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| Subject: | [NEWS] Cisco IOS Malformed OSPF Packet Causes Reload |
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| Date: | 19 Aug 2004 11:03:01 +0200 |
The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com - - promotion The SecuriTeam alerts list - Free, Accurate, Independent. Get your security news from a reliable source. http://www.securiteam.com/mailinglist.html - - - - - - - - - Cisco IOS Malformed OSPF Packet Causes Reload ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY A Cisco device running Internetwork Operating System (IOS) and enabled for the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack from a malformed OSPF packet. The OSPF protocol is not enabled by default. The vulnerability is only present in Cisco IOS release trains based on 12.0S, 12.2, and 12.3. Releases based on 12.0, 12.1 mainlines, and all Cisco IOS images prior to 12.0 are not affected. Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability. There are workarounds available to mitigate the effects. DETAILS Vulnerable Products: This vulnerability was introduced by a code change that was committed to the 12.0S, 12.2, and 12.3 based release trains, causing these trains to be vulnerable. All Cisco devices running a vulnerable release train and running OSPF process are vulnerable. Some release trains that are not vulnerable are explicitly listed below for clarification. The release trains that are not mentioned below are not vulnerable. Release Train - Vulnerable Versions 10.x based releases - Not vulnerable 11.x based releases - Not vulnerable 12.0 based releases (except for 12.0.S based releases) - Not vulnerable 12.1 based releases - Not vulnerable 12.0.S - 12.0(22)S and later 12.0.SX - 12.0(23)SX and later 12.0.SY - 12.0(22)SY and later 12.0.SZ - 12.0(23)SZ and later 12.2 mainline - Not vulnerable 12.2.B - 12.2(15)B and later 12.2.BC - 12.2(15)BC and later 12.2.BX - 12.2(15)BX and later 12.2.BZ - 12.2(15)BZ and later 12.2.CX - 12.2(15)CX and later 12.2.EW - 12.2(18)EW and later 12.2.MC - 12.2(15)MC1 and later 12.2.S - 12.2(18)S and later 12.2.SE - 12.2(18)SE and later 12.2.SV - 12.2(18)SV and later 12.2.SW - 12.2(18)SW and later 12.2.SZ - 12.2(14)SZ and later 12.2.T - 12.2(15)T and later 12.2.YU - 12.2(11)YU and later 12.2.YV - 12.2(11)YV and later 12.2.ZD - 12.2(13)ZD and later 12.2.ZE - 12.2(13)ZE and later 12.2.ZF - 12.2(13)ZF and later 12.2.ZG - 12.2(13)ZG and later 12.2.ZH - 12.2(13)ZH and later 12.2.ZJ - 12.2(15)ZJ and later 12.2.ZK - 12.2(15)ZK and later 12.2.ZL - 12.2(15)ZL and later 12.2.ZN - 12.2(15)ZN and later 12.2.ZO - 12.2(15)ZO and later 12.3 - All 12.3 releases 12.3.B - All 12.3.B releases 12.3.BW - All 12.3.BW releases 12.3.T - All 12.3.T releases 12.3.XA - All 12.3.XA releases 12.3.XB - All 12.3.XB releases 12.3.XC - All 12.3.XC releases 12.3.XE - All 12.3.XE releases A Cisco device that is running an OSPF process will have a line in the configuration defining the process number, which can be seen by issuing the command show running-config: router ospf {process number} To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating System Software" or simply "IOS." On the next line of output, the image name will be displayed between parentheses, followed by "Version" and the Cisco IOS release name. Other Cisco devices will not have the show version command, or will give different output. The following example identifies a Cisco product running Cisco IOS release 12.0(3) with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L: Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (TM) 2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.0(3), RELEASE SOFTWARE The release train label is "12.0." The next example shows a product running Cisco IOS release 12.0(2a)T1 with an image name of C2600-JS-MZ: Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) C2600 Software (C2600-JS-MZ), Version 12.0(2a)T1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1) Additional information about Cisco IOS release naming can be found at <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable: * Products that are not running Cisco IOS are not affected * Products running Cisco IOS versions 12.0 and earlier (excluding 12.0 S), 12.1 mainline and 12.2 mainline are not vulnerable * Products running IOS release trains that are not mentioned in the above table are not vulnerable * Products running any version of Cisco IOS that do not have OSPF configured are not vulnerable Details: OSPF is a routing protocol defined by RFC 2328. It is designed to manage IP routing inside an Autonomous System (AS). OSPF packets use IP protocol number 89. A vulnerability exists in the processing of an OSPF packet that can be exploited to cause the reload of a system. Several parameters need to be known by an attacker to successfully exploit this vulnerability. These are the OSPF area number, netmask, hello, and dead timers that are configured on the targeted interface. Since OSPF needs to process Unicast packets as well as multicast packets, this vulnerability can be exploited remotely. It is also possible for an attacker to target multiple systems on the local segment at a time. Using OSPF Authentication as described in the workarounds section can be used to mitigate the effects of this vulnerability. Using OSPF Authentication is a highly recommended security best practice A Cisco device receiving a malformed OSPF packet will reset and may take several minutes to become fully functional. This vulnerability may be exploited repeatedly resulting in an extended DOS attack. This issue is documented in bug ID CSCec16481. Impact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability results in a reload of the device. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS attack. Software Versions and Fixes: A table listing all the affected software version and their appropriate fixes can be found at: <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20040818-ospf.shtml#software> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20040818-ospf.shtml#software Obtaining Fixed Software: Customers with Service Contracts Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third-party Support Organizations Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for assistance with the upgrade, which should be free of charge. Customers without Service Contracts Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Please do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com" for software upgrades. Workarounds The effectiveness of any workaround is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. There are multiple workarounds available to mitigate the effects of this vulnerability. Using OSPF Authentication OSPF authentication may be used as a workaround. OSPF packets without a valid key will not be processed. MD5 authentication is highly recommended, due to inherent weaknesses in plain text authentication. With plain text authentication, the authentication key will be sent unencrypted over the network, which can allow an attacker on a local network segment to capture the key by sniffing packets. Refer to <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/104/25.shtml> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/104/25.shtml for more information about OSPF authentication. Infrastructure Access Control Lists Although it is often difficult to block traffic transiting your network, it is possible to identify traffic which should never be allowed to target your infrastructure devices and block that traffic at the border of your network. Infrastructure ACLs are considered a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The white paper "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for infrastructure protection ACLs: <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/iacl.html> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/iacl.html. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The information has been provided by <mailto:psirt@cisco.com> Cisco Products Security. The original article can be found at: <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20040818-ospf.shtml> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20040818-ospf.shtml ======================================== This bulletin is sent to members of the SecuriTeam mailing list. To unsubscribe from the list, send mail with an empty subject line and body to: list-unsubscribe@securiteam.com In order to subscribe to the mailing list, simply forward this email to: list-subscribe@securiteam.com ==================== ==================== DISCLAIMER: The information in this bulletin is provided "AS IS" without warranty of any kind. In no event shall we be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages.
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