Ethical Hacking Learn to find vulnerabilities before the bad guys do! Gain real world hands on hacking experience in our state of the art hacking lab. Course designed and taught by expert instructors with years of penetration testing experience. 12 student maximum in every class. Certification attempt included in every package. | Computer Forensics Training at InfoSec Institute Gain the in-demand skills of a certified computer examiner, learn to recover trace data left behind by fraud, theft, and cybercrime perpetrators. Discover the source of computer crime and abuse at your organization so that it never happens again. All of our class sizes are guaranteed to be 12 students or less to facilitate one-on-one interaction with one of our expert instructors. |

| Subject: | [NEWS] Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and Telnet Sessions Buffer Overflow |
|---|---|
| Date: | 8 Sep 2005 10:04:50 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and Telnet Sessions Buffer Overflow ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY The Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions feature in specific versions of Cisco IOS software is vulnerable to a remotely-exploitable buffer overflow condition. Devices that do not support, or are not configured for Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Services are not affected. Devices configured with only Authentication Proxy for HTTP and/or HTTPS are not affected. Only devices running certain versions of Cisco IOS are affected. Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability. There are workarounds available to mitigate the effects of the vulnerability. DETAILS Vulnerable Products Devices that are running the following release trains of Cisco IOS are affected if Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions is configured and applied to an active interface. * 12.2ZH and 12.2ZL based trains * 12.3 based trains * 12.3T based trains * 12.4 based trains * 12.4T based trains To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating System Software" or simply "IOS." On the next line of output, the image name will be displayed between parentheses, followed by "Version" and the Cisco IOS release name. Other Cisco devices will not have the show version command, or will give different output. The following example identifies a Cisco 7200 router running Cisco IOS release 12.3(10a) with an installed image name of C7200-JK8O3S-M. Router#show version Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) 7200 Software (C7200-JK8O3S-M), Version 12.3(10a), RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2) Copyright (c) 1986-2004 by cisco Systems, Inc. Additional information about Cisco IOS release naming can be found at <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html. Refer to the Details section for more information about affected and unaffected configurations. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable * Products that are not running Cisco IOS are not affected * Products that are running Cisco IOS versions 12.2 and earlier (including 12.0S) are not affected. (excluding 12.2ZH and 12.2ZL) * Products that are running Cisco IOS are not affected unless they are configured for Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions. * Products that are running Cisco IOS XR are not affected. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. Details The Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature allows network administrators to apply specific security policies on a per-user basis. With the Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions feature, users can log into the network services via FTP and/or Telnet, and their specific access profiles are automatically retrieved and applied from a Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS), or Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus (TACACS+) authentication server. Cisco IOS Software is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) and potentially an arbitrary code execution attack when processing the user authentication credentials from an Authentication Proxy Telnet/FTP session. To exploit this vulnerability an attacker must first complete a TCP connection to the IOS device running affected software and receive an auth-proxy authentication prompt. This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco Bug Toolkit as Bug ID CSCsa54608 (registered customers only) To determine if your device is running Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions feature, log into the device and issue the show ip auth-proxy configuration command to display the configuration of Firewall Authentication Proxy services. The following example identifies Firewall Authentication Proxy services running for Telnet and FTP under the proxy rule name proxy_example. Router#show ip auth-proxy configuration Authentication global cache time is 60 minutes Authentication global absolute time is 0 minutes Authentication Proxy Watch-list is disabled Authentication Proxy Rule Configuration Auth-proxy name proxy_example ftp list not specified auth-cache-time 60 minutes telnet list not specified auth-cache-time 60 minutes The following will be seen if Firewall Authentication Proxy services are not enabled but supported in your IOS version: Router#show ip auth-proxy configuration Authentication global cache time is 60 minutes Authentication global