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Network Security Bugtraq
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Google Talk cleartext credentials in process memory

Subject: Google Talk cleartext credentials in process memory
Date: 28 Nov 2005 13:42:22 -0000
Title: Google Talk Beta Messenger cleartext credentials in process memory

Affected versions: 1.0.0.64 (this version is believed to be the first one 
released to the public)

Vendor contacted: 25/08/05

Patched version released: 29/08/05

Advisory released: 28/11/05

Author: pagvac (Adrian Pastor)

Homepage: www.ikwt.com - In Knowledge We Trust

Advisory URL: 
www.adrianpv.com/projects/google-talk-cleartext-credentials-in-process-memory.txt



Description

Google Talk stores all user credentials (username and password) in clear-text 
in the process memory. Such vulnerability was found on August 25, 2005 (two 
days after the release of Google Talk) and has already been patched by Google.

This issue would occur regardless of whether the "Save Password" feature was 
enabled or not.

It was noticed that the Google Talk client was loading all the credentials 
unencrypted in the memory of the process "googletalk.exe". It was possible to 
recover the password by dumping the process memory to a file with PMDump and 
which could then examined with a hex editor.

The vulnerability would allow anyone with access to the client system to obtain 
the username and password of the current user. This vulnerability could also be 
exploited by fooling the user to execute malicious code which would dump the 
memory of the process "googletalk.exe" and then parse the credentials and 
finally send them to the attacker.  

It is also worth mentioning that sometimes, no direct user interaction is 
required for the execution of malicious code. Crackers often exploit 
vulnerabilities in web browsers and email clients that allow them to execute 
malicious code on the victim's machine without requiring the victim to manually 
execute the trojaned executable. This means that given the right scenario, this 
vulnerability could have been exploited in such a way.



References

PMDump - http://ntsecurity.nu/toolbox/pmdump/
Free Hex Editor - http://www.chmaas.handshake.de/delphi/freeware/xvi32/xvi32.htm
Google Talk - http://www.google.com/talk/

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