Re: MD5 Collisions and Evidence Integrity

Anders Thulin wrote:
> Ferrill, Rob wrote:
> > Has anyone stopped using MD5 for hashing evidence files since the
> > disclosure of collision issues at the Crypto 2004 conference?
> The current discussion apart, it's interesting to note that
> Ferguson & Schneier (Practical Cryptography, 2003) recommend that
> neither MD5 nor SHA-1 be used. The authors set a 'security target'
> of 128 bits strength for their recommendations: SHA-256 is the
> 'weakest' hash function they recommend.

Which is also the NIST recommendation, and why they are doing a SHA-1 to 
SHA-256 migration.  I mentioned this in the posting back on 10 Nov, and the 
link to the NIST response on this issue is at this URL:
http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/collision.html

Dave
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 David W. Baker                               bakerd@mitre.org
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