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| Subject: | [NT] Multiple Vendor Progress Server Heap Overflow Vulnerability |
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| Date: | 15 Jul 2007 18:00:14 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - Multiple Vendor Progress Server Heap Overflow Vulnerability ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY A vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of RSA Authentication Manager and other products that include the Progress server. User interaction is not required to exploit this vulnerability. DETAILS The specific flaw exists in the Progress Server listening by default on TCP ports 5520 and 5530. The _mprosrv.exe process trusts a user-supplied DWORD size and attempts to receive that amount of data into a statically allocated heap buffer. The user-supplied size parameter is used directly as an argument to recv() as shown below: _mprosrv.exe: 0044F24F mov eax, [esp+42Ch+buf] ; 1012 byte heap buffer 0044F253 push 0 ; flags 0044F255 push esi ; attacker-controlled size 0044F256 push eax ; 1012 byte heap buffer 0044F257 push edi ; s 0044F258 call recv The heap buffer which is received into is 1012 bytes. Sending more than 1012 bytes will overflow into subsequent heap chunks. This heap corruption can be leveraged by an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the SYSTEM user. Vendor Response: Progress Software states: Progress Software has released an update for this issue through our partners. EMC/RSA information is listed below. Other vendors may be affected. For additional information, please contact Progress Technical Support and reference Support ID: P123949. RSA Security states: RSA has made hot fixes available to registered users through RSA Customer Support. For more information, please visit the RSA website for the appropriate product: For RSA ACE/Server 5.2, apply the following hot fix on top of Patch 1: <https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_as52p.asp> https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_as52p.asp For RSA Authentication Manager 6.0, apply the following hot fix on top of the Patch 2 - (scroll down to the second half of the page) <https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_am60p2.asp> https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_am60p2.asp For RSA SecurID Appliance 2.0, apply the following hot fix on top of the Upgrade 2.0.1: <https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_app.asp> https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_app.asp For RSA Authentication Manager 6.1, apply the 6.1.2 patch: <https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_am60p2.asp> https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/dlcpages/rsa_securid/securid_dlc_am60p2.asp RSA recommends that all customers using RSA ACE/Server 5.2, RSA Authentication Manager 6.0 and 6.1, and RSA SecurID Appliance 2.0 install the hot fixes. Notification was recently (June 28, 2007) sent to RSA SecurCare customers about the vulnerability and the correct way to resolve it. Disclosure Timeline: 2007-03-14 - Vulnerability reported to vendor 2007-05-22 - Digital Vaccine released to TippingPoint customers 2007-07-12 - Coordinated public release of advisory ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by Aaron Portnoy, TippingPoint DVLabs. The original article can be found at: <http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com/advisory/TPTI-07-12> http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com/advisory/TPTI-07-12 ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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