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| Subject: | [NT] Danware NetOp Host Multiple Information Disclosure Issues |
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| Date: | 22 Nov 2004 11:34:07 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - Danware NetOp Host Multiple Information Disclosure Issues ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY The <http://www.danware.com> Danware NetOp Host and Guest products provide remote control capabilities for a variety of operating systems. The data exchange between the Guest and Host can be protected by both authentication and encryption, but even with these options enabled the NetOp proprietary protocol can still disclose the hostname, username and local IP address of the host system. DETAILS Vulnerable Systems: * Danware NetOp versions prior to 7.65 build 2004278 Immune Systems: * Danware NetOp version 7.65 build 2004278 The NetOp Host and Guest products use a number of standard transport protocols (such as UDP, TCP and IPX) to encapsulate a proprietary data exchange through which remote control services are provided. This proprietary exchange can be protected by a number of optional features, such as authentication and data encryption. However, early on in the session initiation process (prior to both authentication and encryption being enforced), it is still possible for the hostname, username and local IP address of the host system to be disclosed. If a valid NetOp HELO request is sent to the host, then it responds with a packet that may contain one or more of the NetOp hostname, username and local IP address value. Although the hostname option can be overridden, the default setting is to "use Windows computer name". If enabled, the username returned will be the name of the current logged in user (if any). Additionally, if the system is protected by a firewall or other device that provides NAT services between private and public address ranges, then the private addressing information will be disclosed. The NetOp products provide an option to disable making this information public, however in versions prior to 7.65 build 2004278 this does not work as intended, and can be bypassed with the use of a custom HELO request. Although none of these disclosures are critical in themselves, they provide additional information that may be combined with other vulnerabilities to launch further attacks against the host. Recommendations: Upgrade to NetOp 7.65 build 2004278. Under the options "Host Name" tab, uncheck the "Public Host name" option. If upgrading to NetOp 7.65 build 2004278 is not feasible, the following workaround eliminates most disclosures of the computer and user name, but does not protect against disclosing the private addressing through a NAT gateway: Under the options "Host Name" tab, select the "Enter name or leave name field blank" radio button, and uncheck both the "Public Host name" and "Enable User Name" options. In the name entry field then appearing on the main program screen, actually leave the name field blank. CVE Information: <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0950> CAN-2004-0950 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:martin.oneal@corsaire.com> Martin O'Neal. ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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