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Re: [CISSP-D] REVIEW: "The Information Security Dictionary", Urs E. Gatt

Subject: Re: [CISSP-D] REVIEW: "The Information Security Dictionary", Urs E. Gattiker
Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2005 18:41:35 +0200


this kind of dictionary is subject to change immediately and in my
opinion it should be organized as a web based dictionary. Like
whatis.com, webopedia.com or babylon.com

regards


On Mon, 14 Mar 2005 08:26:06 -0800, Rob, grandpa of Ryan, Trevor,
Devon & Hannah <rslade@computercrime.org> wrote:
 BKINSCDI.RVW   20041222
 
 "The Information Security Dictionary", Urs E. Gattiker, 2004,
 1-4020-7889-7, U$145.00/C$203.50
 %A   Urs E. Gattiker dictionary@weburb.com
 %C   233 Spring St., New York, NY   10013
 %D   2004
 %G   1-4020-7889-7
 %I   Springer-Verlag/Kluwer
 %O   U$145.00/C$203.50 212-460-1500 800-777-4643
 %O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1402078897/robsladesinterne
   http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/1402078897/robsladesinte-21
 %O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/1402078897/robsladesin03-20
 %O   tl n rl 1 tc 0 ta 2 tv 1 wq 0
 %P   411 p.
 %T   "The Information Security Dictionary"
 
 A good dictionary of information security terms is seriously needed by
 the security community, and by the computer and communications
 industry as a whole.  The "Internet Security Dictionary" (cf.
 BKINSCDC.RVW), by Phoha, was a good start, but needs to be expanded
 and updated.
 
 I have been working on a security glossary myself, so this might be
 yet another case of bias or conflict of interest.  I should also note
 that, although it is widely believed that I enjoy trashing books, I am
 actively looking for works that I can recommend.  Oh, it's easier to
 point out flaws in a work than it is to say why someone writes well. 
 However, I take no particular pleasure in having to savage a work as
 thoroughly as this one requires.
 
 Far too many of the definitions contain misleading, incomplete, or
 outright false information.  Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection Systems
 are said to discover known attacks, which might be true, but
 signature-based systems would normally be considered better for that
 purpose: you want anomaly-based detection to discover previously
 unknown attacks.  The entry for Authentication does not list the
 standard factors of something you know, have, or are.  The definition
 for the Bell-La Padula security model doesn't provide any details of
 the pattern itself, does not mention confidentiality (a central
 concept), and does not refer to the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
 Criteria and other outcomes of the paradigm.  The Biba integrity model
 is listed as "Bibra."
 
 Patent mentions the ability of the patent holder to restrict use, but
 doesn't mention that patent is only applicable to devices and that the
 device must be novel, useful, and non-obvious.  Reference is made to
 copyright (the definition of which is equally flawed) and to Tables
 16A and B, neither of which alludes to intellectual property laws.  No
 listing is given for trade secrets or trade marks.  Both the entry for
 patent and the account of copyright state that patents protect ideas,
 which is specifically untrue.
 
 There is a listing for Illegal Software (software used without a
 licence), although there isn't one for piracy.  There is one for
 Software Piracy, but neither of the two cross-references points to
 Illegal Software.  There is an entry for Cable, as in cable TV, but
 nothing for cabling as in network media, which has much greater
 importance in terms of information security.  Challenge Handshake
 points to Handshake (there is no listing for challenge/response) and,
 for some completely inexplicable reason, also to Circuit-Level
 Gateway.  
 
 The sub-listing for Content Filtering (which comes under filtering,
 rather than content) makes no mention of the origin of the practice in
 restricting access to objectionable material.
 
 "DoS on the 13 Internet Root Servers" is not the title of a famous
 Cultural Revolution artwork, but a reference to the October, 2002
 attack against the top-level DNS servers.  Almost no details of the
 event are provided (and this was actually a *distributed* denial of
 service attack).
 
 Digital Versatile Disk (generally used as an update to Digital Video
 Disk, the original expansion of the DVD acronym) is defined as using
 both sides of the disk (almost unknown in commercial DVDs) and also
 notes a capacity of 17 gigabytes, which would actually require both
 sides and both depths.
 
