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Multiple Vendor Insecure use of CreateProcess()
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
The Microsoft Windows API includes the
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dllproc/base/createprocess.asp>
CreateProcess() function as a means to create a new process and it's primary
thread.
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dllproc/base/createprocessasuser.asp>
CreateProcessAsUser() is similar but allows for the process to be run in the
security context of a particular user.
Improper use of Windows API command CreateProcess allows attackers to
execute arbitrary programs with in Microsoft's Windows.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* RealPlayer version 10.5
* Kaspersky Anti-Virus for Windows File Servers version 5.0
* iTunes version 4.7.1.30
* VMWare Workstation version 5.0.0 build-13124
* Microsoft Antispyware version 1.0.509 (Beta 1)
The format of the CreateProcess() function is as follows:
BOOL CreateProcess(
LPCTSTR lpApplicationName,
LPTSTR lpCommandLine,
LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpProcessAttributes,
LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes,
BOOL bInheritHandles,
DWORD dwCreationFlags,
LPVOID lpEnvironment,
LPCTSTR lpCurrentDirectory,
LPSTARTUPINFO lpStartupInfo,
LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation
);
The 'lpApplicationName' variable contains the name of the module to be
executed. However, this can be a NULL value, in which case, the module
name to be executed will be the first white space-delimited token in the
lpCommandLine string.
It is a known issue, that if lpApplicationName contains a NULL value and
the full module path in the lpCommandLine variable contains white space
and is not enclosed in quotation marks, it is possible that an alternate
application will be executed. Consider the following scenario:
CreateProcess(
NULL,
c:\program files\sub dir\program.exe,
...
);
In this case, the system will successively expand the string when
interpreting the file path, until a module is encountered to execute.
The string used in the above example would be interpreted as follows:
c:\program.exe files\sub dir\program name
c:\program files\sub.exe dir\program name
c:\program files\sub dir\program.exe
Therefore, if a file named program.exe existed in the c:\ directory, it
would be executed instead of the intended application.
Despite the fact that this is a known issue, several popular applications,
insecurely call the CreateProcess() and CreateProcessAsUser() functions.
This creates a scenario whereby arbitrary code could be executed. In the
scenario detailed above, if an attacker were able to install arbitrary
code in a file at c:\program.exe, when the vulnerable application was
launched, the code would be executed. The arbitrary code would generally
be executed under the privileges of the executing user but could also be
launched with elevated privileges if an insecure call were made
CreateProcessAsUser() using elevated privileges. This attack would involve
some form of social engineering or need to be combined with another attack
to first get the arbitrary code installed in the correct location.
CVE Information:
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2936>
CAN-2005-2936
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2937>
CAN-2005-2937
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2938>
CAN-2005-2938
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2939>
CAN-2005-2939
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2940>
CAN-2005-2940
Disclosure Timeline:
09/19/2005 - Initial vendor notification
11/15/2005 - Coordinated public disclosure
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by
<mailto:idlabs-advisories@lists.idefense.com> iDEFENSE.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=340&type=vulnerabilities>
http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=340&type=vulnerabilities
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