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| Subject: | [UNIX] AsteriDex Code Execution (Asterisk and Trixbox) |
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| Date: | 9 Jul 2007 15:44:33 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - AsteriDex Code Execution (Asterisk and Trixbox) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY <http://bestof.nerdvittles.com/applications/asteridex/> AsteriDex is "a digital rolodex for Asterisk / Trixbox PBXs". There is a command injection vulnerability which allows unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary commands on the Asterisk management console. Such access permits execution of arbitrary operating system commands as the 'asterisk' user. DETAILS Vulnerable Systems: * AsteriDex version 3.0 and prior The script 'callboth.php' is used by AsteriDex to bridge a VOIP call between two end-points. Insufficient parameter checking is done on the variables IN and OUT, allowing a malicious user to inject arbitrary commands into the Asterisk management console. The script works by logging into the console server on port 5038/TCP on localhost. It then issues an 'Action: Originate' command which is used to setup the bridged call. The relevant code from callboth.php is: fputs ($fp, "Action: login\r\n"); fputs ($fp, "Username: phpagi\r\n"); fputs ($fp, "Secret: phpagi\r\n"); fputs ($fp, "Events: off\r\n\r\n"); sleep(1) ; fputs ($fp, "Action: Originate\r\n"); fputs ($fp, "Channel: $IN\r\n"); << Command injection fputs ($fp, "Context: custom-callboth\r\n"); fputs ($fp, "Exten: $OUT\r\n"); << Command injection fputs ($fp, "Priority: 1\r\n\r\n"); $IN is set from $_GET['IN'] with no sanity checking other than a test of string length; all strings passed to $IN must be less than 100 chars, including the string 'sip/' which is prepended to $IN prior to the length check. Given sane values of $IN=123, $out=321 and $CallerID=567, the session would look like this: Action: login Username: phpagi Secret: phpagi Events: off Action: Originate Channel: 123 Context: custom-callboth Exten: 321 Priority: 1 By including CRLF characters in $IN, an attacker can inject arbitrary commands into the data stream, hijacking the authenticated session to run commands of the attackers choice. Take, for example, a $IN string containing: 190@example.com\r\nApplication: System\r\nData: echo pwn3d > /tmp/hoku.txt\r\n This would transform the session into: Action: login Username: phpagi Secret: phpagi Events: off Action: Originate Channel: 190@example.com Application: System Data: echo pwn3d > /tmp/hoku.txt Context: custom-callboth Exten: 321 Priority: 1 This would use the call manager's 'System' functionality to execute user-supplied operating system commands, in this case writing the word "pwn3d" to a file called "/tmp/hoku.txt". The rest of the session would fail because the attacker has subverted the original 'Action', rendering the remaining commands meaningless to the manager. Solution: A patched version of AsteriDex is available from: <http://bestof.nerdvittles.com/applications/asteridex/> http://bestof.nerdvittles.com/applications/asteridex/ Disclosure Timeline: 06/25/2007 - Vendor contacted. 06/03/2007 - Vendor contacted again, response received. Details sent to vendor. 06/03/2007 - Patch issued and updated version available. 06/05/2007 - Advisory released. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:carl@hoku.co.uk> Carl Livitt. The original article can be found at: <http://www.hoku.co.uk/advisories/asteridex.txt> http://www.hoku.co.uk/advisories/asteridex.txt ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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