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| Subject: | Re: Forensic disk duplication modifies the evidence hard disk |
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| Date: | Fri, 27 May 2005 21:46:23 -0500 |
On Friday 27 May 2005 06:21, Steven McLeod wrote:
SMART Anti-Forensics This paper highlights an oversight in the current industry best practice procedure for forensically duplicating a hard disk. A discussion is provided which demonstrates that although the forensic duplication process may not directly modify data on the evidence hard disk, a hard disk will usually modify itself during the forensic duplication process. The paper highlights some consequences, for example that an attacker who has compromised the computer containing the hard disk can programmatically detect that the hard disk has been forensically duplicated, or otherwise powered on and accessed via a mechanism other than via the operating system installed on the hard disk. Suggestions are provided to help minimise the changes made to the hard disk during the forensic duplication process. These suggestions minimise the likelihood that an attacker will notice the system administrator or forensic analyst performing an investigation of the suspected compromised computer. http://members.ozemail.com.au/~steven.mcleod/SMART_Anti_Forensics.pdf
Interesting...
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle applied to hard disks.
("You cannot measure/observe something without changing that which you are
measuring/observing.")
Given that, the act of observing the disk changes the disk. The act of
observing the change changes the change. The act of observing _that_ changes
changes _that_ change. (ad infinitum...) Therefore, there is no method by
which you can observe a disk without leaving some trace.
Then, if the change(s) is/are mitigated sufficiently, is the final result
change measurable?
Yes, it's very interesting, but I'm starting to get a headache...
--
Clinton E. Troutman
CeTro
Independent Computer Consultant for Home,
Home Office, and Small Business in Fort Worth, Texas
http://cetro.dnsalias.org/
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