have logged on locally) are granted 
Modify permissions to cvpnd.exe (and its parent directory), denoted by NT 
AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE:C in the cacls output below.

C:\Program Files\Cisco Systems\VPN Client\cvpnd.exe
                                            NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE:C
                                            BUILTIN\Users:R
                                            BUILTIN\Power Users:C
                                            BUILTIN\Administrators:F
                                            NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:F
                                            BUILTIN\Administrators:F

This allows normal users who have logged on to a susceptible host to move 
cvpnd.exe to another location, and substitute another binary for 
cvpnd.exe. When the CVPND service restarts (e.g. on reboot), the replaced 
cvpnd.exe will run in the context of Local System. This effectively 
escalates users' privileges, thereby compromising the host.

Fix Information:
Upgrade to a fixed version of the Cisco VPN client: see Cisco's advisory 
at the URL below for more details:  
<http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070815-vpnclient.shtml> 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070815-vpnclient.shtml

Alternatively, as a workaround, revoke access rights for NT 
AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE from cvpnd.exe, e.g.:

C:\Program Files\Cisco Systems\VPN Client>cacls cvpnd.exe /E /R "NT 
AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE"


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  <mailto:dominic@ngssoftware.com> 
Dominic Beecher.



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