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| Subject: | RE: MD5 Collisions and Evidence Integrity |
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| Date: | Thu, 11 Nov 2004 11:56:51 -0800 |
I guess my question would be the method employed to hash evidence. If a collision occurred during the hash of evidence, either a single file, or a bit stream of a group of bits, and the resultant was an inaccurate hash, what would the likelihood be of obtaining that same "collided" hash during the verification process? I would submit that prior to departing an investigation scene, that the investigator would perform a verification hash prior to releasing evidence. If the acq and ver hashes do not match, best practices dictates you reacquire the original evidence. r/Jim Butterworth, GCIA Sr. Forensic Consultant -----Original Message----- From: Jerry Shenk [mailto:jshenk@decommunications.com] Sent: Wednesday, November 10, 2004 1:17 PM To: 'Ferrill, Rob'; forensics@securityfocus.com Subject: RE: MD5 Collisions and Evidence Integrity Haven't any collisions in MD5 hashes all been intentionally contrived...I think this is very rare in actual practice. I don't think this argument has even been attempted yet has it? One solution would be to do an md5sum as well as an sha1sum. This issue was brought up in the GCFA track in Orlando earlier this year. The instructor (Rob Lee) talked about evidence not needing to be 100% infallible proof. In any court case, there will be multiple issues to support any single conclusion. It does seem that if we'd start doing md5sum and sha1sum hashes that that precaution might help in a few cases where some lawyer tries to prove that the md5sum isn't reliable. -----Original Message----- From: Ferrill, Rob [mailto:Rob.Ferrill@healthsouth.com] Sent: Tuesday, November 09, 2004 2:44 PM To: forensics@securityfocus.com Subject: MD5 Collisions and Evidence Integrity Has anyone stopped using MD5 for hashing evidence files since the disclosure of collision issues at the Crypto 2004 conference? There was some concern raised during a discussion this morning that this may not be acceptable in court cases anymore to prove evidence integrity. Thanks, Rob Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by replying to this message and deleting it from your computer. Thank you. ----------------------------------------------------------------- This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. For more information on this free incident handling, management and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com ----------------------------------------------------------------- This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. For more information on this free incident handling, management and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com Note: The information contained in this message may be privileged and confidential and thus protected from disclosure. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, or an employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the message and deleting it from your computer. Thank you. ----------------------------------------------------------------- This list is provided by the SecurityFocus ARIS analyzer service. For more information on this free incident handling, management and tracking system please see: http://aris.securityfocus.com
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