Ethical Hacking Learn to find vulnerabilities before the bad guys do! Gain real world hands on hacking experience in our state of the art hacking lab. Course designed and taught by expert instructors with years of penetration testing experience. 12 student maximum in every class. Certification attempt included in every package. | Computer Forensics Training at InfoSec Institute Gain the in-demand skills of a certified computer examiner, learn to recover trace data left behind by fraud, theft, and cybercrime perpetrators. Discover the source of computer crime and abuse at your organization so that it never happens again. All of our class sizes are guaranteed to be 12 students or less to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors. |

| Subject: | [UNIX] UW-IMAP Netmailbox Name Parsing Buffer Overflow |
|---|---|
| Date: | 6 Oct 2005 15:46:23 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - UW-IMAP Netmailbox Name Parsing Buffer Overflow ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY " <http://www.washington.edu/imap/> UW-IMAP is a popular free IMAP service for Linux and UNIX systems and is distributed with various Linux distributions." A buffer overflow vulnerability in UW-IMAP netmailbox name parsing allows attackers to cause the product to execute arbitrary code. DETAILS Vulnerable Systems: * UW-IMAP Netmailbox version imap-2004c1 Immune Systems: * UW-IMAP Netmailbox version imap-2004g The vulnerability specifically exists due to insufficient bounds checking on user-supplied values. The mail_valid_net_parse_work() function in src/c-client/mail.c is responsible for obtaining and validating the specified mailbox name from user-supplied data. An error in the parsing of supplied mailbox names will continue to copy memory after a " character has been parsed until another " character is found as shown below: long mail_valid_net_parse_work (char *name,NETMBX *mb,char *service) { int i,j; #define MAILTMPLEN 1024 /* size of a temporary buffer */ char c,*s,*t,*v,tmp[MAILTMPLEN],arg[MAILTMPLEN]; ...snip... if (t - v) { /* any switches or port specification? */ 1] strncpy (t = tmp,v,j); /* copy it */ tmp[j] = '\0'; /* tie it off */ .. if (*t == '"') { /* quoted string? */ 2] for (v = arg,i = 0,++t; (c = *t++) != '"';) { /* Vulnerability */ /* quote next character */ if (c == '\\') c = *t++; arg[i++] = c; } If an attacker supplies only one " character, the function will continue to copy bytes to the new pointer, overflowing the stack buffer and resulting in arbitrary code execution. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability will result in the execution of arbitrary code with permissions of the IMAP server. The impact of this vulnerability is slightly reduced due to the requirement of valid credentials, however IMAP servers commonly are used for free webmail systems and other services which may give untrusted users valid credentials. Networks that restrict IMAP service access to trusted users are at low risk. Vendor Patch: "The fix is in the following patch to imap-????/src/c-client/mail.c: *** mail.c 2005/03/17 00:12:22 1.6 --- mail.c 2005/09/15 16:48:46 *************** *** 691,698 **** --- 691,700 ---- if (c == '=') { /* parse switches which take arguments */ if (*t == '"') { /* quoted string? */ for (v = arg,i = 0,++t; (c = *t++) != '"';) { + if (!c) return NIL; /* unterminated string */ /* quote next character */ if (c == '\\') c = *t++; + if (!c) return NIL; /* can't quote NUL either */ arg[i++] = c; } c = *t++; /* remember delimiter for later */ CVE Information: <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2933> CAN-2005-2933 Disclosure Timeline: 09/15/2005 - Initial vendor notification 09/15/2005 - Initial vendor response 10/04/2005 - Coordinated public disclosure ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:idlabs-advisories@lists.idefense.com> iDEFENSE Labs Security Advisories. The original article can be found at: <http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=313&type=vulnerabilities> http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=313&type=vulnerabilities ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
| <Prev in Thread] | Current Thread | [Next in Thread> |
|---|---|---|
| ||
| Previous by Date: | [NT] Symantec AntiVirus Buffer Overflow, SecuriTeam |
|---|---|
| Next by Date: | [NT] Kaspersky AntiVirus Buffer Overflow (CAB Files), SecuriTeam |
| Previous by Thread: | [NT] Symantec AntiVirus Buffer Overflow, SecuriTeam |
| Next by Thread: | [NT] Kaspersky AntiVirus Buffer Overflow (CAB Files), SecuriTeam |
| Indexes: | [Date] [Thread] [Top] [All Lists] |