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| Subject: | [NT] CA BrightStor Discovery Service Mailslot Buffer Overflow Vulnerability |
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| Date: | 8 Oct 2006 16:01:18 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - CA BrightStor Discovery Service Mailslot Buffer Overflow Vulnerability ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Computer Associates ARCserver Backup. Authentication is not required exploit this vulnerability and both the client and server are affected. DETAILS Vulnerable Systems: * BrightStor ARCserver Backup version R11.5 Client * BrightStor ARCserver Backup version R11.5 Server The problem specifically exists within the handling of long messages received over the Mailslot named 'CheyenneDS'. As no explicit MaxMessageSize is supplied in the call to CreateMailslot, an attacker can cause an exploitable stack-based buffer overflow. The vulnerable Mailslot creation occurs: casdscsvc.exe -> Asbrdcst.dll 20C14E8C push 0 ; lpSecurityAttributes 20C14E8E push 0 ; lReadTimeout 20C14E90 push 0 ; nMaxMessageSize 20C14E92 push offset Name ; "\\\\.\\mailslot\\CheyenneDS" 20C14E97 stosb 20C14E98 call ds:CreateMailslotA 20C14E9E cmp eax, INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE 20C14EA1 mov mailslot_handle, eax Note there is no explicit MaxMessageSize specified. Later the mailslot handle is read from into a 4k buffer. The read data is also passed to a routine which calls vsprintf into a 1k buffer. casdscsvc.exe -> Asbrdcst.dll 20C15024 mov eax, mailslot_handle 20C15029 lea edx, [esp+1044h+Buffer_4k] 20C1502D push ecx ; nNumberOfBytesToRead 20C1502E push edx ; lpBuffer 20C1502F push eax ; hFile 20C15030 call edi ; ReadFile 20C15032 test eax, eax 20C15034 jz short read_failed 20C15036 lea ecx, [esp+3Dh] 20C1503A push ecx ; char 20C1503B push offset str_ReadmailslotS ; "ReadMailSlot: %s\n" 20C15040 call not_interesting_call_to_vsnprtinf 20C15045 add esp, 8 20C15048 lea edx, [esp+3Dh] 20C1504C push edx ; va_list 20C1504D push offset str_ReadmailslotS_0 ; "ReadMailSlot: %s" 20C15052 push 0 ; for_debug_log 20C15054 call vsprintf_into_1024_stack_buf_and_debug_log As mentioned in TSRT-06-02, exploitation of this vulnerability is possible due to the ability to exceeding the second-class Mailslot message size limitation. Vendor Response: Computer Associates has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More details can be found at: <http://supportconnectw.ca.com/public/storage/infodocs/basbr-secnotice.asp> http://supportconnectw.ca.com/public/storage/infodocs/basbr-secnotice.asp Disclosure Timeline: 2006.03.27 - Digital Vaccine released to TippingPoint customers 2006.04.27 - Vulnerability reported to vendor 2006.10.05 - Coordinated public release of advisory ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:TSRT@3com.com> Pedram Amini, TippingPoint Security Research Team. The original article can be found at: <http://www.tippingpoint.com/security/advisories/TSRT-06-12.html> http://www.tippingpoint.com/security/advisories/TSRT-06-12.html ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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