The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can
be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com
- - promotion
The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent.
Get your security news from a reliable source.
http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html
- - - - - - - - -
Linksys WRT54G Router Multiple Vulnerabilities (Buffer Overflow, Multiple
Authentication Bypass, DoS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
"The
<http://www.linksys.com/servlet/Satellite?childpagename=US%2FLayout&packedargs=c%3DL_Product_C2%26cid%3D1124916802645&pagename=Linksys%2FCommon%2FVisitorWrapper>
Linksys WRT54G is a combination wireless access point, switch and router."
Lack of proper validation of input and protocol requests allows attackers
to cause a buffer overflow, DoS and bypass the authentication in algorithm
of the Linksys WRT54G Router.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* Linksys WRT54G firmware version 3.03.6
* Linksys WRT54G firmware version 3.01.03
Immune Systems:
* Linksys WRT54G firmware version 4.20.7
Buffer Overflow:
The vulnerability specifically exists in the 'apply.cgi' handler of the
HTTPd running on the internal interfaces, including the by default the
wireless interface. This handler is used by many of the configuration
pages to perform the configuration management of the router.
If an unauthenticated remote attacker sends a POST request to the
apply.cgi page on the router with a content length longer than 10000
bytes, an exploitable buffer overflow may occur.
Exploitation of this vulnerability requires that an attacker can connect
to the web management port of the router. The HTTPd is running by default
but is only accessible via the LAN ports or the WLAN (wireless LAN). An
attacker who can associate via the wireless interface to the network
running a vulnerable HTTPd could send an exploit from a wireless device,
and so not require direct physical access to an affected network.
Additionally, if the HTTPd is configured to listen on the WAN (Internet)
interface, this vulnerability would be exploitable remotely over the
Internet.
On some versions of the WRT54G firmware the buffer used to store the POST
input, 'post_buf', is before a structure in memory containing pointers to
the 'mime_handlers' structure, which contains function pointers for
handling the various types of input. By overwriting this structure so some
function pointers point into post_buf, it is possible to execute arbitrary
commands. Overwriting these values with nulls will prevent access to the
HTTPd on the system until the router is restarted. Overwriting these
values with 'garbage' values will cause the HTTPd to crash but it will be
restarted by a system monitoring process within 2 minutes, allowing
multiple exploitation attempts.
Although authentication checks are performed on access to this page, the
code which reads in the buffer is executed even if authentication fails,
so as to clear the input buffer from the client before returning an error
message. This may allow an unauthenticated user to exploit the
vulnerability.
Remote exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability in multiple
versions of the firmware for WRT54G wireless router may allow
unauthenticated execution of arbitrary commands as the root user.
Authentication Bypass:
Remote exploitation of a design error in the upgrade.cgi component of
Linksys WRT54G wireless router may allow unauthenticated modification of
the router firmware.
The vulnerability specifically exists in the "POST" method of the
upgrade.cgi handler. The HTTPd running on the internal interfaces,
including by default the wireless interface, does not check if
authentication has failed until after data supplied by an external user
has been processed. The upgrade.cgi handler allows a user to upload new
firmware, which contains the operating system and applications, into the
non-volatile memory of the router.
If the user is authenticated, the router will then restart, and the new
firmware will be loaded. If the user is not authenticated, they will
receive an error page when they attempt to upload a new firmware without
supplying authentication and the router will not reboot. The firmware will
be saved, but will not take effect until the next time the router
restarts.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability would allow an
unauthenticated user the ability to completely compromise the affected
router, by installation of an arbitrary firmware. As the source code and
tools for compiling the firmware are available from the vendor, an
attacker could simply rebuild the firmware and add the extra
functionality. Exploitation of this vulnerability would require that an
attacker connect to the web management port of the router. The HTTPd is
running by default but is only accessible via the LAN ports or the WLAN
(wireless LAN). For the uploaded firmware to be enabled, the router must
be restarted.
Authentication Bypass:
The vulnerability specifically exists in the 'POST' method of restore.cgi
handler. The HTTPd running on the internal interfaces, including by
default the wireless interface, does not check if authentication has
failed until after data supplied by an external user has been processed.
The restore.cgi handler allows a user to upload a new configuration into
the non-volatile memory of the router. If the user is authenticated, the
router will then restart, and the new configuration will be loaded.
If the user is not authenticated, they will receive an error page when
they attempt to upload a new configuration without supplying
authentication and the router will not reboot. The settings the user set
will be saved, but will not take effect until the next time the router
restarts.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability would allow an
unauthenticated user the ability to modify the configuration of the
affected router, including the password. This could allow firewall rules
to be changed, installation of a new firmware with other features, or
denial of service. Exploitation of this vulnerability would require that
an attacker can connect to the web management port of the router. The
HTTPd is running by default but is only accessible via the LAN ports or
the WLAN (wireless LAN). A mitigating factor is that if the firmware
settings are saved by a process on the router before the server is reset,
the saved settings will overwrite the settings uploaded by the attacker.
An attacker who can associate with a network running a vulnerable HTTPd
could send an exploit from a wireless device to reset the password on the
device and enable the remote management port, allowing continued access
from the Internet.
Remote exploitation of a design error in the 'restore.cgi' component of
Linksys WRT54G wireless router may allow unauthenticated modification of
the router configuration.
Authentication Bypass:
Remote exploitation of a design error in multiple versions of the firmware
for Cisco Systems Inc.'s Linksys WRT54G wireless router may allow
unauthenticated modification of the router configuration.
