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| Subject: | RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes |
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| Date: | Wed, 22 Sep 2004 15:18:41 -0400 |
It seems these devices are illegally deployed, regardless. They're not upheld to the same Information Assurance requirements necessitated for other governmental information technologies, including FIPS140-2 and Common Criteria. Instead, these electronic voting systems have been "approved" by unnamed, unsupervised third parties with vested interests in these systems being deployed. It's absurd. -----Original Message----- From: Jaeson Schultz [mailto:jaeson@jaeson.net] Sent: Wednesday, September 22, 2004 12:33 PM To: pressinfo@diebold.com; bugtraq@securityfocus.com Subject: RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes How about providing the source code so we can see for ourselves? Shouln't the machines used for elections in a democracy such as The United States of America be open to such review? Just because you refute the existence, doesn't mean that the "back doors" or "hidden codes" aren't there. Only the source code can prove that. Why should we just take your word for it? ~Jaeson Schultz -----Original Message----- From: pressinfo@diebold.com [mailto:pressinfo@diebold.com] Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 2004 8:05 AM To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com Subject: Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes In-Reply-To: <20040831203815.13871.qmail@www.securityfocus.com> Diebold strongly refutes the existence of any "back doors" or "hidden codes" in its GEMS software. These inaccurate allegations appear to stem from those not familiar with the product, misunderstanding the purpose of legitimate structures in the database. These structures are well documented and have been reviewed (including at a source code level) by independent testing authorities as required by federal election regulations. In addition to the facts stated above, a paper and an electronic record of all cast ballots are retrieved from each individual voting machine following an election. The results from each individual machine are then tabulated, and thoroughly audited during the standard election canvass process. Once the audit is complete, the official winners are announced. Any alleged changes to a vote count in the election management software would be immediately discovered during this audit process, as this total would not match the true official total tabulated from each machine.
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