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Network Security Exploits-HackingTools
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[NT] Checkpoint VPN-1 SecureClient Insecure Usage of CreateProcess()

Subject: [NT] Checkpoint VPN-1 SecureClient Insecure Usage of CreateProcess()
Date: 25 Jan 2006 11:06:20 +0200
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  Checkpoint VPN-1 SecureClient Insecure Usage of CreateProcess()
------------------------------------------------------------------------


SUMMARY

The Microsoft Windows API "includes the  
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dllproc/base/createprocess.asp>
 CreateProcess() function as a means to create a new process and it's primary 
thread".

Improper use of Windows API command CreateProcess allows attackers to 
execute arbitrary programs with elevated privileges.

DETAILS

During Startup, the SR_Watchdog.exe spawns the GUI process (SR_GUI.exe) 
through the use of the CreateProcess() function. By doing so it omits to 
set the 'lpApplicationName' variable and further omits to quote the path 
in the variable "lpCommandLine".

This results in executing c:\program.bat|exe|com prior to Sr_GUI.exe and 
allow automatic startup of a potentially rogue application. In particular 
one could imagine a scenario where it is possible to escalate rights using 
this (as they are inherited from SR_Watchdog.exe).


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The information has been provided by  <mailto:Thierry@zoller.lu> Thierry 
Zoller.
The original article can be found at:  
<http://secdev.zoller.lu/research/checkpoint.txt> 
http://secdev.zoller.lu/research/checkpoint.txt
The advisory about CreateProcess() can be found at:  
<http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/6X00S0AELA.html> 
http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/6X00S0AELA.html



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