The vulnerability specifically exists in the 'ezconfig.asp' handler of the
HTTPd running on the internal interfaces, including by default the
wireless interface. This handler is used by the 'ezSetup' to perform the
initial setup of the router.
Vulnerable Code:
struct mime_handler mime_handlers[] = {
//{ "ezconfig.asp", "text/html", ezc_version, do_apply_ezconfig_post,
do_ezconfig_asp, do_auth },
/*Modified by Daniel(2004-09-06);*/
{ "ezconfig.asp", "text/html", ezc_version, do_apply_ezconfig_post,
do_ezconfig_asp, NULL },
The 'auth()' method for this page does not contain an authentication
initialization function. As the authentication initializer (do_auth) was
removed, no check is made when requesting the page. If the auth_fail flag
was set for any reason, this call will fail. The code which sets the
auth_fail flag is shown below. When the HTTPd starts, the value of
auth_flag defaults to 0.
Vulnerable Code:
if (handler->auth) {
handler->auth(auth_userid, auth_passwd, auth_realm);
auth_fail = 0;
if (!auth_check(auth_realm, authorization))
auth_fail = 1;
}
The request returns an encrypted version of the configuration information,
however the encryption on this data is very weak, it is a simple XOR based
encryption, with a fixed 256 byte mask. In order to change the
configuration, this key must be known. Once this key is known and the new
configuration data is encrypted with it, and the new data
can simply be posted to the httpd, the new configuration will take
effect.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability would allow an
unauthenticated user the ability to modify the configuration of the
affected router, including the password. This could allow firewall rules
to be changed, installation of a new firmware with other features, or
denial of service. Exploitation of this vulnerability would require that
an attacker can connect to the web management port of the router. The
HTTPd is running by default but is only accessible via the LAN ports or
the WLAN (wireless LAN).
An attacker who can associate with a network running a vulnerable HTTPd
could send an exploit from a wireless device to reset the password on the
device and enable the remote management port, allowing continued internet
access.
Authentication credentials may be set if another user has attempted to
view a page since the router was restarted. An attacker may be able to
crash the HTTPd using another vulnerability, in which case it will restart
within 2 minutes, with no authentication details initialized.
This would then allow them to exploit the HTTPd with this vulnerability.
Workaround:
In order to prevent exposure of this vulnerability from wireless clients,
disable wireless access to the web interface:
* Connect to the web interface, typically at http://192.168.1.1/
* Go to the Administration page
* Select 'Disable' next to the 'Wireless Access Web'
* Click the 'Save Settings' button.
Please note that this will only prevent wireless access, and not access
from one of the physical ports. Additionally, other vulnerabilities in the
HTTPd may allow exploitation of the router, even with this setting
enabled.
Dos:
The vulnerability exists in several of the "POST" method handlers of the
HTTPd running on the router's internal interfaces, including by default
the wireless interface. In addition to not checking if authentication has
failed until after data supplied by an external user has been processed,
there are several places where the Content-Length is assumed to be valid.
In some of those cases, data is read in without error checking while
decrementing the length value. If the Content Length is set to a negative
number, these checks will take an extremely long time, during which the
HTTPd will become unresponsive.
An unauthenticated remote attacker may cause a DoS on the affected router.
Exploitation of this vulnerability would require that an attacker can
connect to the web management port of the router. The HTTPd is running by
default, but is only accessible via the LAN ports or the WLAN (wireless
LAN).
Although this DoS is against the HTTPd itself, it may cause a higher than
normal load on the router, which may be sufficient to cause packet loss.
The HTTPd will also be unavailable. This may be sufficient to cause to
owner to restart the device, which could in turn trigger changes made by a
previous vulnerability.
Remote exploitation of an input validation error within the web management
HTTPd component of Linksys WRT54G wireless router may allow
unauthenticated users to cause a denial of service (DoS).
Vendor Status:
This vulnerability is addressed in firmware version 4.20.7 available for
download at:
<http://www.linksys.com/servlet/Satellite?childpagename=US%2FLayout&packedargs=c%3DL_Download_C2%26cid%3D1115417109974%26sku%3D1124916802645&pagename=Linksys%2FCommon%2FVisitorWrapper>
WRT54G - Wireless-G Broadband Router V4.0
CVE Information:
<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2799>
CAN-2005-2799
06/07/2005 Initial vendor notification - Buffer overflow, Authentication
Bypass - Initial vendor response - Buffer overflow, Authentication Bypass
07/05/2005 Initial vendor notification - Authentication Bypass, DoS
07/25/2005 Initial vendor response - Authentication Bypass, DoS
09/13/2005 Coordinated public disclosure
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by
<mailto:idlabs-advisories@lists.idefense.com> iDEFENSE Labs Security
Advisories.
The original article can be found at:
<http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=304&type=vulnerabilities>
http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=304&type=vulnerabilities,
<http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=305&type=vulnerabilities>
http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=305&type=vulnerabilities,
<http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=306&type=vulnerabilities>
http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=306&type=vulnerabilities,
<http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=307&type=vulnerabilities>
http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=307&type=vulnerabilities,
<http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=308&type=vulnerabilities>
http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=308&type=vulnerabilities
========================================
This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list.
To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to:
list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com
In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to:
list-subscribe@securiteam.com
====================
====================
DISCLAIMER:
The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any
kind.
In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct,
indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special
damages.