absolute time is 0 minutes Authentication Proxy Watch-list is disabled Router# The following will be seen if running a version of IOS that does not support Firewall Authentication Proxy services: Router#show ip auth-proxy configuration ^ % Invalid input detected at '^' marker. Router# A router that has Firewall Authentication Proxy services assigned to an interface will have ip auth-proxy command under an interface in the show running-config output. The following example identifies Firewall Authentication Proxy services running under the proxy rule name "proxy_example" applied to the interface Ethernet 2/1: Router#show ip auth-proxy configuration Authentication global cache time is 60 minutes Authentication global absolute time is 0 minutes Authentication Proxy Watch-list is disabled Authentication Proxy Rule Configuration Auth-proxy name proxy_example ftp list not specified auth-cache-time 60 minutes telnet list not specified auth-cache-time 60 minutes Router#show running-config ! ! ! interface Ethernet2/1 ip address 10.1.1.1 255.255.255.0 ip auth-proxy proxy_example ! ! ! Additional information about Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy services refer to: <http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios120/120newft/120t/120t5/iosfw2/iosfw2_1.htm> Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy. Additional information about Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions refer to: <http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios123/123newft/123_1/ftp_tel.htm> Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and Telnet Sessions Impact Successful exploitation of the vulnerability on Cisco IOS may result in a reload of the device or execution of arbitrary code. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS attack or execution of arbitrary code on Cisco IOS devices. Software Versions and Fixes The following link provides information on affected versions and their appropriate patches: <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050907-auth_proxy.shtml#software> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050907-auth_proxy.shtml#software Workarounds The effectiveness of any workaround is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Disable Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature for Telnet/FTP sessions In networks where Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature for Telnet/FTP sessions is not required but enabled, disabling the feature on an IOS device will eliminate exposure to this vulnerability. On a router which is configured for Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature for Telnet/FTP sessions, this must be done by issuing the command: "no ip auth-proxy name 'auth-proxy-name' {ftp | telnet}" Deploy Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature for HTTP/HTTPS sessions Configure the device with Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature for HTTP and/or HTTPS sessions and allow the Telnet and FTP services within the per-user TACACS+/RADIUS profile. Disable Authentication proxy for Telnet/FTP sessions to eliminate exposure. An example of the configuration statements for HTTP session Auth-proxy is: ! Configure auth-proxy for http session authentication ip auth-proxy name http-proxy http ! Configure the router's web server to service auth-proxy authentication attempts ip http server ! Set the HTTP server authentication method to AAA ip http authentication aaa Additional auth-proxy and web server configuration settings are available. For details see: <http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios120/120newft/120t/120t5/iosfw2/iosfw2_1.htm> Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy After successful authentication via HTTP/HTTPS, the user can initiate required FTP or Telnet sessions. The example shown below for Cisco Secure Windows (TACACS+) server profile Group setting allows FTP and Telnet as part of access-list entry proxyacl#2=permit tcp any any priv-lvl=15 proxyacl#1=permit icmp any any proxyacl#2=permit tcp any any proxyacl#3=permit udp any any Mitigations Not all of the mitigation strategies listed will work for all customers. Some of the workarounds listed are dependent on which versions and feature-sets of IOS you have in your network. These mitigation strategies, may help reduce exposure to this vulnerability. To eliminate exposure to this vulnerability, customers should apply one of the workarounds listed above, or upgrade to a fixed release of Cisco IOS. Access Control Lists (ACLs) Deploying IP access-lists can mitigate the effects of this vulnerability by allowing Firewall Authentication Proxy access only from trusted subnets. This feature must be used in conjunction with interface access-lists to ensure that IP traffic from un-trusted subnets is dropped by the router and not forwarded around the auth-proxy feature. Once the IP access-list is created, it is applied to the Authentication proxy by adding the keyword "list" followed by the IP access-list name or number. In the example below the trusted network is 169.160.160.0/24 and the auth-proxy router interface is 10.66.65.47. Example: ! Permit trusted network 169.160.160.0/24 to access auth-proxy access-list 105 permit tcp 169.160.160.0 0.0.0.255 any eq telnet ! ! Deny all IP traffic that is not authenticated by auth-proxy ! Note: Management and Control traffic to the router itself