 One of the sub-entries under Disinfection is Generic Scan String,
 which has nothing to do with disinfection of computer viruses.
 
 "Activity monitor" is defined solely in terms of employee
 surveillance, and ignores the specialized use in malware detection.
 
 The entry for Cookies states (incorrectly) that they can only be used
 by the originating site.  However, there is a cross-reference to table
 18A (a mere 140 pages from the entry).  Table 18A has no mention of
 the term.  Table 18B does have a listing for Java Cookies--which
 contradicts the earlier assertion, and says that other parties can
 read cookies.  Defence-In-Depth has a reference to Table 6A.  There is
 no 6A, although there is a 6.  Table 6 contains no reference to
 defence-in-depth.
 
 Urs isn't always certain of his definitions: an Application Level
 Gateway "could" be a type of firewall.  However, in that case, he is
 certain that it re-addresses traffic--which is actually the function
 of network address translation (NAT), generally considered a type of
 circuit-level proxy firewall.  Phishing is equated with "carding"
 (obtaining or trading in credit card numbers for fraudulent use) while
 the more definitive practice of obtaining banking information is
 ignored.  (We are told that avoiding the running of attachments
 prevents phishing.  Phishing scams seldom make use of attachments or
 executable code.)
 
 Cross references are not always accurate.  On page 12 the listing for
 "Anti-Virus Researcher" points to the entry for "Research."  There is
 no material for Anti-Virus Researcher in that entry, but there is in
 the later entry for "Researcher."  Ethics points to Justice, which
 doesn't say anything about ethics.
 
 Some of the terms included are rather odd.  "Binders" are supposed to
 be utilities that bind multiple code modules together.  Most people
 refer to these utilities as linkers.  "Derf" was used as a term for
 hijacking sessions on logged in terminals, but in a limited setting
 and quite a while back: the term is pretty much unknown today.
 
 The definitions given for some entries don't seem to have any real
 meaning.  For example, "Virus Algorithm means a set of operations or a
 procedure designed to create a virus problem."  Many long definitions
 appear to have been patched together from disparate and unrelated
 sources, not listing additional meanings, just appending disjointed
 verbiage.
 
 Some of the definitions given are correct.  Heck, some are copied
 straight out of government documents.  But Gattiker has included a
 number of terms which are either generic, or have only the most
 tenuous of connections to security.  There is an entry for Computer
 Mouse.  There is a listing for the fictional cyberpunks, but no
 mention of the real-world cypherpunk community.  The definition for
 Virology deals only with biology.  The entry for Virus is only
 relevant to (pretty much obsolete) file infectors.
 
 As could be expected with a work of this calibre, a number of terms
 are simply missing.  There are entries for false positive and false
 negative, but none for false acceptance or false rejection (the more
 widely known terms for similar concepts).
 
 It is difficult to give a complete picture of the unreliability of
 this text.  It would be easy for me to simply do an exhaustive search
 of every minor error, and in a few pages collect all that might be
 wrong with an otherwise great work.  But in this volume we have
 spurious listings, missing entries, definitions that make no sense to
 the reader, explanations that are erroneous, and even opinion stated
 as fact.  (The man, or manual, pages of the UNIX system, incorrectly
 identified as "main" pages, are said to be technobabble, presumably
 because Urs doesn't understand their cryptic nature.)  Slang is
 included and technical terms are left out.
 
 Probably the best way to give a flavour of the quality of this work is
 to reproduce some listings.  (I have tried to be as careful as
 possible in copying the exact writing and punctuation of the entries
 as they appear in the book.)
 
 A listing that sounds good but makes no sense (as well as being a non-
 sequitur) provides a good feel for the quality of language and logic
 representative of the work as a whole:
 
     Homomorphic Encryption is a cryptographic technique in which
     the sum of two encrypted values is equal to the encrypted sum
     of the values.  The signature operation in public key
     cryptography is an exponentiation operation using the private
     key as the exponent.
 
