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[NEWS] Cisco PIX DoS TTL(n-1)

Subject: [NEWS] Cisco PIX DoS TTL(n-1)
Date: 8 Mar 2006 16:10:26 +0200
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  Cisco PIX DoS TTL(n-1)
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

"The  <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/> Cisco PIX 
Firewall delivers strong security and, with market-leading performance, 
creates little to no network performance impact."

It is possible to perform a DoS attack on PIX or an IP address behind a 
PIX from the outside interface, utilizing a flaw in the embryonic 
connection mechanism. The flaw utilized in this attack is the same was 
used in Cisco PIX TCP Connection Prevention vulnerability.

DETAILS

It is possible to prevent new communication establishment to a specific 
port on a server located behind the PIX firewall, when a permanent static 
mapping is applied between a local and a global IP address, similar to the 
Network setup diagram below.

Network Setup:
Attacker ------ Internet ------ PIX ------ Router ------ Server

By sending a legitimate packet and specifying TTL equal to n-1 of the 
destination value, it is possible to disable communication between the 
source and destination port pair for the duration of approximately 120 
seconds on PIXOS version 6 and 30 seconds on PIXOS version 7.

In order for the attack to succeed, an additional hop (router) should be 
present between the PIX and the server, that would timeout the packet 
returning the ICMP time exceeded in-transit.

Such setups can be easily identified using the TCPTraceroute to the open 
port and returning repeating destination IP in the last two hops. e.g.

TCPTraceroute:
5  xxx.xxx.xxx.32  18.952 ms  19.396 ms  20.438 ms
6  xxx.xxx.xxx.7  19.667 ms  22.174 ms  20.629 ms
7  xxx.xxx.xxx.68  29.286 ms  21.401 ms  19.935 ms
8  xxx.xxx.xxx.100  108.143 ms  42.783 ms *
9  xxx.xxx.xxx.100 [open]  32.268 ms  26.037 ms  23.569 ms

Although, it would take a lot of packets to disrupt the communication 
between the hosts completely, we assume that the attacker's aim is to 
prevent the communication to a specific service located on the machine 
behind the PIX firewall (e.g. HTTP/S, SMTP) and some other host on the 
Internet, whose source address can be spoofed. Depending on the bandwidth, 
it might take as little as 15 seconds to generate and send out 65535 
packets with a custom source port.

The attack can be performed using the interactive packet constructors such 
as hping, e.g.

if you want to prevent new communication establishment between SOURCE_IP 
source port 31337 and TARGET_IP destination port 80, execute:
arhontus / # hping2 -a $SOURCE_IP -S -c 1 -s 31337 -p 80 -t 8 $TARGET_IP

if you want to prevent new communication establishment between SOURCE_IP 
port ranges 0-63535 and TARGET_IP destination port 80, execute:
arhontus / # hping2 -a $SOURCE_IP -S -s 0 -p 80 --faster -t 8 $TARGET_IP

The attack was tested on two PIX 535 firewalls with 1Gb of RAM each 
performing static permanent mapping and running in failover mode with 
PIXOS ver 6.3(4), and on a single PIX 515E with 64Mb of RAM running PIXOS 
ver 7.0(4)

Workarounds: 
PSIRT response with workarounds to follow this disclosure

Disclosure Timeline:
04/11/2005 - Issue discovered
24/01/2006 - PSIRT notified
07/03/2006 - Public disclosure


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  <mailto:mlists@arhont.com> 
Konstantin V. Gavrilenko.



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