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| Subject: | [NEWS] SIP Packet Reloads IOS Devices Not Configured for SIP |
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| Date: | 1 Feb 2007 17:10:22 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - SIP Packet Reloads IOS Devices Not Configured for SIP ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY Cisco devices running IOS which support voice and are not configured for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) are affected by a vulnerability that may lead to a reload of the device under yet to be determined conditions, but isolated to traffic destined to Port 5060. At the present time, Cisco is investigating the exact nature of the issue; further details will be provided in an update to this Advisory at such time as we are able to confirm the technical characteristics. There are no known exploits for this issue although the Cisco PSIRT is seeing randomly generated traffic which may be unintentionally causing this issue to manifest. Workarounds exist to mitigate the effects of this problem. DETAILS Affected Products: IOS releases that include voice support after 12.3(14)T, 12.3(8)YC1, 12.3(8)YG and all of 12.4 are affected. Please see the fixed software table for a complete list of fixed and vulnerable trains. To determine if your device has SIP enabled, enter the commands show ip sockets and show tcp brief all. Below is an example of a router running code without the fix, and without the workaround enabled. The router in this example is vulnerable to this issue. The router in this example is running the vulnerable release 7200-p-mz.124-3.bin: Router#show ip sockets Proto Remote Port Local Port In Out Stat TTY OutputIF 17 0.0.0.0 0 --any-- 5060 0 0 211 0 17 0.0.0.0 0 192.168.100.2 67 0 0 2211 0 17 0.0.0.0 0 192.168.100.2 2517 0 0 11 0 The first line with UDP Port 5060 shows that UDP SIP is enabled. Router#show tcp brief all TCB Local Address Foreign Address (state) 2051E680 *.5060 *.* LISTEN 2051E680 *.5060 *.* LISTEN The above lines with *.5060 show that TCP SIP is enabled. Vulnerable Products: The following is a list of products that support voice and could be affected by this vulnerability. * 815 * 871 * 876 * 877 * 878 * 1701 * 1711 * 1712 * 1721 * 1751 * 1751-V * 1760 * 1801 * 1802 * 1803 * 1811 * 1812 * 1841 * 2610XM-2611XM * 2620XM-2621XM * 2650XM-2651XM * 2691 * 2801 * 2811 * 2821 * 2851 * 3220 * 3250 * 3270 * 3725 * 3745 * 3825 * 3845 * 7200 * 7200-NPE-G2 * 7301 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable: Devices that do not support voice are not affected by this issue. Devices which are properly configured for SIP processing are not affected by this issue. We have no reports of this vunerability on devices that are configured for SIP processing. We also have no reports of affected IOS-XR devices, CatOS devices, or any device which does not run IOS, but can not conclusively rule them out without further testing. This advisory will be updated with more information as it becomes available. Below is an example of a router not vulnerable to this issue. The router in this example is running the fixed release c7200-js-mz.124-5b.bin. Router#show tcp brief all Router#show ip sockets Proto Remote Port Local Port In Out Stat TTY OutputIF 17 0.0.0.0 0 192.168.100.2 67 0 0 2211 0 No lines with UDP Port 5060 are shown and UDP SIP is not enabled. In this example, UDP port 67 is used by DHCP is not related to this vulnerability. Details: SIP is a protocol designed for use in IP voice networks and is widely used for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communications worldwide. Cisco devices running certain versions of IOS with support for voice services may be affected by a vulnerability that may lead to a reload of the device under yet to be determined conditions, but isolated to traffic destined to port 5060. The root cause of this reload is currently under investigation. This issue is being tracked in Cisco Bug ID <http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/Support/Bugtool/onebug.pl?bugid=CSCsh58082> CSCsh58082. In addition, certain versions of IOS with support for voice services may process SIP messages even if they are not fully configured for SIP operation. To process SIP messages IOS will open UDP port 5060 and TCP port 5060 for listening. The Cisco Bug ID that documents the issue of IOS processing SIP messages without being fully configured for SIP operation is <http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/Support/Bugtool/onebug.pl?bugid=CSCsb25337> CSCsb25337. The fix for this bug turns off the listening ports TCP and UDP 5060. There have been no reports of <http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/Support/Bugtool/onebug.pl?bugid=CSCsh58082> CSCsh58082 causing reloads in any images with <http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/Support/Bugtool/onebug.pl?bugid=CSCsb25337> CSCsb25337 integrated. Impact: Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in a reload of the device. The issue may be repeatedly exploited, leading to an extended Denial Of Service (DoS) condition. Workarounds: Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion document for this advisory: <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-air-20070131-sip.shtml> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-air-20070131-sip.shtml. Turn Off SIP Processing Since this vulnerability is reported only in routers not configured for SIP, the simplest and most effective workaround is to turn SIP processing off. Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z. Router(config)#sip-ua Router(config-sip-ua)#no transport udp Router(config-sip-ua)#no transport tcp Router(config-sip-ua)#end After applying this workaround the commands show ip sockets and show tcp brief all will not show the device listening on UDP and TCP port 5060: Router#show ip sockets Proto Remote Port Local Port In Out Stat TTY 17 --listen-- 9.13.32.18 2887 0 0 11 0 Router#show tcp brief all TCB Local Address Foreign Address (state) 6649A5A4 *.1720 *.* LISTEN 66CDC764 *.1723 *.* LISTEN Control Plane Policing Cisco IOS software releases 12.0S, 12.2SX, 12.2S, 12.3T, 12.4, and 12.4T support the Control Plane Policing (CoPP) feature. CoPP may be configured on a device to protect the management and control planes to minimize the risk and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic sent to infrastructure device in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. The following example can be adapted to your network. !-- Permit all TCP and UDP SIP traffic sent to all IP addresses !-- configured on all interfaces of the affected device so that it !-- will be policed and dropped by the CoPP feature access-list 100 permit tcp any any eq 5060 access-list 100 permit udp any any eq 5060 !-- Permit (Police or Drop)/Deny (Allow) all other Layer3 and Layer4 !-- traffic in accordance with existing security policies and !-- configurations for traffic that is authorized to be sent !-- to infrastructure devices !-- Create a Class-Map for traffic to be policed by !-- the CoPP feature class-map match-all drop-sip-class match access-group 100 !-- Create a Policy-Map that will be applied to the !-- Control-Plane of the device policy-map drop-sip-traffic class drop-sip-class drop !-- Apply the Policy-Map to the Control-Plane of the !-- device control-plane service-policy input drop-sip-traffic Note: In the above CoPP example, the access control list entries (ACEs) which match the potential exploit packets with the "permit" action result in these packets being discarded by the policy-map "drop" function, while packets that match the "deny" action (not shown) are not affected by the policy-map drop function. Additional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can be found at <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6642/products_white_paper0900aecd804fa16a.shtml> http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6642/products_white_paper0900aecd804fa16a.shtml and <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1838/products_feature_guide09186a008052446b.html> http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1838/products_feature_guide09186a008052446b.html. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:psirt@cisco.com> Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team. The original article can be found at: <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070131-sip.shtml> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070131-sip.shtml ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. 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