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Multiple Vulnerabilities in Mandiant First Response
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
Mandiant First Response is "an incident response tool to collect system
information such as running processes, system services, registry
information, event logs, and file lists from a local or remote host". The
First Response agent (FRAgent.exe) can be installed and configured as a
daemon on target hosts in order to collect information remotely via a
First Response Command Console. Multiple vulnerabilities exist that could
lead to a variety of attack payloads. Agents running in either HTTP or SSL
mode are vulnerable to denial of service and server hijacking conditions.
The server hijacking vulnerability present in HTTP agents can be further
leveraged to allow a rogue process to intercept and modify legitimate
agent/console communication, and force a Command Console to download
arbitrary content and visit arbitrary URLs.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* MFR version 1.1.0 and prior
Immune Systems:
* MFR version 1.1.1
Vulnerability #1: Denial of Service against an SSL agent through malformed
client requests
When run in daemon mode, the First Response agent (FRAgent.exe) accepts
remote connections from a First Response console via HTTP or a modified
HTTPS implementation. By sending a series of specially-crafted requests to
an SSL-enabled agent, it is possible to force the agent to throw an
exception that is not properly handled. After this occurs, the agent's
sockets will enter an indefinite CLOSE_WAIT state and all subsequent
connection attempts will be refused. The service then must be restarted in
order to recover and accept connections again.
Vulnerability #2: Denial of Service against an HTTP or SSL agent through
Agent hijacking
An FRAgent daemon permits other processes to bind to the same socket
addresses on which it is already listening. If FRAgent is bound to a
0.0.0.0 wildcard address ("all interfaces"), a rogue process can intercept
client connections by subsequently binding to the same port on a specific
IP address. By hijacking an agent with a non-responsive listener, an
attacker can effectively prevent all legitimate client connections.
Vulnerability #3: Command Console and Data Manipulation through HTTP Agent
Hijacking
If an HTTP FRAgent daemon is hijacked, the attacker can control the
response data sent to and processed by a client, as well as other aspects
of client behavior. A rogue process can conduct a man-in-the-middle attack
to redirect and modify all requests and responses between the client and a
legitimate agent. The attacker can also send specially-crafted HTTP
responses that force the client to visit arbitrary URLs and/or download
arbitrary content. (NOTE: The use of HTTPS/SSL is default behavior for
First Response; using cleartext HTTP requires manual configuration.)
Vendor Response:
Mandiant has confirmed the reports provided by Symantec and updated
Mandiant First Response (MFR) to correct these issues. Version 1.1.1 is
now available for download from
<http://www.mandiant.com/firstresponse.htm>
http://www.mandiant.com/firstresponse.htm. Mandiant advises all users of
MFR to upgrade to 1.1.1 as soon as possible. Registered users of the
software have been notified via email of availability of the upgrade.
During the course of our review we noted the following addenda to
Symantec's analysis:
Vulnerability 1: The DoS condition was due to a design error where the
Agent would choose to exit upon receipt of a malformed request. The exit
was an explicit choice exercised by the code path and not caused by a
buffer overflow or heap corruption. Version 1.1.1 addresses the explicit
exit condition and correctly handles requests with malformed payloads,
allowing the MFR Agent to continue operation while correctly rejecting
malformed requests.
Vulnerability 2 and 3: The vulnerabilities are present because the MFR
Agent opens its listening port in non-exclusive mode. Version 1.1.1
correctly opens the port as exclusive, preventing the multiple-bind
condition.
Mandiant would like to thank Brian Reilly and Scott King for discovering
and notifying us of these vulnerabilities, and Symantec for their
participation in public disclosure.
Recommendation:
Upgrade to MFR version 1.1.1, available at
<http://www.mandiant.com/firstresponse.htm>
http://www.mandiant.com/firstresponse.htm.
CVE Information:
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-6475>
CVE-2006-6475,
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-6476>
CVE-2006-6476,
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-6477>
CVE-2006-6477
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:brian_reilly@symantec.com>
Brian Reilly.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/21548>
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/21548
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