Ethical Hacking Learn to find vulnerabilities before the bad guys do! Gain real world hands on hacking experience in our state of the art hacking lab. Course designed and taught by expert instructors with years of penetration testing experience. 12 student maximum in every class. Certification attempt included in every package. | Computer Forensics Training at InfoSec Institute Gain the in-demand skills of a certified computer examiner, learn to recover trace data left behind by fraud, theft, and cybercrime perpetrators. Discover the source of computer crime and abuse at your organization so that it never happens again. All of our class sizes are guaranteed to be 12 students or less to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors. |

| Subject: | [NEWS] Cisco PIX DoS TTL(n-1) |
|---|---|
| Date: | 8 Mar 2006 16:10:26 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - Cisco PIX DoS TTL(n-1) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY "The <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/> Cisco PIX Firewall delivers strong security and, with market-leading performance, creates little to no network performance impact." It is possible to perform a DoS attack on PIX or an IP address behind a PIX from the outside interface, utilizing a flaw in the embryonic connection mechanism. The flaw utilized in this attack is the same was used in Cisco PIX TCP Connection Prevention vulnerability. DETAILS It is possible to prevent new communication establishment to a specific port on a server located behind the PIX firewall, when a permanent static mapping is applied between a local and a global IP address, similar to the Network setup diagram below. Network Setup: Attacker ------ Internet ------ PIX ------ Router ------ Server By sending a legitimate packet and specifying TTL equal to n-1 of the destination value, it is possible to disable communication between the source and destination port pair for the duration of approximately 120 seconds on PIXOS version 6 and 30 seconds on PIXOS version 7. In order for the attack to succeed, an additional hop (router) should be present between the PIX and the server, that would timeout the packet returning the ICMP time exceeded in-transit. Such setups can be easily identified using the TCPTraceroute to the open port and returning repeating destination IP in the last two hops. e.g. TCPTraceroute: 5 xxx.xxx.xxx.32 18.952 ms 19.396 ms 20.438 ms 6 xxx.xxx.xxx.7 19.667 ms 22.174 ms 20.629 ms 7 xxx.xxx.xxx.68 29.286 ms 21.401 ms 19.935 ms 8 xxx.xxx.xxx.100 108.143 ms 42.783 ms * 9 xxx.xxx.xxx.100 [open] 32.268 ms 26.037 ms 23.569 ms Although, it would take a lot of packets to disrupt the communication between the hosts completely, we assume that the attacker's aim is to prevent the communication to a specific service located on the machine behind the PIX firewall (e.g. HTTP/S, SMTP) and some other host on the Internet, whose source address can be spoofed. Depending on the bandwidth, it might take as little as 15 seconds to generate and send out 65535 packets with a custom source port. The attack can be performed using the interactive packet constructors such as hping, e.g. if you want to prevent new communication establishment between SOURCE_IP source port 31337 and TARGET_IP destination port 80, execute: arhontus / # hping2 -a $SOURCE_IP -S -c 1 -s 31337 -p 80 -t 8 $TARGET_IP if you want to prevent new communication establishment between SOURCE_IP port ranges 0-63535 and TARGET_IP destination port 80, execute: arhontus / # hping2 -a $SOURCE_IP -S -s 0 -p 80 --faster -t 8 $TARGET_IP The attack was tested on two PIX 535 firewalls with 1Gb of RAM each performing static permanent mapping and running in failover mode with PIXOS ver 6.3(4), and on a single PIX 515E with 64Mb of RAM running PIXOS ver 7.0(4) Workarounds: PSIRT response with workarounds to follow this disclosure Disclosure Timeline: 04/11/2005 - Issue discovered 24/01/2006 - PSIRT notified 07/03/2006 - Public disclosure ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:mlists@arhont.com> Konstantin V. Gavrilenko. ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
| <Prev in Thread] | Current Thread | [Next in Thread> |
|---|---|---|
| ||
| Previous by Date: | [TOOL] HLBR - Open Source Intrusion Prevention System, SecuriTeam |
|---|---|
| Next by Date: | [NEWS] Alien Arena's Multiple Vulnerabilities, SecuriTeam |
| Previous by Thread: | [TOOL] HLBR - Open Source Intrusion Prevention System, SecuriTeam |
| Next by Thread: | [NEWS] Alien Arena's Multiple Vulnerabilities, SecuriTeam |
| Indexes: | [Date] [Thread] [Top] [All Lists] |