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| Subject: | Re: [CISSP-D] Control types? |
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| Date: | Mon, 29 Nov 2004 22:02:45 -0800 |
On Nov 29, 2004, at 19:57, Alberto Rivai wrote:
I think we should understand the goals of each control methods -- Preventive : Avoid occurrence Detective : Identify occurrence Corective : Remedy circumstances, restore control Deterrent : Discourage violations Recovery : restore resources, capabilities Compensating : alternative control Fire suppression is preventive because it lessen the damage from the fire. Although fire suppression takes place after the fire happened, it fits the objective of control as countermeasure,which is to minimize the risk to an acceptable level for the organization. There are no definitive guides to those types of controls, because each method can be part of other control types.
Thanks, that's helpful - in my words, fire suppression systems prevent/limit the extent of the loss. Got it.
For the ARO value the range can be from 0 which is never to 1 which is always. If a virus attacks happens all the time in a company, then the ARO value for a virus attacks is 1. What does it means? It means the the value of a safeguards you should put in the company per year is the same as the value of the SLE itself. Example: Assest value for a file server is $100,000 Exposure factor for the file server 50 % Then the SLE : 50% * $100,000 == $50,000 To calculate ALE == ARO * SLE If the ARO == 1 then the ALE == 1 * $50,000 == $50,000 It means you should spend $50,000 or less per year for the countermeasure to be efficient.
This still seems wrong to me. Take your file server example, and assume that we're talking about, say, a RAM failure. Say this actually occurs an average of once a year. Punching the numbers: Value is $100,000 (pricey server!) EF is 50% SLE is $50,000 ARO is 1 ALE = 1 * $50,000 = $50,000 Check. NOW say that for server B, the actual rate of incident of RAM failure is once every three months. Per your perspective, the above calculation is identical. The conclusion is that your ALE can never be greater than your SLE, and that replacing that RAM four times during the year (avg.) cost you exactly the same amount in loss or mitigation as replacing it once per year. My perspective is that ARO for the second scenario should be 4. Run the numbers again: Value is $100,000 (too much for a server with crappy RAM!) EF is 50% SLE is $50,000 ARO is 4 ALE = 4 * $50,000 = $200,000 Now you have a accurate reflection of the loss expectancy - the server that fails four times a year is going to cost you (or is worth paying to avoid) four times as much as the server that fails only once. The *probability* that each server will fail during a year is, indeed, 1. The *frequency* expectation that the server will fail is 1 for the first server, and 4 for the second. I thought ARO was about frequency (annualized RATE of occurrence), not probability (annualized likelihood that ANY failure will occur)? Ok, finally, y'all have driven me to look up the ISC2 definition of ARO: "This term characterizes, on an annualized basis, the frequency with which a threat is expected to occur. For example, a threat occurring once in ten years has an ARO of 1/10 or 0.1; a threat occurring 50 times in a given year has an ARO of 50.0. The possible range of frequency values is from 0.0 (the threat is not expected to occur) to some whole number whose magnitude depends on the type and population of threat sources. For example, the upper value could exceed 100,000 events per year for minor, frequently experienced threats such as misuse of resources..." "It is useful to note here that many confuse ARO or frequency with the term and concept of probability (defined below). While the statistical and mathematical significance of these metrics tend to converge at about 1/100 and become essentially indistinguishable below that level of frequency or probability, they become increasingly divergent above 1/100, to the point where probability stops -- at 1.0 or certainty -- and frequency continues to mount undeterred, by definition." So they said it better than I did. ;) I'm gonna make the call that the Meyers book is wrong. Actually, so is ISC2, because there's no reason to think that the ARO will ever be a "whole number", but I get their drift. KeS ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> $9.95 domain names from Yahoo!. Register anything. http://us.click.yahoo.com/J8kdrA/y20IAA/yQLSAA/kgFolB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/CISSP-Discuss/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: CISSP-Discuss-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
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