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Linux Kernel Socket Buffer Memory Exhaustion DoS
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SUMMARY
<http://www.kernel.org> Linux is "a clone of the operating system Unix,
written from scratch by Linus Torvalds with assistance from a loosely-knit
team of hackers across the Net. It aims towards POSIX and Single UNIX
Specification compliance".
Local exploitation of a memory exhaustion vulnerability in Linux Kernel
versions 2.4 and 2.6 allow local attackers to cause a denial of service
condition.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* Linux version 2.4.22
* Linux version 2.6.12
The vulnerability specifically exists due to a lack of resource checking
during the buffering of data for transfer over a pair of sockets. An
attacker can create a situation that, depending on the amount of available
system resources, can cause the kernel to panic due to memory resource
exhaustion. The attack is conducted by opening up a number of connected
file descriptors or socketpairs and creating the largest possible kernel
buffer for the data transfer between the two sockets. By causing the
process to enter a zombie state or closing the file descriptor while
keeping a reference open, the data is kept in the kernel until the
transfer can complete. If done repeatedly, system memory resources can be
exhausted from the kernel.
Successful exploitation requires an attacker to have local access to an
affected Linux system and can result in complete system denial of service.
The system may not reboot after successful exploitation, requiring human
interaction to be restored to a working state. Depending on available
resources, systems with large amounts of physical memory may not be
affected.
Vendor Status:
The maintainer acknowledges that this issue is a design limitation in the
Linux kernel. The following advice has been offered for creating a patch.
It should be noted that this patch has not been fully tested.
The patch requires three steps:
1) Add a "struct user *" reference to the "struct file" file structure.
2) Whenever creating a new "struct file" add the following code:
struct user *user = current->user;
if (atomic_read(&user->files) > MAX_FILES_FOR_THIS_USER)
return -EMFILE;
file->user = user;
if(user) {
atomic_inc(&user->count);
atomic_inc(&user->files);
}
3) Whenever a "struct file" is released apply the following code:
struct user *user = file->user;
if (user) {
atomic_dec(&user->files);
free_uid(user);
}
CVE Information:
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-3660>
CAN-2005-3660.
Disclosure Timeline:
11/17/2005 Initial vendor notification - Linux vendors
11/19/2005 Initial vendor responses
12/22/2005 Public disclosure
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by
<mailto:idlabs-advisories@lists.idefense.com> iDEFENSE Labs.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=362>
http://www.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=362
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