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| Subject: | [UNIX] SquirrelMail G/PGP Plugin Multiple Vulnerabilities |
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| Date: | 12 Jul 2007 16:29:52 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - SquirrelMail G/PGP Plugin Multiple Vulnerabilities ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY The <http://www.squirrelmail.org/plugin_view.php?id=153> SquirrelMail G/PGP Encrpytion Plugin is "a general purpose encryption, decryption, and digital signature plug-in for SquirrelMail that implements the OpenPGP standard using GPG". Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in SquirrelMail's G/PGP plugin which allow command execution and file inclusion. DETAILS SquirrelMail G/PGP Plugin gpg_help.php Local File Inclusion Vulnerability Remote exploitation of a local file inclusion vulnerability in version 2.0 of the SquirrelMail G/PGP Plugin could allow an authenticated webmail user to execute arbitrary PHP code under the security context of the running web server. Version 2.0 of the SquirrelMail G/PGP Plugin contains an implementation flaw in the way it includes certain files. Specifically, the 'gpg_help.php' and 'gpg_help_base.php' files will include local files that are supplied via the 'help' HTTP GET request parameter. An excerpt from the code follows: 68 // Help body text is inserted here via GET parameter 69 require_once (SM_PATH.'plugins/gpg/help/' . $_GET['help'] ); By using directory traversal specifiers, an attacker can trivially cause files stored on the Web server to be parsed as PHP code. Analysis: Exploitation could allow an attacker to include an arbitrary local file on the affected host. Due to the lack of input validation on $GET_['help'], directory traversal specifiers could be utilized to parse any file on the system as PHP code. iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in version 2.0 of the G/PGP Encryption Plugin for SquirrelMail. It is suspected that earlier versions of the plug-in are also affected. Vendor response: The maintainers of the SquirrelMail G/PGP plug-in have not responded to repeated inquires regarding this vulnerability. Versions since gpg.2.1devbuild14Jun07 appear to include a fix for this problem. This problem is not present in the recent 2.1 release made on July 7th, 2007. CVE Information: <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4169> CVE-2006-4169 SquirrelMail G/PGP Plugin gpg_recv_key() Command Injection Vulnerability Remote exploitation of a command injection vulnerability in the G/PGP Encrpytion Plugin for The SquirrelMail Project Team's SquirrelMail webmail package allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the underlying web server. The problem specifically exists within the function gpg_recv_key() defined in gpg_key_functions.php. A call is made to exec() with unfiltered user-supplied data as demonstrated in the following piece of code: $command = "$path_to_gpg --batch --no-tty --homedir $gpg_key_dir \ --keyserver hkp://$keyserver --recv-key $searchkeyid 2>&1"; [...] exec($command, $output, $returnval); The aforementioned '$keyserver' variable is supplied in the POST data to the gpg_options.php script. The attacker must have a valid authenticated session to exploit this vulnerability. Analysis: Exploitation of the described vulnerability allows authenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the underlying web server. This vulnerability could be exploited by webmail users to gain shell access on the target server and potentially further compromise the system with local privilege escalation vulnerabilities. Detection: iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in the latest version of the G/PGP Encryption Plugin for SquirrelMail, version 2.1. Furthermore, this vulnerability has been confirmed to exist as early as version 2.0. Other versions may be affected. Workaround: Disable the G/PGP Plugin if it is not required. Alternatively, add the following line above the initialization of the '$command' variable just prior to the call to exec(): $keyserver = escapeshellarg($keyserver); Please note that this is an unofficial source patch, but should be sufficient as a workaround until an official patch is released from the vendor. Vendor response: The maintainers of the SquirrelMail G/PGP plug-in have not responded to repeated inquires regarding this vulnerability. As such, it remains unpatched, even in the most current release made on July 7th, 2007. CVE Information: <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-1924> CVE-2005-1924 SquirrelMail G/PGP Plugin gpg_check_sign_pgp_mime() Command Injection Vulnerability Remote exploitation of a command injection vulnerability in the G/PGP Encrpytion Plugin for The SquirrelMail Project Team's SquirrelMail webmail package allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the underlying web server. The problem specifically exists within the function gpg_check_sign_pgp_mime() defined in gpg_hook_functions.php. A call is made to exec() with unfiltered user-supplied data as demonstrated in the following piece of code: $command = "echo -n \"$messageSignedText\" | $path_to_gpg --batch \ --no-tty --homedir $gpg_key_dir --verify ".\ $detachedSignatureFilename."- 2>&1"; if ($debug) echo "gpg command: ".$command."\"; exec($command, $results, $returnval); The '$messageSignedText' variable from above contains the stripped e-mail message. Analysis: Exploitation of the described vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the underlying web server. Exploitation of this vulnerability occurs when a target webmail user opens a malicious e-mail message. As such the vulnerability can be exploited by any attacker who can convince a target user to open a malicious message. Detection: iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in version 2.0 of the G/PGP Encryption Plugin for SquirrelMail. It is suspected that earlier versions of the plug-in are also affected. Workaround: Disable the G/PGP Plugin if it is not required. Alternatively, add the following line above the initialization of the '$command' variable just prior to the call to exec(): $messageSignedText= escapeshellarg($messageSignedText); Please note that this is an unofficial source patch, but should be sufficient as a workaround. Vendor response: The maintainers of the SquirrelMail G/PGP plug-in have not responded to repeated inquires regarding this vulnerability. Versions since 2.1devbuild12Sep06 appear to include a fix for this problem. This problem is not present in the recent 2.1 release made on July 7th, 2007. SquirrelMail G/PGP Plugin deleteKey() Command Injection Vulnerability Remote exploitation of a command injection vulnerability in the G/PGP Encrpytion Plugin for The SquirrelMail Project Team's SquirrelMail webmail package allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the underlying web server. The problem specifically exists within the function deleteKey() defined in gpg_keyring.php. A call is made to exec() with unfiltered user-supplied data as demonstrated in the following piece of code: $command = "$path_to_gpg --batch --no-tty --yes --homedir \ $gpg_key_dir $flag $fpr 2>&1"; exec($command, $output, $returnval); The deleteKey() routine is called from three files: import_key_file.php, import_key_text.php and keyring_main.php. the '$fpr' variable from above is supplied in the POST data. The attacker must have a valid authenticated session to exploit this vulnerability. Analysis: Exploitation of the described vulnerability allows authenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the underlying web server. This vulnerability could be exploited by webmail users to gain shell access on the target server and potentially further compromise the system with local privilege escalation vulnerabilities. Detection: iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in the latest version of the G/PGP Encryption Plugin for SquirrelMail, version 2.1. Furthermore, this vulnerability has been confirmed to exist as early as version 2.0. Other versions may be affected. Workaround: Disable the G/PGP Plugin if it is not required. Alternatively, add the following line above the initialization of the '$command' variable just prior to the call to exec(): $fpr = escapeshellarg($fpr); Please note that this is an unofficial source patch, but should be sufficient as a workaround until an official patch is released from the vendor. Vendor response: The maintainers of the SquirrelMail G/PGP plug-in have not responded to repeated inquires regarding this vulnerability. As such, it remains unpatched, even in the most current release made on July 7th, 2007. CVE Information: <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-1924> CVE-2005-1924 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:idlabs-advisories@idefense.com> iDefense Labs Security Advisories. The original article can be found at: <http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=555> http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=555, <http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=331> http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=331, <http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=330> http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=330 and <http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=329> http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=329 ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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