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Network Appliance iSCSI Authentication Bypass
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SUMMARY
iSCSI is "a TCP protocol running over a well-known port, over which iSCSI
records are exchanged. Full-featured iSCSI sessions provide access to raw
disk blocks conveyed as SCSI messages inside iSCSI records. Security in an
iSCSI deployment is typically based on strong authentication, which proves
that an iSCSI client ('initiator') is allowed access to disk blocks on an
iSCSI server and target LUNs ('target' and 'LUN')".
Unauthenticated iSCSI Initiators can bypass iSCSI authentication on NetApp
Filers by manipulating the iSCSI Login Negotiation protocol. The impact of
this vulnerability is the negation of iSCSI security on affected NetApp
filers.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* Network Appliance Data ONTAP Operating System, Releases 6.4, 6.5, and
7.0
iSCSI authentication occurs via LOGINREQUEST and LOGINRESPONSE iSCSI
records, which are used to negotiate authentication parameters, including
the initiator, target, and mode of authentication. iSCSI "Login
Negotiation" occurs in 3 phases:
1. Security ("Start") mode, where the client and server verify their
identity.
2. Operational mode, where the client and server negotiate
on-security-related session parameters.
3. FullFeature mode, where the client and server exchange SCSI commands.
The problem we have observed is that an iSCSI clients can launch
negotiation attacks in which clients force servers to transition from
Security phase to Operational phase **without proving identity**.
To exploit this problem, we wrote a custom iSCSI client that short
circuits login negotiation, asserting an unchecked transition to
Operational mode. Affected Filers honor the client assertion, bypassing
authentication.
There is no known exploit code circulating for this vulnerability.
Data stored in iSCSI-mapped LUNs on affected Network Appliance Filers can
be read and altered by an attacker. Unmapped LUNS and LUNs mapped only to
Fibre Channel initiators are not vulnerability to this attack.
Vendor Response:
Network Appliance Data ONTAP 7.0.2 is a General Availability release:
<http://now.netapp.com/NOW/cgi-bin/software>
http://now.netapp.com/NOW/cgi-bin/software
Release of this advisory was coordinated with Network Appliance. Network
Appliance has confirmed this vulnerability. For further information about
the vulnerability disclosed in this advisory, see
[NOW.NETAPP.COM BugsOnline] (
<http://now.netapp.com/NOW/cgi-bin/bol?Type=Detail&Display=169359>
http://now.netapp.com/NOW/cgi-bin/bol?Type=Detail&Display=169359).
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:tqbf@matasano.com> Thomas H.
Ptacek.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.matasano.com/advisories/netapp-iSCSI.txt>
http://www.matasano.com/advisories/netapp-iSCSI.txt
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