 According to "Algebraic Aspects of Cryptography" by Neal Koblitz (cf.
 BKALASCR.RVW), and a number of other references, homomorphism refers
 to groups or sets rather than express algorithms or techniques. 
 Homomorphic encryption can be useful for signature or authentication
 systems where anonymity is important (such as in voting procedures)
 but it probably isn't necessary to specify exponentiation.
 
 The sub-entry for "Anti-Virus Researcher or Security Assurance
 Researcher" on page 270 is lengthier, and requires a bit more
 dissection:
 
     Anti-Virus Researcher or Security Assurance Researcher may
     conduct his or her research in many ways.  An example might be
     a lawyer searching among old court cases for legal precedents
     regarding Privacy and Hacking.
 
     An epidemiologist studying age groups or cohorts and hip-
     fracture incidents to an Anti-Virus Researcher studying
     malicious code to discover programming patterns and
     characteristics (see Theory).
 
     Often Anti-Virus Researcher is used synonymously with "product
     development."  Sometimes, a "bonafide antivirus researcher's"
     role within his or her organization might be documented by
     independent examination (see also Appendix 3 and badguys
     website).
 
 It should be reasonably obvious that the specialized activity of
 antivirus research and the more general undertaking of security
 assurance research are not exactly synonymous.  In addition, very
 little antivirus research involves case law.  If you are confused by
 the meaning of the sentence about an epidemiologist, you are not
 alone.  Again, very little antivirus research involves hip-fractures. 
 Some AV researchers are also product developers, but the two
 activities are hardly identical.  The reference to "badguys website"
 is to the "Bad Guys" Website (www.badguys.org) run by Sarah Gordon,
 which does have some information about legitimate virus research, in
 opposition to the blackhats who write viruses and call themselves
 researchers.
 
 If, following the cross reference to Theory, we flip to page 324, we
 find a sub-entry for "Anti-Virus Theory":
 
     Anti-Virus Theory if it would exist would be based on
     Inductive or Deductive Research outline phenomena and their
     relationship to other issues.  Hence, investigation of the
     subject aimed at uncovering new information in a systematic
     way, while permitting a group of statements about how some
     part of the world works, in this case Computer Viruses.  A
     good Anti-Virus Theory would allow us to generalize from one
     virus to the next (see Tables 19A and 19B).
 
 The wording here would seem to imply that Anti-Virus Theory does not
 exist, which raises the immediate question of why you would include an
 entry for a non-existent entity.  Induction and deduction are fairly
 broad tools: the first sentence doesn't really appear to say anything
 useful about the type of theory or research.  Tables 19A and B are
 nowhere near that entry.  In fact, you will find them on pages 207 and
 209-11.  Neither do the tables have anything to do with viruses: they
 talk about the costs and prevalence of various forms of Internet
 access.  In any case, that entry doesn't appear to say anything about
 any theory to do with computer viruses, beyond the definition of a
 theory in general.
 
 (If we follow the further cross-reference to "Methodology," we find no
 allusion to antivirus research at all.)
 
 Errors in formatting (particularly indenting) are rife, and make it
 difficult to follow the structure of entries, or the book as a whole. 
 Bold text sometimes means that the term is another entry, but
 sometimes it doesn't seem to mean anything.  Sometimes the formatting
 problem might explain entries that appear to be out of place, but I'm
 not sure that they explain the sequential listings of Autopsy,
 Authorization, and Auto Dial-Back.
 
 There are numerous typographical errors, mistakes in spelling and
 grammar, and tremendous inconsistencies in capitalization.  Even the
 most cursory copy and style edit would have improved things
 enormously.
 
 The security community and industry deserves better than this. 
 Students of security need more accurate information than is provided
 in this work.  Society as a whole is relying on information security
 and requires more credible content than this book contains.
 
 copyright Robert M. Slade, 2004   BKINSCDI.RVW   20041222
 
 
 ======================  (quote inserted randomly by Pegasus Mailer)
 rslade@vcn.bc.ca      slade@victoria.tc.ca      rslade@sun.soci.niu.edu
 Mike: I swear, you must think you're some kind of god.
 Pitr: God, root, what is difference?
    http://www.userfriendly.org/cartoons/archives/98nov/19981111.html
 http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev    or    http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade
 
 
 
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