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| Subject: | [NEWS] Default SNMP Community Strings in Cisco IP/VC Products |
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| Date: | 3 Feb 2005 11:05:19 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - Default SNMP Community Strings in Cisco IP/VC Products ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY Hard-coded Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) community strings are present in Cisco IP/VC Videoconferencing System models 3510, 3520, 3525 and 3530. Any user who has access to the vulnerable devices and knows the community strings, can obtain total control of the device. Cisco strongly recommends that all users deploy the mitigation measures outlined in the Workaround section. DETAILS Affected Products: Vulnerable Products The following products are known to be vulnerable: * Cisco IPVC-3510-MCU * Cisco IPVC-3520-GW-2B * Cisco IPVC-3520-GW-4B * Cisco IPVC-3520-GW-2V * Cisco IPVC-3520-GW-4V * Cisco IPVC-3520-GW-2B2V * Cisco IPVC-3525-GW-1P * Cisco IPVC-3530-VTA Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable The following products are known not to be vulnerable: * Cisco IPVC-3511-MCU * Cisco IPVC-3511-MCU-E * Cisco IPVC-3521-GW-4B * Cisco IPVC-3526-GW-1P * Cisco IPVC-3540-EMP * Cisco IPVC-3540-EMP3 * Cisco IPVC-3540-MCU03A * Cisco IPVC-3540-MCU06A * Cisco IPVC-3540-MCU10A * Cisco IPVC-3540-GW2P * Cisco IPVC-3540-GW4S No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. In particular, video-enabled Cisco IP video telephones are not affected. Details Affected products contain hard-coded SNMP community strings. SNMP is used for managing and monitoring an IP/VC device and community strings are the equivalent to a password. All models listed as affected are vulnerable regardless of the software release they are running. Impact A user with knowledge of the community strings can gain full control of the device. Such user can, among other things, create new services, terminate or affect existing sessions, and redirect traffic to a different destination. Software Versions and Fixes Cisco will not provide fixed software for this vulnerability. Customers are strongly advised to deploy the mitigation measures described in the Workaround section. Workarounds The only mitigation for this vulnerability is to disable SNMP traffic at the switch port that is connected to the affected device. If that cannot be done, the SNMP traffic to the IP/VC device should be blocked at the nearest possible point. In order for the mitigation to be successful all possible paths to the device must be protected. This can be done by blocking traffic on UDP (User Datagram Protocol) ports 161 and 162. Port 161 is used for inbound/outbound read/write SNMP access and port 162 is used for outbound traffic for SNMP traps. Blocking these ports disables all configuration and traps to/from the device. Access to ports 161 and 162 from the trusted hosts should be temporarily enabled and the IPVC Configuration Utility used when configuration changes are required on the affected IP/VC device. The effectiveness of any workaround is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:psirt@cisco.com> Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team. The original article can be found at: <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050202-ipvc.shtml> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050202-ipvc.shtml ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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