would ! need to be allowed in this access-list access-list 106 deny ip any any ! ! Modify the telnet auth-proxy config to use access-list 105 ip auth-proxy name tel-proxy telnet inactivity-time 60 list 105 ! ! Apply interface access-list 106 and auth-proxy test interface FastEthernet1/0 ip address 10.66.65.47 255.255.255.0 ip access-group 106 in ip auth-proxy tel-proxy For further information on creating IP access lists see Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801a1a55.shtml> Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists and Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/tacl.html> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/tacl.html Control Plane Policing The Control Plane Policy (CoPP) feature can be used to mitigate the effects of this vulnerability by only allowing trusted hosts to attempt connections through the auth-proxy router. Care must be taken to ensure that legitimate management connections to the auth-proxy router itself are not dropped by the CoPP policy. In the following example trusted management host 169.160.160.1 is allowed to establish Telnet connections to the auth-proxy router itself. Trusted network 169.160.160.0/24 is allowed to attempt FTP and Telnet auth-proxy connections to IP networks and addresses other than the auth-proxy router itself. All other inbound FTP and Telnet connections attempts are denied. The auth-proxy router's IP addresses are 172.16.1.1 (Internet Side), 1.1.1.1/24 and 10.66.65.47 (Internal). Telnet/FTP server is 172.168.1.1. ! Do not police Telnet from trusted management host 169.160.160.1 to the auth-proxy ! router access-list 105 remark ** Do not police telnet from Trusted Hosts to Auth-Proxy Router ** access-list 105 deny tcp host 169.160.160.1 host 172.16.1.1 eq telnet access-list 105 deny tcp host 172.168.1.1 host 1.1.1.1 eq telnet access-list 105 deny tcp host 172.168.1.1 host 10.66.65.47 eq telnet ! ! Police all other telnet and ftp connections to the auth-proxy router access-list 105 remark ** Police all other telnet/ftp attempts to Auth-Proxy Router ** access-list 105 permit tcp any host 172.16.1.1 eq telnet access-list 105 permit tcp any host 1.1.1.1 eq telnet access-list 105 permit tcp any host 10.66.65.47 eq telnet access-list 105 permit tcp any host 172.16.1.1 eq ftp access-list 105 permit tcp any host 1.1.1.1 eq ftp access-list 105 permit tcp any host 10.66.65.47 eq ftp ! ! Allow telnet and ftp auth-proxy for trusted network 169.160.160.0/24 access-list 105 remark ** Allow Auth-Proxy sessions from trusted networks ** access-list 105 deny tcp 169.160.160.0 0.0.0.255 any eq telnet access-list 105 deny tcp 169.160.160.0 0.0.0.255 any eq ftp ! ! Allow telnet and ftp auth-proxy for trusted network back to 169.160.160.0/24 access-list 105 remark ** Allow Auth-Proxy sessions to trusted networks ** access-list 105 deny tcp host 172.168.1.1 169.160.160.0 0.0.0.255 ! ! Allow TACACS+ from ACS server 10.66.79.229 access-list 105 remark ** Ensure we can still communicate with TACACS+ Server ** access-list 105 deny tcp host 10.66.79.229 gt 1023 host 10.66.65.47 eq 49 access-list 105 deny tcp host 10.66.79.229 eq 49 host 10.66.65.47 gt 1023 ! ! Police all TCP based management traffic from un-trusted hosts ! Note: If BGP is configured it would need to be allowed before this access-list entry access-list 105 remark ** Drop any other TCP connections ** access-list 105 permit tcp any any ! ! Do not police any other type of traffic going to the router access-list 105 remark ** Rest do not police ** access-list 105 deny ip any any ! class-map match-all only-allow-trusted-hosts match access-group 105 ! policy-map control-plane-policy ! Drop all traffic that matches the class "only-allow-trusted-hosts" class only-allow-trusted-hosts drop ! control-plane service-policy input control-plane-policy Note: CoPP is available only in IOS release trains 12.0S, 12.2S and 12.3T. Additional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can be found at the following URL: <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1838/products_white_paper09186a00801afad4.shtml> Control Plane Policing Transit Access Control Lists Additional mitigation can be added by Transit Access Control Lists that filter transit and edge traffic at network ingress points should be configured so that IP traffic is only allowed from legitimate, trusted IP addresses. For more information on tACLs, refer to: <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/tacl.html> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/tacl.html ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:psirt@cisco.com> Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team. The original article can be found at: <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050907-auth_proxy.shtml> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050907-auth_proxy.shtml ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
| <Prev in Thread] | Current Thread | [Next in Thread> |
|---|---|---|
| ||
| Previous by Date: | [NT] IIS 5.1 Source Disclosure Under FAT/FAT32 Volumes Using WebDAV, SecuriTeam |
|---|---|
| Next by Date: | [NT] SecureOL VE2 Information Disclosure, SecuriTeam |
| Previous by Thread: | [NT] IIS 5.1 Source Disclosure Under FAT/FAT32 Volumes Using WebDAV, SecuriTeam |
| Next by Thread: | [NT] SecureOL VE2 Information Disclosure, SecuriTeam |
| Indexes: | [Date] [Thread] [Top] [All Lists] |